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INTRODUCTION
"Rhetoric, " contended A ristotle , "is an offshoot of d ia lec t ic
and a lso  o f  eth ical s t u d ie s . "  ^ From the time o f this statement until
2
the present, the relationship  o f d ia lec t ic  and lo g ic  to rhetoric has  
been one o f the central i s s u e s  in debates over rhetorical theory. The 
two arts or s c ie n c e s ,  a s  different theorists c la s s i f y  them, have variously  
been perceived a s  the open hand and the c lo se d  f is t  o f  the same body, 
a s  parent and offspring, and a s  mutually e x c lu s iv e  c a te g o r ie s .  With 
each new view  o f  this relationsh ip , fundamental changes have taken 
place in rhetorical theory.
What is  true of the disputed p lace o f  lo g ic  in rhetoric i s  a lso  
true of the relation of e th ic s  to its  offshoot. Some have regarded
^Aristotle's Rhetoric and P o e t ic , trans, W. Rhys Roberts (New 
York; Modern Library, 1954), 1356^^
2
The distinction betw een log ic  and d ia lec t ic  which w as  clear  
in the works of Aristotle seem s to have become blurred in rhetorical 
theory s in ce  his tim e. In fact, references to "dialectic" in both the 
f ie ld s  of rhetoric and philosophy are re la t ive ly  infrequent in current 
literature.
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rhetor ic  a s  am ora l ,  and o t h e r s  h a v e  argued  that  i t s  s o l e  purpose  i s  to 
e n a b l e  o n e  to d i s c o v e r  the "good and  to i n f l u e n c e  o t h e r s  in the d i r e c t io n  
o f  truth and j u s t i c e .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  of  both  l o g i c  and  e t h i c s  to 
rhetor ic  s e e m s  to vary  wi th  the g e n e r a l  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  the  
rhe tor ic ian  who i s  s p e a k i n g .
Perhaps the r e a s o n  for th is  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  tha t  A r i s to t l e  a p p r o a c h e d  
the s tudy  of  rhe tor ic  from the p h i l o s o p h e r ' s  po int  o f  v i e w  and c o u ld  
c a t e g o r i z e  it in r e la t io n  to a l o g i c a l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  v i e w  o f  a l l  known  
f i e l d s  of  k n o w l e d g e ,  and h i s  f o l l o w e r s  c o u ld  not .  To him, l o g i c  w a s  
the method of s c i e n c e ,  d i a l e c t i c  the method o f  s o l v i n g  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
p r o b le m s ,  e t h i c s  "the s c i e n c e  d e a l i n g  w i th  i n d iv id u a l  c o n d u c t ,  " w h ic h  
" s h a d e s  o f f  into P o l i t i c s  (a broader s u b j e c t ) ,  w h ic h  d e a l s  w i th  the  
c o n d u c t  and a c t i v i t i e s  of 'ren in g r o u p s ,  and  r h e tor ic  the d i s c o v e r y  
of the a v a i l a b l e  m e a n s  of p e r s u a s i o n  to be u s e d  wi th  popular a u d i e n c e s .  
In much of  the p a s t  and  p r e s e n t  d e b a t e s  over  th e  p l a c e  o f  r e a s o n  and  
e t h i c s  in r h e tor ic ,  no such  o v e r a l l  und er s tan d in g  i s  p r e s e n t .
3
Everett  Lee Plunt , "Plato and  A r i s to t l e  on  Rhetor ic  and  
R h e t o r i c i a n s , " S t u d i e s  in Rhetor ic  and Publi c  S p e a k in g  in Honor o f  
Tames A . W in a n s  (New Tork: C entury  C o .  , 192 5 ) ,  52 .
4
Ralph T. Eubanks and Virgil  L. Baker,  "Toward an A x i o l o g y  of  
R h eto r ic ,"  Quarterly  Tournai of  S p e e c h , Xl.VHl (April, 1962 ) ,  162.
5
Exp lanatory note  in The Rhetoric  of A r i s t o t l e , t rans .  W n e  C o o p e r  
(New York: D. A p p le t o n - C e n t u r y  C o  . , 1 9 3 / ) ,  5.
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The purpose o f  th is  study is  to su g g est  that a group of 
contemporary philosophers have developed  a method o f a n a ly s is  which  
should help rhetoricians clarify th ese  rela tionsh ips and that th ese  
p rofessional philosophers have produced co n c lu s io n s  which should be 
of value to rhetorical theory.
The philosophers in question are not members of a particular 
school nor do they a ll  share the same c o n c lu s io n s .  ^ They do, however, 
seem to agree on the nature and purpose of philosophy and share a 
similar methodology. For purposes of th is  study they w il l  be referred 
to as  "analytic philosophers" in general and "functional analysts"  in
7
particular.
In a study of th is  nature to examine a l l  of the works of the men 
who comprise th is  group would be im p o ss ib le .  A general examination  
of the origin, method, and inclination o f the a n a ly s ts  coupled with a 
detailed  study of the works of one of its  representatives  would, however, 
be p o ss ib le  and productive. Therefore, th is  study w ill  explore analytic
6
This v iew  is  developed in Gilbert R yle’s "Taking Sides in 
Philosophy,"  P h ilosophy. XII (July, 1937), 3 17 -32 , and Stephen 
Toulmin's "Logical Positiv ism  and After or Back to Aristotle, " 
U n iversit ies  Quarterly. XI (August, 1957), 3 3 5 -4 7 ,
The term "analytic philosophy" is  an extremely broad one and 
d efie s  brief and precise  defin ition . A working defin ition for the purpose 
of rhetorical a n a ly s is  w ill  be one of the g o a ls  o f  the sec tion  of this 
study devoted to the history and method of ph ilosophical a n a ly s is .
Within the larger family of analytic  philosophy one branch, "linguistic"  
or "functional" a n a ly s is ,  w ill be em phasized.
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philosophy in general and the works of Stephen Toulmin in particular in 
an attempt to d iscover  a new way o f view ing the relationship  of log ic  
and e th ic s  to the f ie ld  of rhetoric.
Two reason s  lead to the ch o ice  o f  Professor Toulmin. First, two
Q
of his works, i . e . .  The U se s  of Argument and ^  Examination of the
9
place of Reason in E th ic s , seem to apply more d irectly  to the problem
at hand than do th ose  of h is c o l le a g u e s .  Second, a pattern which he
developed for the "layout of argument" has already been adjudged
valuable  by some rhetorical th eor ists .
Throughout th is  study, the point of departure w ill  be rhetorical.
The student of philosophy would probably w ish  to go into great deta il  in
an examination of various primary sources  in analytic  philosophy, such
11 12a s  those  of W ittgen ste in  and Moore, and to make value judgments
0
(Cambridge: University P ress , 1958).
Q
(Cambridge: University Press, 1950).
10
See Wayne Brockriede and D ouglas Ehninger, "Toulmin on 
Argument: An Interpretation and Application, " Quarterly Tournai of  
S p eech , XLVI (February, 1960), 44-53; Austin J Freeley, Argu­
mentation and D eb ate ; Rational D ec is io n  Making (San Francisco: 
Wadsworth Publishing Co , 1961), 115-18; and Halbert E. G ulley ,  
D is c u s s io n , C o n feren ce . and Group Process (New York; Henry Holt 
and C o. , 1960), 160 -62 .
 ^^Ludwig W ittgenstein , Tracta tu s L ogico-P hilosophions (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, L td ., 1922).
12
George Edward Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: University  
P ress, 1903),
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regarding the differences of opinion among the various exponents of  
analytic  philosophy^ Time and the purpose of  th is  study do not, 
however, a llow  for such an exhaustive  a n a ly s is  of the finer points of  
analytic  philosophy. For th is  reason , only  a general history and summary 
of the methods and co n c lu s io n s  of this movement taken from qualified  
secondary sources w il l  be presented a s  an introduction to the sp ec if ic  
v iew s  of Stephen Toulmin.
Perhaps the most productive of th ese  sources are The Revolution
11
in Philosophy, edited by A. J. Ayer; English Philosophy Since 1900, 
by G. J. Warnock;^^ Language. L o g ic . and G od , by Frederick Ferre'; 
and J. O. Urmson's Philosophical Ana l ys i s . I n  addition to th es e ,  
numerous books and a r t ic les  deal d irectly  with various a sp e c ts  of  
contemporary analytic  theory.
In order to e s ta b lish  a comprehensive v iew  of Toulmin's theories  
on lo g ic  and e th ic s ,  the second sec tion  of th is  study i s  devoted to an 
examination of his writings on sc ie n t if ic ,  e th ica l ,  and ordinary reasoning.  
Each of h is  major works on th ese  top ics  w il l  be d is c u s se d  and their inter­
relationships e s ta b lish ed .
13 (London; Macmillan and Go. , 1956).
^^(London; Oxford University Press, 1958). 
^^(NewYork; Harper and Brothers, 1961). 
(Oxford: University Press, 1956).
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The final sec t io n  of this study is  devoted to an a n a ly s is  o f  the
value of Toulmin's observations on lo g ic  and e th ics  to the f ie ld  of
rhetoric and, ind irectly , to the potential value o f  functional a n a ly s is
to the rhetorician. In evaluating Toulmin's contributions, a number
of stud ies  from both philosophy and sp eech  have been o f v a lu e .
In the February, 1960, i s su e  of the Quarterly Tournai of Speech
an article  entitled  "Toulmin on Argument: An Interpretation and
Application, " by Wayne Brockriede and D ouglas Ehninger first empha-
17s ized  the importance o f Toulmin's work to rhetorical theory. The
authors amplified and extended Toulmin's model, showed its  workability,
and argued p ersu asive ly  that it w as superior to traditional w ays  of
18viewing argument. This work and others by the same authors are 
valuable to th is  study in connecting Toulmin's model and terminology  
to current argumentation theory, but they do not address th em se lves
either to the relation of log ic  and e th ic s  to rhetoric or to the b a s ic  ten ets
19
of analytic  philosophy.
17
XLVI, 4 4 -5 3 .
18
D ec is io n  by Debate (New York: Dodd, Mead and C o . ,  1963), 
and Wayne Brockriede, "A Standard for Judging Applied Logic in D ebate , " 
A.F.A. R egister . X (Spring, 1962), 10 -14 .
19
It appears, further, that no study either in the fie ld  of rhetoric 
or of philosophy has been undertaken which covers the same area a s  th is
- 7 ~
Although Professor Toulmin's ideas have rece ived  ser ious attention
20only from Brockriede and Ehninger within the f ie ld  o f  sp eech ,  a number 
of works by professional philosophers have been devoted to h is  writings
and are of value in judging his contributions. In particular, the
21 22 2 3crit ic ism s of his U s e s  o f  Argument by C asten ada , C o o ley ,  Scott,
and S i m o p o u l o s a s  w e ll  a s  those  of h is  Examination of the Place
d isserta tion . Bibliographical sources such as: J. Jeffery Auer (e d .) ,  
"Doctoral D isser ta tion s  in Speech: Work in Progress, " Speech  
Monographs (1959-62); Franklin H Knower (e d .) ,  "Graduate T heses  —
An Index o f  Graduate Work in Speech, " Speech Monographs (1935-1961);  
Franklin H. Knower (ed .)  Table o f  Contents of the 0 .  I .  S . , 1915-1948  
and S. M . . 1934-1948 (Columbia: U niversity o f  M issouri, Speech  
A ssocia tion  o f America, 1949); G ile s  W ilkeson Gray, (ed .)  Index to the 
Û - 1- S. (Dubuque, Iowa: William C . Brown C o . ,  1958); Lester Thons sen  
and Elizabeth Fatherson ( e d s . ) .  Bibliography o f  Speech Education (New  
York: H. W. W ilson  C o . , 1939); Lester Thonssen e t  a i .  (eds).
Bibliography of Speech Education Supplement: 1939-1948 (New York:
H. W. W ilson C o . , 1950); Arnold H. Trotier and Marian Harman ( e d s . ) .  
Doctoral D isser ta tio n s  Accepted American U n iv ers it ie s  (New York:
H. W. W ilson C o . ,  1955); and D issertation  Abstracts (Ann Arbor:
University  Microfilm, 1955-June 1963).
20
G ulley , op . c i t .  and Freeley, o p .c U .  both presented Toulmin's 
"layout o f  argument" briefly in their tex ts  but did not elaborate on it.
21
H. N. C astaneda, "On a Proposed Revolution in Logic, "
Philosophy of S c ie n c e . XXVll (July, 1960), 2 7 9 -9 2 .
22
J. C . C oo ley , "On Mr. Toulmin's Revolution in L ogic ,"  Journal 
of Philosophy, LVl (March 26 , 1959), 2 9 7 -3 1 9 .
23
George Edward Scott, "The Formal and Informal Logics of M odality, " 
Unpublished P h .D . d isser ta tion . University of V irginia, 1961.
24
J. C . Simopoulos, Review of The U se s  of Argument by Stephen 
Toulmin, Hibbert Journal. LVII (October, 1958), 9 6 -9 8 .
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2 5of Reason in Ethics by John Rawls and others are helpful in exposing  
w e a k n e sse s  which e x is t  in Toulmin's writings.
D esp ite  th ese  w e a k n e sse s  and some lim itations on the a p p lica ­
b ility  of Toulmin's ideas  to rhetoric, the con c lu s ion s  of th is  study  
su ggest  that h is  observations about lo g ic ,  e th ic s ,  and argument are 
generally  c o n s is ten t  with the rhetorical tradition and valuable to the 
rhetorician of today. Further, th ese  con c lu s ion s  su g g est  that, b ecau se  
both the rhetorician and the practitioner of functional a n a ly s is  are 
concerned with common reasoning, common language, and commonly
held eth ica l standards, the works o f  other functional a n a ly sts  are
2 Aworthy of further study.
25
Philosophical R eview , LX (October, 1951), 5 7 2 -8 0 .
26
The potential value of analytic  philosophy to rhetoric is  suggested  
indirectly in Morton W hite's  "New Horizons in Philosophy," Central 
States Speech Journal. XII (Spring, 1961), 188-96 .
CHAPTER I
THE RE’v^OLUTION IN PHILOSOPHY: A CONTEXT 
FOR THE STUDY OF TOULMIN'S WORKS
A useful analogy may be drawn betw een recent developm ents in 
rhetoric and philosophy. Both f ie ld s  b oast an ancient heritage and 
can recall a more glorious past when many of the present academ ic  
d isc ip l in es  were unknown. Yet the r ise  of new fie ld s  of knowledge  
has had a great impact on both rhetoric and philosophy. Aristotle, 
a s  a rhetorician, could a d v ise  the speaker who would face  a live  
audience to appeal to the m otives of men a s  He  described them from a 
com m on-sense  point of v iew . Today, the speaker often communicates  
with a mass audience which he cannot s e e  and r e l ie s ,  not on common- 
sen se  ideas of m otives , but on the co n c lu s io n s  of the so c ia l  
p sych o log is t  regarding sources  of "hidden persuasion" which are a 
matter of empirical study.
In Aristotle 's  day, too, questions about how man thinks and 
how he should think, how man behaves  and should behave, obviou sly ,  
were the province of the philosopher. Today, however, the p sych o lo ­
g is t ,  the so c io lo g is t ,  the politica l s c ie n t is t ,  and a host of others 
would claim at le a s t  a part of th is  territory. What, then, is the
- 9 -
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s p e c i â l  s u b j e c t  matter ot  p h i l o s o p h y ?
The a n s w e r  to t h i s  q u e s t i o n  i s  not  o n l y  r e l e v a n t  to the problem  
of the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  of l o g i c ,  e t h i c s ,  and rhetor ic  but  h a s  b e e n  a 
c h i e f  c o n c e r n  o f  the p r o f e s s i o n a l  p h i l o s o p h e r s  during the l a s t  half  
centu ry  a s  w e l l .  In f a c t ,  the "revolution"  that  h as  tak e n  p l a c e  in 
c ontem porary  p h i l o s o p h y  h a s  b e e n  a r e s u l t  o i  a r e d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the  
tunrtion  and s c o p e  of  p h i l o s o p h y  in r e a c t io n  to the c h a l l e n g e  o f  o ther  
d i s c i p l i n e s .
Th is  r e v o l u t i o n ,  if s uch  i s  the  proper term,  ^ n e i ther  took  p l a c e  
s u d d e n ly  nor i n v o l v e d  a l l  s c h o o l s  o f  p h i l o s o p h y ,  and i t s  p a r t i c ip a n t s  
ne i ther  a g r e e d  wi th  e a c h  other  nor d e s c r i b e d  it in the s am e  w a y .
ITirther , s i n c e  many of t h o s e  who par t i c i p a t e d  in the u p h e a v a l  are s t i l l  
a c t i v e l y  e n g a g e d  in p h i l o s o p h i c a l  writ ing  and r e s h a p in g  their  v i e w s ,  
we arc probably too c l o s e  to it in point  of t ime to s e e  the c h a n g e  in i t s  
true p e r s p e c t i v e .  H o w e v e r ,  a brief  h i s t o r i c a l  r e v i e w  o f  the r e c e n t  
a t te m p ts  ot s o m e  p n o i e s s i o n a l  ph i losop her  s to find a new purpose  and  
method lor p h i l o s o p h y  should  at  l e a s t  provide a frame of r e f e r e n c e  from 
which  to approaci i  tiie problem of t h i s  s tu d y .
1
The teir'i "i e vo l u t i on"  i s  a common do  sc :  ipt ion for the c h a n g e s  
whIt It took phu e 111 1/ii 1 'o.miphy af ter  19IH'. f'm s v i e w  i s  w e l l  e x p r e s s e d  
l y A .  I. Ayer ( e d . ) ,  Tm Kevol ut ion in I d i i l o s o p h y (London; Ma c mi l l an  
a U'l (3o.  , lyiif)}.  S: ume doubt ,  h o w e v e r ,  abo ut  the prop: i e t y  of  this  
t e r m  i s  e x p r e s s e d  by (d . 1. War noc k ,  Knu li sh IHii l o s o p h y  S i n c e  IÜUÜ 
(London,  Oxford Hnivm s i t y  Press  , ItJhH), U>0-73 .
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Philosophy at the Turn of the Century
At the beginning of th is  century philosophy p assed  through a
rapid period of developm ent in which new and important figures emerged
to ch a llen ge  its  prevailing v iew . The general movement they began
2
has been ca lled  "analytical philosophy, " "The center of the new  
movement w as England, and more particularly, Cambridge, and its
3
leaders were Moore, R u sse ll ,  and W ittgen ste in . " Although th ese  
men were the m ost important to the direction of early tw entieth-century  
philosophy, it  is  more convenient to consider  certain movements with  
which they  were involved  than to reconstruct the v iew s  o f each in turn. 
For, in the c a s e  o f  both R usse ll  and W ittgen ste in , the id ea s  they  
started early in their careers were maintained by loya l fo llow ers even  
after each had changed his  original p os it io n . The ch ie f  movements  
in an alytica l philosophy with which the three were a s so c ia te d  were  
Common Sense Philosophy, Logical Atomism, and Logical Positiv ism  
(or Logical Empiricism). Elements of th ese  combined into the major
2
For a particularly good d is c u s s io n  of this point, and one praised  
by Toulmin, see  the e s s a y  by John H ollow ay, "Analytical Philosophy, " 
The New OuUine of Modern Knowledge, e d . Alan Pryce-Jones (New  
York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), 19.
3
D. F. Pears, "Logical Atomism: R ussell  and W ittgen ste in , "
The Revolution in Philosophy. 41.
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Philosophy developed into a separate academ ic subject, detached from 
c la s s i c a l  sch olarsh ip , th eo logy , econ om ics , and fin a lly  from p sych o logy .  
The teachers o f  philosophy of a university  came to constitu te  a facu lty ,  
and they  organized their own d is c u s s io n  groups. The professional  
quarterly journal. Mind, w as e s ta b lish ed  in 1876, and soon thereafter  
the Aristotelian S ociety  w as formed. Papers were read and d is c u s s e d  
at the m eetings of the S ociety  and subsequently  printed in i t s  annual 
proceedings. Ryle contrasted th is situation with an earlier time a s  
follows:
Where M ill, H uxley, and L eslie  Stephen had published their 
professional a r t ic le s  in the ordinary R ev iew s, Bradley, Moore, 
and R u sse ll  published theirs in the p h ilo sop h ers’ profession al  
organ or in the Proceedings o f  the philosophers' metropolitan  
forum. This new professional practice of submitting problems 
and arguments to the expert crit icism  o f fe llow  craftsmen led  to 
a growing concern with q u estion s  of ph ilosophical technique and 
a growing p ass ion  for ratiocinative  rigour. . . .
C onseq uently  the moment could not be long delayed  when  
philosophers would ch a llen ge  one another, and be ch a llen ged  by 
their new academ ic c o l le a g u e s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  the natural s c i e n t i s t s ,  
to state  unequivocally  what sort of an enquiry philosophy w as  and 
what were the canons of its sp e c ia l  methods.®
The answer to this ch a llen ge  to demonstrate a purpose for 
philosophy is  the history of recent an a ly tica l philosophy, a brief review  
of which w ill  comprise the bulk of this chapter; yet a ca p su le  statem ent  
of the answer by Frederick Ferré may be usefu l in introducing the more
^ Ib id . , 3 -4 .
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deta iled  answ er.
Philosophy's  method, appropriate to i t s  own g o a ls ,  must be 
a n a ly s i s . S y n th es is ,  or putting together, might have been  a 
p o ss ib le  method for philosophers who imagined th em se lves  to 
have some sort of s e l f - s u b s is t e n t ,  empirical subject matter, 
but the new understanding o f the object of ph ilosophical  
concern elim inated that method. Meaningful statem ents are 
(by definition) already u n it ie s .  Only the method of picking 
apart, or a n a ly s is ,  would be app licab le  to this subject matter. 
We shall find various interpretations o f  the proper analytica l  
procedure when we d istin gu ish  d ifferences  within the larger 
"family" of l in g u is t ic  philosophy; at the moment we are so le ly  
concerned with their agreem en ts . And here, without doubt, 
w as a firm platform of unanimity; the function of philosophy  
i s  to engage in a n a ly s is  o f  the eaning o f lan gu age . ^
Bradley and Absolute Idealism
The term "revolution" im plies an attack upon the status guo or, 
to u se  a more philosophica l descr ip tion , a th e s is  overcome by its  
a n t i th e s is .  Against what kind of philosophy w as the revolution
8
directed? First, it w as "highly and am bitiously m eta p h y sica l . "
It attempted to e s ta b lish  striking and important co n c lu s io n s  about the 
universe a s  a w hole , about R eality, not in some superficia l or limited  
a s p e c t ,  but in its  ultimate nature. "The philosopher's concern with  
'the whole'" w a s ,  a s  Warnock described it .
7
Language, L og ic , and God (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1961), 5 -6 .
8
Warnock, ojp. c i t . ,  3.
>
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. , . constantly  and powerfully contrasted with the merely partial 
or fragmentary in terests  of other d isc ip lin es ;  his endeavour to 
arrive at really  "ultimate" truths w as d istinguished  from, say ,  
sc ien t if ic  attempts to e s ta b lish  propositions that would serve for 
some non-ultim ate purpose, or to sa t is fy  some more or l e s s  arbitrary 
or provisional standard. It w as held that what p assed  for truths in 
the world, or in the laboratory, were . . . somehow unsatisfactory  - -  
that for the philosopher there w as  not o n l^  something more, but 
a lso  something very different to be sa id .
Ultimate rea lity  w as  to be found in the philosophy of Absolute
Idealism or "Hegelianism modified by Anglo-Saxon caution . H egel
held that the universe rev ea ls  the workings, the developm ent, the
rea liza tion , and the unfolding of a World Spirit or Absolute Idea.
Morton White summarizes H eg e l 's  conception  of the Absolute a s  follows;
On his v iew  the universe is  not unlike an animate being that has  
a sou l, d e s ir e s ,  a im s, in ten tions, and g o a ls .  The universe is  
spiritual; it has direction; and the explanation of ordinary fa c ts ,  
human a c t io n s ,  h is tor ica l ch a n g es ,  and institu tion s  may be  
grasped once w e recogn ize  how they are imbedded in th is  cosm ic  
organism, how they are directed by the cunning of the Absolute, 
how they play their part in the U niverse 's  progressive rea lization  
of the World Spirit.
The most influential of the British id e a l is t s  who added Anglo-  
Saxon caution to the reassertion  o f H eg e l 's  doctrines w as F. H.
^Ib id .
^^Ibid. H eg e l 's  v iew s  are worth noting at this point b eca u se  they  
served as  the b a s is  for the dominant strain in British philosophy aga in st  
which Moore, R u sse ll ,  and W ittgenstein  reacted and b eca u se  "almost 
every important ph ilosophical movement o f  the twentieth century begins  
with an attack on h is  v i e w s . " Morton W h ite , The Age of A nalysis  
(New York: The New American Library, 1955), 13.
^^bid . , 13 -14 .
“ 16"
Bradley. He w as not only the ch ief  spokesman for and the "most 
12powerful mind" among the group but w as a lso  a major influence upon 
the thinking of the young Moore and R usse ll  and later the ch ie f  subject  
of their attack .
Bradley w as opposed to the traditional British empiricism of
Locke, Hume, and M ill,  which he fe lt  fa iled to d is tin gu ish  adequately
"between qu estion s  concerning the meanings of propositions and those
13
concerning their g e n e s i s .  " Here, Bradley w as  probably on safe  
ground and even  Moore, R u sse l l ,  and W ittgenstein  agreed on th is  po>int. 
But the v iew  of philosophy which Bradley would substitute  for the 
traditional empiricism w as a lm ost the opposite  of that supported by 
the later analytic  group.
He attempted to show that the meaning of any proposition which  
purports to state that something exh ib its  a certain quality constantly  
breaks down into an e n d le s s  s er ie s  o f  other propositions in which the 
original subject of d is c u s s io n  c e a s e s  utterly to appear a s  a d is t in ct  
object o f  thought. He rejected  Hume's th e s is  that id eas  are "copies"  
o f  d is tin ct and original im p ression s, which at b e s t  are "loosely"
12
Henry D. Aiken, The Rise of Analytical Philosophy in England, 
Vol. II o f  Philosophy ^  the Twentieth Century, ed . William Barrett and 
Henry D. Aiken, 4 v o l s .  (New York: Random H ouse, 1962), 464.
13
Ib id .
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14connected by natural a s so c ia t io n  with another. He a lso  tried to
show how poin tless  is  a theory of truth which judges the truth of any
proposition by its  "correspondence" to a d istinct object in a world
independent of exp er ien ce .  He fe lt that what philosophers ca ll
"appearances" cannot va lid ly  be measured by
. . . their correspondence to an external reality  to which we 
have no independent a c c e s s ,  but only by their coherence with  
other appearances within an infin ite ly  extendable . . . system  
of in fin itely  complex "internal" relations within which c lea r -cu t ,  
unambiguous ideas are im possib le  to find. There w a s ,  in 
conseq uence, an elem ent of deep ph ilosophical skeptic ism  in 
Bradley's thought, and while he pass ion ate ly  b e lieved  in the 
reality of the Absolute, which is  the ultimate subject matter of 
all thought, he w as doubtful of the adequacy of any human idea 
of i t . l 3
As a resu lt , the Anglo-Saxon caution which Bradley added to 
Hegelian doctrine functioned as  a preoccupation with problems of log ic  
and meaning, which he fe lt the empirical tradition had ignored. This 
produced, among others, two d istin ct e lem en ts , "both of which were in 
flagrant contradiction to accepted  English ideas: that is  to say , the 
separation of log ic  and philosophy from psychology, and monism, the 
theory that Reality is  an ind iv is ib le  w hole . " In Bradley's v iew  
there w as a clear connection between the two th ese s  in spite  of the
14 15
Ibid. Ibid .
16
R. A. W cllheim, "F. H. Bradley," The Revolution in 
Philosophy. 13.
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fact that subsequent philosophers have a lm ost un iversally  subscribed to
17the former th es is  and a ll  have unanimously d is sen ted  from the latter.
To put the matter somewhat differently, Bradley both participated in the
revolution and provided the th e s is  which it attacked .
This th es is  w as not so much one which developed  a ser ies  of
dogma a s  it was a general ph ilosophical d isp o s it io n . It was an
attempt to relate the world to a central concept which would organize
a ll  attitudes and b e l ie f s .  This tendency to regard the proper role of
philosophy as synoptic se t  Bradley apart from his stud en ts. He sought
to explain  all thought and action in relation to a central construct.
His opponents fe lt  that philosophers should attack lim ited, particular
problems by the method of a n a ly s is .  This difference in approach led
Morton White to state that "the history of philosophy in the twentieth
century is  a history of hedgehogs and fo x e s ,  a history of philosophers
who strive to know one big thing and those  who are content to know
18many little  th ings, or indeed one lit t le  th ing . "
17
Ibid.
18
White, o£ . _cit. , 1 8 .  This analogy is  taken from the works of 
the Greek poet Archilochus and from Isaiah Berlin's study of T olstoi,  
entitled The Hedgehog and The Fox. It is  an a llu sion  In frequent use  
by Stephen Toulmin and his c r it ic s .  In particular, note the debate  
between Toulmin, "Logical Positivism  and After or Back to A ristotle , " 
U niversit ies  Quarterly, XI (August, 1957), 3 3 5 -4 7 ,  and Ernest Gellner, 
"Logical Positivism  and After or The Spurious Fox, " U niversit ies  Quarterly, 
XI (August, 1957), 3 4 8 -6 7 .
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Bradley and the other British id e a l is ts  were led to claim that the 
actual world of sc ie n c e  and common sen se  is  i t s e l f  only  an appearance  
of the perfect ideal rea lity , "the Absolute, " and that our ordinary per­
ceptions and judgments are imperfect, partial g lim pses  of what is  
19
id ea lly  "there. " In short, the id e a l is ts  tended to blur the d istinction
between facts  and va lu e , betw een what is  and what ought to b e .  Yet
upon this d istinction  depended their own defense  of the e s se n t ia l ly
spiritual aim of m etaphysics . "Because of th is ,  " Aiken contends,
"they were subject to the charge, which w as shortly to be made with
such devastating e ffect  by Moore and R u sse ll ,  that th ey  th em se lves
were incurably m uddle-headed, that their log ic  (what must be) w as
faulty; their conception of reality  (what there i s ) ,  paradoxical and
sentimental; and their e th ic s  (what ought to be), confu sed , complacent,
2 0and strangely grubby. "
The Revolution of Analytical Philosophy
21
'"Moore and R ussell' — the conjunction is  in ev ita b le ."  They 
were leaders in the early s ta g es  of the revolt aga in st  Bradley, helped  
shape one another's id e a s ,  and are often considered together in
19 20
Aiken, o £ .  c i t . , 465. Ibid.
2 1John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (London; 
Gerald Duckworth and C o . , L td., 1957), 203 .
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histories  of contemporary philosophy. However, for purposes of this  
study they w ill  be considered separately and in a s so c ia t io n  with the 
movements with which they are identified .
G. E. Moore and Common Sense Philosophy
One should begin the historical sketch o f the revolution by
considering a man who w as a movement by h im se lf .  For, as  C . D .
Broad observed, "Professor Moore, whom I treated as  in a c la s s  by
h im self, has undoubtedly had a greater influence than any other man
on English philosophy in general and Cambridge philosophy in particular
22during the la s t  fifty years . "
Perhaps one reason why Professor Moore should be considered
by h im self, according to C J. Warnock, is  that Moore's character and
not his sp ec if ic  id eas  contributed to the decay of Absolute Idealism .
For it w as not s o le ly  by reason of h is  in te llectu a l g ifts  that 
Moore differed so greatly from his immediate p red ecessors ,  
or influenced so powerfully his own contemporaries. . . .  It
22
"The Local Historical Background of Contemporary Cambridge 
Philosophy, " British Philosophy in M id-Century, ed. C . A .  Mace 
(London; George Allen and Unwin Ltd. , 1957), 50. Broad u se s  the 
phrase "in a c la s s  by himself" in the context o f  being the only person 
who belongs to one of the s ix  c la s s e s  of philosophers which he 
esta b lish es;  i. e . , "1) Logician s , 2) P sy ch o lo g is t-P h ilo so p h ers ,
3) Pure M eta p h y s ic ia n s , 4) M oralist-P h ilosop hers , 5) the c la s s  w hose  
only member is  Professor Moore, an d , 6) Logico-mathematical 
Philosophers . " Ib id . , 17.
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w as in point of character that he w as different, and importantly 
so .  He seem s to have been , in the first p la ce ,  entirely  without 
any of the m otives that tend to make a m etaphysician . He w as  
neither d iscontented  nor puzzled by the ordinary b e l ie f s  of plain  
men and plain s c ie n t is t s  . . . .  Secondly , he had the great force 
of character to r e s is t  the temptation to conform him self  with his  
environment . . . .  He did not borrow a modish m etaphysical  
idiom to make up for, or to c o n cea l ,  h is  own real lack  of re lish  
for any such th ing. And thirdly, he seem s never to have had the 
s l ig h te s t  d ifficu lty  . . .  in causing  h is  v iew s  to be taken ser iou s ly .  
It w as a lw ays c lear that h is  op in ions, however unorthodox or naive  
they may have been or^^ em ed, were not those of one who could  
sa fe ly  be disregarded.
The influence of M oore's character was spread, only  in part,
by his  w ritings . Although the ideas and sty le  of a n a ly s is  of a
number of h is  publications had a great impact upon his contemporaries,
he w as not a prolific writer and w as probably fully a s  influentia l a s  a
t e a c h e r . H e  "greatly influenced generations of Cambridge students
and teachers of philosophy by courses  of lectures  which he never
publisned, e . g .  on ph ilosophica l p sychology , and by h is  interventions
2 5in philosophical debate. "
23
O p. c i t . , 12-13 .
24
For an Interesting d isc u ss io n  of h is teaching methods and 
e f fe c t iv e n e s s  as a teacher see  G. A. Paul, "G. E. Moore: A n a ly s is ,  
Common Usag'", and Common S en se ,  " Revolution in_ Ph ilosophy,
69.
25
Broad, op. c i t . ,  5 1 -5 2 .
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Sources of Moore's Common 
Sense Philosophy
Moore came to Cambridge in 1892 to study c l a s s i c s  and had 
l it t le  interest in philosophy until Bertrand R usse ll  and others drew 
him into philosophical d is c u s s io n s ,  and then led him, at the end of  
his first year, to start reading philosophy. His concern with the 
subject did not, a s  R u sse ll 's ,  begin with any in terest in s c ie n c e .
"I do not think, " he wrote, "that the world or the s c ie n c e s  would  
ever have suggested  to me any philosophical problems. What has  
suggested  philosophical problems to me is  things which other
2 g
philosophers have said about the world and the s c ie n c e s .  "
In d is c u s s io n s  at Cambridge, he heard id eas  a sser ted  which
he could see  no suffic ient reason to b e l ie v e .  He tried to find out
on what grounds the a sser t io n s  were made and if, in fact, they had
any meaning. It appeared to him that h is  companions som etim es
27denied what every sane man knew quite w ell to be true. As a 
con seq u en ce , he w as gradually driven to the con c lu s ion  that an 
enormous amount of ph ilosophical writing w as "marred by h a s t in ess
26
Cited in The Philosophy of G. E. M oore. ed . Paul A, 
Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing C o. , 1952), 14.
27
Warnock, op. cU . , 13-14.
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and confusion  " which occurred b eca u se  philosophers tried to search  
for answ ers to qu estion s of seem ingly  great importance without
2 8considering e x a ct ly  what questions they were trying to answ er.
"They w ere , " as  Warnock ex p la in s ,
. , , l ia b le ,  too , to make one or two points in an argument, and 
forthwith to consider their whole question a s  c lo s e d .  But o ften ,  
even u su a lly ,  th ese  points could be shown to b e ,  entirely inadequate  
a s  grounds for the co n c lu s io n s  supp osed ly  based  on them . . . .  
"Reality, " for exam ple, "may be spiritual, for a l l  I know; and I 
devoutly  hope it i s .  " That opinion a t l e a s t  is  "truly interesting and 
important. " But one must rea lize  how very different the opinion is  
from what any ordinary person b e l ie v e s ;  how many propositions must 
be disproved and proved, before it  could p o ss ib ly  be said  to be 
estab lish ed ; what a v a s t  number of arguments must, therefore, be 
involved; and how remote we are, rea lly ,  from any position in which we  
would s e e  the doctrine to be true or, a lternative ly , f a l s e .
Such an approach had a profound e ffe c t  upon the Idealism of the 
1890's .  That the ordinary opin ions were d e fec tiv e  and that common 
ways of speaking were a lm ost a lw ays unsatisfactory  w as supposedly  
agreed by a ll ph ilosophers. For this reason , they fe lt  that new w ays  
of speaking and new opin ions about the world should be d e v is e d ,  "Moore 
struck in fact,  though perhaps unwittingly, a t  the very foundation of all  
the current philosophica l structures. He a sk ed , in e f fec t ,  why they were  
needed .
What Moore did w as to challenge  the philosophers o f  the day to 
accep t  the burden of proving that the opin ions o f  the common man were
28 29 30
Ibid. I b i d . . 15. I b id . ,  16.
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wrong. Some of the Id ea lis ts  supposed that time w as unreal. This,
31
Moore regarded a s  a "perfectly monstrous proposition. " If time is  
unreal, should we not deny that we have breakfast before we have
lunch? If Reality is  spiritual are not "chairs and tab les  . . .  far more
32like us than we think?" Rather than assum e that common b e l ie fs  
were probably m istaken, he was inclined to b e liev e  that they were 
quite true.
Here w as a combination of sim plicity  and d irectness  "with the
most remarkable powers of a n a ly s is  and crit ic ism . Often th is  has had
the e ffect  of the child in the fab le, who horrified the courtiers by piping
33out that the emperor w as in fact naked. "
Doctrines of Moore's Common 
Sense  Philosophy
In 1925 Moore published an artic le  ca lled  "ADefense of Common 
34
S en se .  " It begins with a l i s t  of what he c a l l s  "truisms, " for example,  
that he has a body, w as born a certain number of years ago , e tc .  He 
accom panies th ese  truisms with a flat denial that they are open to doubt
31
The Philosophy of G. E. M oore, op. c i t . . 14.
32 33
Ibid . Broad, op. c i t . ,  51,
34
In Contemporary British Philosophy (second ser ie s ) ,  ed. J. H. 
Muirhead (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. ,  1925).
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and a blunt assertion  that he knovvS every one of them to be true, that
is ,  "true not just in some emended form, or in some sp ec ia l usage of
the words employed; he meant by each of them p recise ly  what every
reader, in reading them w ill have understood him to mean, i .  e .  what
3 5they are ordinarily understood to e x p r e s s . "
Moore points out, however, that a great many philosophers  
have made assert ion s  incompatible with th ese  truism s. They have  
asserted  that there are no material things at a l l ,  that there e x is t  no 
other minds than their own, and in some c a s e s  they have used such  
words as  th ese  in such a way as  to contradict some or a ll  of h is  truisms. 
Yet th ese  people know that such truisms are, in fact, true. "For, " 
as Warnock sta tes  their argument, "even in their philosophical writings  
they have alluded to th em se lv es ,  and to other philosophers, or p o ss ib le  
readers, in such a way as  to reveal their knowledge of the ex is ten ce
of th em selves  and other people, and of the ordinary world in which they
3 fiand others were living."
So far the em phasis has been on Moore's general attack on 
Idealism and his defen se  of the notion that common b e lie fs  about 
certain proposiUons were to be regarded a s  true. This attack, however.
35
Paul ,  o p .  c i t .  , 6 3 .
36
Warnuok , _op. c i t .  , 18.
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i s  a rather negative a sp e c t  of his philosophy. Certainly, no brief
treatment of Moore's id eas  can begin to d is c u s s  a l l  the top ics  v/ith
which he dealt nor explain  fully even a s ign ifican t portion of them.
One general top ic, however, d eserv es  some sp ec ia l attention . This
37
is  Moore's d isc u ss io n  of e th ic s .
Here one must d istinguish  betw een the purely lo g ica l  a s p e c t s
of h is e th ica l theory and the ph ilosophical con c lu s ion s  which he draws
from his lo g ica l th e s e s  about the meaning of "good. " Aiken makes
this d istinction  a s  follows;
Now one of the most influential o f  M oore's v iew s  about the 
meaning of "good" was his contention that such statem ents  
as  "this is  good" or "this is  desirable" are not lo g ic a l ly  
reducible to such other statem ents a s  "this is  p leasant, " "this 
is  rational, " or even  "this is  c o n s is te n t .  " His main argument 
was quite simple: Of anything which is  p leasant, desired ,  
rational, c o n s is ten t ,  e t c . , we can a lw ays  ask  whether it rea lly  
is  good or des irab le . And the fact that we can s ign if ican tly  ask  
such questions plainly shows that "good" and "pleasant" or 
"desirable" and "desired" cannot mean the same thing.
Whether a ll p leasures are good i s ,  therefore, not a lo g ica l  but 
a moral question . Moore concluded that good n ess  is  an indefinable  
notion and that those  who attempt to define it are guilty  c f  what he
37
His Frincipia Ethica (Cambridge: University Press, 1903) 
contains most of h is v iew s  on th is  topic and is generally  regarded 
a s  h is  most important work.
38
Aiken, op. e f t . ,  4 7 1 -7 2 .
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3 9c a lled  "the naturalistic  fa l la cy ."  There i s ,  he a s se r ted ,  an objective
quality  of g o o d n e s s ,  w holly  d is t in ct  from rhe things we c a l l  good, and
independent of any fee l in g s  or opin ions we may have about them.
Further, he argued, s in ce  the concept cannot be defined by reference
to p leasure, d es ire ,  or in any other naturlistic  w ay, it presumably is
an a b so lu te ly  unique, sim ple, and "nonnatural" quality , w hose
in s ta n ce s  cannot be apprehended through s e n se  perception. There
are, in other words, no moral " sen se  data" which are perceptual parts
40of the material o b jec ts  on which e th ica l terms are predicated.
This v iew  of "good" w as extended to other simple c o n cep ts .
Their meaning is  to be found not through lo g ic a l  a n a ly s is  but by a form
of n on sensuou s intuition. In e sta b lish in g  certain b a s e s  of knowledge
on intuition, Moore's v iew  w as not unlike that of the rhetorician George
Campbell who w as influenced by the earlier British exponent of common
41
s e n s e  philosophy, Thomas Reid.
39
This fa l la cy  has been variously  descr ibed  by Moore, and 
among th ose  who fo llow  M oore's general th e s is  that the concep t of  
g o o d n ess  is  irreducible there is  no agreement concerning the ex a c t  
nature of the naturalistic  fa l la cy .  Ib id . , 472 .
40
mid_.
41 This v iew  is  supported Indirectly by D ou glas  Ehninger, "George 
Campbell and the Revolution in Inventional Theory, " Southern Speech  
Tournai. XV (May, 1950), 2 7 0 -7 6 ,  and C larence  Edney, "George C am pbell’s 
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After treat ing how w e  know the m ean in g  o f  c e r ta in  s im p l e  c o n c e p t s  
s u c h  a s  the nature of  "good ,  " Moore  turns to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of  the  
"truth" w e  know about, mater ia l  o b j e c t s  and  moral l a w .  This  a n a l y s i s  
IS w e l l  sum marized  by  Henry Aiken a s  f o l l o w s :
Now so  far a s  s t a t e m e n t s  about  mater ia l  o b j e c t s  are  c o n c e r n e d ,  
Moore c l a i m s  o n l y  to know  w i th  c e r t a in ty  the  truth o f  s u c h  
s in gu lar  s t a t e m e n t s  a s  "This  i s  a hand" and  "That i s  a t r e e . "
He d o e s  not appear  to h a v e  b e l i e v e d  that su c h  g e n e r a l  s t a t e m e n t s  
about  materia l  o b j e c t s  a s  "All s w a n s  are w h it e"  can  be  known  
with  a b s o l u t e  c e r t a in t y  to be true.  O u ts id e  e t h i c s ,  the  o n l y  
genera l  p r o p o s i t i o n s  w h ic h  he a p p e a r s  to h a v e  regarded  a s  
- if i . solutely c e r t a in  are  the truths o f  l o g i c  and s:u'h " a n a ly t i c  
truths" a s  "All brothers  are male s i b l i n g s . "  l i e  a l s o  c l a i m s ,  
e v e n  w i th in  e t h i c s ,  that  "All moral  l a w s  . . . are m ere ly  s t a t e ­
ments  that cet ta in k in d s  o f  a c t i o n s  w i l l  h a v e  good  e f f e c t s , "  and  
h e n c e  that "Not  a s i n g l e  q u e s t i o n  in p r a c t i c a l  E th ic s  c an  be  
a n s w e r e d  e x c e p t  by  a c a u s a l  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n .  " . . .  H e n c e ,  
al thou gh  c n u s a l  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  do not  a s  su c h  s u f f i c e  to e s t a b l i s h  
e v e n  the p robab i l i ty  of  a n y  moral l a w  ( s i n c e  the q u e s t i o n  whether  
c e r ta in  e f f e c s  of our a c t i o n s  are good  i s  not  i t s e l f  a c a u s a l  
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  but <-.n e t h i c a l  judgm ent) ,  a l l  k n o w l e d g e  o f  w h a t  i s  
right  or wrong d e p e n d s  upon them .  In a very  important r e s p e c t ,  
then ,  a l l  moral law< are c o n t i n g e n t  t ru th s ,  the c e r t a in ty  of w h ic h  
i s  mere ly  pro!) Hde .
H o w e v e r , though moral lav/s  w h ic h  aim to d i s t i n g u i s h  b e t w e e n  
iigh.l and wrong r ondur ' '"annot he known for c e r ta in  .o be true ,  t h e s e  
l a w s  are not tin.' i oUi l i iy  of g e n e r a l  e t h i c a l  truths or p r i n c i p l e s .  E th ica l  
pi i n c i p l e s . , un l i l . e  moral i.-'ws, do not  purport to t e l l  u s  w h a t  sor t s  o f  
. v t i o n s  w i l l  lia'-e th<; h - a  el tec ts in the long run,  hut ,  rath er ,  w h at  
' 'U I s ')! tin III; s nil' 1 a n 1 n SIC I ! ly good  in t h o m s r d v o s .  Moore  b e l i e v e d
■hi
Op . CO. . , .
- 2 9 -
that  there  are c e r ta in  fundam enta l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  e t h i c s  w h ic h  are  s e l f -  
e v i d e n t .  T h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s  are  not  a n a l y t i c  (as  are  p r o p o s i t i o n s  l ik e  
"a l l  brothers  are male  s i b l i n g s " ) ,  s i n c e  t h e y  do not  t e l l  us  an y th in g  
w e  c o u l d  infer  from an a n a l y s i s  o f  the  m ean ing  o f  "a l l  g o o d  t h i n g s .  " 
S i n c e  g o o d n e s s  i s  a s i m p l e  u n a n a l y z a b l e  q u a l i t y ,  a n y  e t h i c a l  p r in c ip l e  
w h ic h  a s s e r t s  that  a i l  g o o d  t h i n g s  are  p l e a s u r e s  or o b j e c t s  o f  d e s i r e  
must, be  s y n t h e t i c / ; that  i s  to s a y ,  i t  a s s e r t s  a r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  
g o o d  t h in g s  a n d ,  s a y  p l e a s a n t  t h in g s  w h o s e  truth i s  not  e n t a i l e d  by  
a n y  c o n j u n c t i o n  of  t h o s e  (a n a ly t i c )  truths w h ic h  t e l l  u s  w h a t  'good'  
m e a n s  a nd  w h at  ' p l e a s a n t '  m e a n s .
M o o r e ' s  a p p r o a c h  to the s c o p e  o f  p h i l o s o p h y  in g e n e r a l  and to
e t h i c s  and l o g i c  in part icu lar  i s  d e s c r i b e d  by  P r o f e s s o r  Aiken;
In the f i r s t  p l a c e ,  u n l i k e  Hume and ( later)  the l o g i c a l  p o s i t i v i s t s ,  
M oore  d o e s  not  b e l i e v e  that  a l l  n o n - a n a l y t i c  g e n e r a l  truths  
are uncer ta in ;  nor d o e s  he  b e l i e v e  that  a l l  n o n - a n a l y t i c  (or 
s y n t h e t i c )  truths are  e m p ir i c a l  h y p o t h e s e s  a b o u t  o b s e r v a b l e  
matters  o f  f a c t .  There a r e ,  for him,  s om e  g e n e r a l  s y n t h e t i c  
t ru ths ,  p r in c ip a l ly  e t h i c a l ,  w h i c h  are  s e l f - e v i d e n t .  In the  
s e c o n d  p l a c e ,  he a l s o  b e l i e v e s  that  through p h i l o s o p h i c a l  a n a l y s i s  
and r e f l e c t i o n ,  w e  may c o m e  to know  that  c e r t a in  s y n t h e t i c  truths  
w h ic h  h a v e  b e e n  a l l e g e d  to be  s e l f - e v i d e n t  are n o t  s o ,  and that  
c e r t a in  o t h e r s  are  s o .  Thirdly,  i t f o l l o w s  that  for Moore  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  a n a l y s i s  h a s  a dual  function:  (a) to c l a r i f y  c o n c e p t s  
and p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  and  (b) to e s t a b l i s h  c e r t a in  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  
of  k n o w l e d g e ,  v a l u e ,  and m e t a p h y s i c s ,  the v a l i d i t y  o f  w h ic h  
c a n n o t  be  a s c e r t a i n e d  e i t h e r  by  pure l o g i c  a l o n e  or by  natural  or 
em p ir i ca l  s c i e n c e  a l o n e .
•13 44
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Any summary o f  M o o r e ' s  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  th e o ry ,  i n s o f a r  a s  i t  c a n
be  s a id  that  he  had o n e ,  t e l l s  o n l y  a part o f  the s to r y .  For, a s
Warnock o b s e r v ed :
. . .  in theory  he  did  not  c o n c e i v e  o f  p h i l o s o p h y  q u i te  d i f f e r e n t l y  
from h i s  m e t a p h y s i c a l  p r e d e c e s s o r s .  H i s  p r a c t i c e , h o w e v e r ,  
c o n s i s t i n g  a s  i t m o s t l y  did in the pursu i t  o f  a n a l y s e s ,  n a tu r a l ly  
t e n d e d  to g i v e  r i s e  to the  idea that  the b u s i n e s s  o f  p h i l o s o p h y  
i s  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  and not  d i s c o v e r y ;  tha t  i t s  c o n c e r n  i s  w i t h  m e a n in g ,  
not w i th  truth; that  i t s  s u b j e c t - m a t t e r  i s  our thought  or l a n g u a g e ,  
rather than f a c t s .  In i t s  i n f l u e n c e  the p r a c t i c e  w a s  far more  
important than the t h e o r y . ^5
C r i t i c i s m  o f  M o o r e ' s  Common  
S e n s e  P h i l o s o p h y
W a r n o c k ' s  s t a t e m e n t  i s  both a summary o f  M o o r e ' s  p r a c t i c e  in
p l i i lo s o p h y  a n d ,  by  i m p l i c a t i o n ,  a c r i t i c i s m  of  i t .  For many w o u ld
c o n t e n d  that  the  p h i l o s o p h e r  s h ou ld  be  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  t h e  "truth"
regard ing "fact s"  rather than the m ea n in g  o f  s t a t e m e n t s  in "ordinary
l a n g u a g e .  " Such c r i t i c i s m  i s  r e la t e d  to two other  com m on o b j e c t i o n s
to M o o r e ' s  p h i lo so p h y :  f i r s t ,  that  he  regard ed  ordinary  u s a g e  a s
s a c r o s a n c t ;  and ,  s e c o n d ,  that  s u c h  c l o s e  a t t e n t io n  to com m on l a n g u a g e
46made p h i l o s o p h y  s e e m  tr iv ia l  or i n v o l v e d  a kind o f  s c h o l a s t i c i s m .
In a d d i t io n  to o b j e c t i o n s  a b o u t  the w a y  in w h ic h  M oore  v i e w e d  
the purpose of  p h i l o s o p h y ,  o th e rs  w e r e  r a i s e d  a b o u t  h i s  method o f  
a n a l y s i s .  T h e s e  r e s u l t e d  from M o o r e ' s  " u n q u e s t io n e d  a s s u m p t i o n  that
45  ^ 46
O p . c i t .  , 2 9 .  Paul ,  o £ .  c i t . ,  67
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47any a n a ly s is  must be o f  a standard pattern. " This pattern c o n s is ted
in providing a verbal paraphrase of what w as to be ana lyzed , in the form
of a longer, more ex p lic it ,  but str ictly  synonymous statem ent. Many
words and phrases, however, are not c lo s e ly  related to any more
ex p lic it  synonyms and "can only be made to seem  so by artific ia l  
4 Rd e v ic e s .  " This sort of a n a ly s is ,  so the argument g o e s ,  "sometimes
49le a v e s  out ex a ct ly  what is of the most ph ilosophical in terest .  "
Moore's philosophy began as  a protest aga in st the Idealism of 
Bradley and focused  on the a n a ly s is  of propositions by c lo s e  attention  
to common language and common s e n s e .  At the same time in Cambridge 
his  co lle a g u e ,  Bertrand R u sse ll ,  a lso  began to engage in the a n a ly s is  
of propositions and to oppose Idealism , but h is  Logical Atomism 
differed radically  from the Common Sense Philosophy.
Logical Atomism
Sources of Logical Atomism
The ph ilosophical movement known a s  Logical Atomism w as a 
brief and important one created by two of the three major figures in 
contemporary analytic  philosophy. Bertrand R ussell gradually evolved  
the leading " eor ies  of Logical Atomism in the first two d ecad es  o f  the
47 48 49
Warnock, op. c i t .  , 27 . Ib id . Ibid.
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century, during which time he influenced and w as influenced by his  
pupil, Ludwig W ittgenstein .^^  The v iew  w as first popularized by 
R ussell through a number of e s s a y s  which developed theories which  
he and Whitehead had earlier s e t  forth in their famous Principia 
M athem atica. Later the doctrine w as published by W ittgenstein  
(in German in 1921 and in English in 1925) in h is  Tractatus L ogico-  
P h ilo so p h icu s . R u sse ll 's  version had its  greatest e ffec t  on British 
philosophy in a direct manner and W ittgen stein 's  through the wave  
of Logical Positiv ism  which it helped stimulate in Vienna and ultimately  
in England.
Although R usse ll  and W ittgenstein created Logical Atomism, 
they both later rejected  it and went their own separate w a y s .  
W ittgenstein  became the father of the present branch of lin gu istic  
philosophy and R usse ll  one of the most severe  cr it ics  of W ittgenstein 's  
later id ea s .
The name "Logical Atomism, " invented by Bertrand R u sse ll ,  i s ,  
in the words o f D . F. Pears,
When R ussell first publicly proclaimed the fully developed  
principles of Logical Atomism in 1918, he gave full and candid  
acknowledgment that he had learned th ese  v iew s from his "pupil, " 
W ittgenstein . William Barrett, "Introduction, " P o s it iv ism , Vol. Ill, 
Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. 4. John Passmore a lso  observes  
that "quite what he owed to, and quite what he contributed to, R usse ll's  
'philosophy of log ica l atomism' is d ifficult to sa y . " Op. c i t .  , 354.
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. . .  an entirely appropriate name, which really  te l ls  us something  
about the character of the theory. It brings out the relationship  
with Hume, who w as a ls o  a kind of ph ilosophical atom ist . For 
Hume tried to expla in  ever^dihing in terms of the im pressions and 
id e a s ,  which are, according to him, the so le  contents o f  human 
minds. The word "atomism" i s ,  of course , a metaphor: ju st  as  
the s c ie n t is t  w as supposed to go on dividing ob jects  until he 
reached their u ltim ate, in d iv is ib le  parts, so the philosopher's  
task w as con ceived  a s  a kind o f  a n a ly s is  of thought into its  
ultim ate, simple e lem en ts .  But, whereas Hume b e lieved  that 
philosophers ought to practise  psycho log ica l a n a ly s is  of id e a s ,  
R ussell maintained that the a n a ly s is  should deal with propositions,  
and so R ussell  qualified h is  kind of atomism a s  lo g ic a l .
R u sse l l 's  Logical Atomism grew out of h is  rebellion aga in st  the
kind of philosophy that h is  friend Moore had c r it ic ized . R ussell
claimed that Moore took the lead in the rebellion and that he followed
with a s en se  of em ancipation.^^ He fe lt  that the writings o f  most
contemporary philosophers were exceed in g ly  lo o s e ,  amateurish, and
obscure. He thought that philosophy ought to b e , a s  it never yet had
b een , " 'sc ien tif ic '  — not only not l e s s  rigorous and ex a c t ,  but more
53s o ,  than mathematics and the physical s c ie n c e s ."  For this reason,  
R ussell fe lt  a strong des ire  to bring into philosophy some technique  
which would enable it to compare with d is c ip l in e s  such a s  those of the 
sc ie n t is t  and m athem atician.
^^"Logical Atomism: R ussell  and W ittgenstein , " Revolution in 
Philosophy, op. c i t . , 44 .
52
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Atom ic  A n a l y s i s  o f  P r o p o s i t i o n s
The p h i l o s o p h e r ' s  e lm ,  he  s t a t e d  In a n  e s s a y  e n t i t l e d  "Logic  a s  
the E s s e n c e  o f  P h i l o s o p h y ,  " sh o u ld  b e  "to g i v e  an a c c o u n t  o f  the  world  
o f  s c i e n c e  and d a l l y  l i f e .  In pursu i t  o f  t h i s  a im he  s h o u l d  e m p lo y
the m o s t  r ig o r o u s  m eth o d s  o f  l o g i c  and  not  b e  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  h i s  ow n  
w i s h e s  or b e l i e f s .  The method to b e  f o l l o w e d  s h o u ld  be  that  of  
a n a l y s i s .
W hat  i s  i t  that  R u s s e l l  pr op ose d  to a n a l y z e ?  The a n s w e r  w a s
that p h i l o s o p h e r s  sh o u ld  a n a l y z e  f a c t s , no t  t h i n g s .  For,  a s  he  s ta ted;
The t h in g s  in the world h a v e  v a r io u s  p r o p e r t i e s ,  and  s ta n d  In 
v a r io u s  r e l a t i o n s  to e a c h  o t h e r .  That t h e y  h a v e  t h e s e  prop e r t ie s  
and  r e l a t i o n s  are f a c t s , and the  t h in g s  and the ir  q u a l i t i e s  or r e l a t i o n s  
are  q u i t e  c l e a r l y  in s o m e  s e n s e  or o ther  c o m p o n e n t s  of  the  f a c t s  that  
t h e y  h a v e  t h o s e  q u a l i t i e s  or r e l a t i o n s .  The a n a l y s i s  o f  a p p a r e n t ly  
c o m p l e x  t h i n g s  . . . c a n  be  r e d u c e d  by v a r io u s  m e a n s ,  to the a n a l y s i s  
of  f a c t s  w h ic h  t h e y  are a p p a r e n t ly  a b o u t  t h o s e  t h i n g s .  Therefore  i t  i s  
with  the a n a l y s i s  of  f a c t s  that  o n e ' s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  the  problem o f  
c o m p l e x i t y  m u st  b e g i n .
F a c t s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  are s ta t e d  in p r o p o s i t i o n s  and p r o p o s i t i o n s  are  
c o m p l e x  s i n c e  t h e y  are  made up of w o r d s .  Some w o r d s ,  l i k e  "red ,"  
arc s im p l e  and our u n d ers tand ing  o f  them i s  not a c o m p l e x  r e s u l t a n t  of  
a n y th in g  s im p le r .  U n d e r s ta n d in g  of the m ean ing  o f  s u c h  w ords  can  
o n l y  be a c h i e v e d  by a c q u a i n t a n c e  wi th  w h a t  the word "red" s y m b o l i z e s .
5 4
Tills e s s a y  h a s  b e e n  reprinted in The R i s e  o f  A n a ly t i c  P h i lo s o p h y  
in Eiu;land, Vol .  II, P h i l o s o p h y  in the Tw enll e t i i  C e n t u r y , 6 3 0 - 4 6 .
5 5
Logic and K now ledge  (London: ( l e o r g e  A l len  and U n w i n ,  Ltd. , 
1956) ,  192.
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that i s ,  a particular shade of color. The word "red" is  thus not capable
of a n a ly s is ,  and may be said to be a simple symbol.
It i s ,  in particular, a simple p red ica te . Contrasted with simple  
symbols of this sort, there must be simple sym bols of another 
sort, namely proper names — the words, that i s ,  by which we 
can refer to particular things to which predicates are ascr ibed ,
The s im p lest  sort of proposition, then, w il l  be one which c o n s is t s  
s o le ly  of a proper name and a simple predicate . This sort o f  
proposition R u sse ll  c a l l s  "atomic"; and the fac ts  that such 
propositions s ta te  are atomic f a c t s .
Taking th is  point o i v iew , one can construct more complex  
propositions out of the atomic o n e s ,  sim ply by joining two or more atomic  
propositions together with the words "and" or "or." What resu lts  is  
what R u sse ll  ca lled  a molecular proposition. There are, however no 
molecular f a c t s .  For if one a s se r ts  the molecular proposition "this is  
red and that is  brown, " he is  stating not one molecular fact, but rather 
two atomic facts  that th is  is  red and that that is  brown. Molecular 
propositions are therefore said to be "truth functions" of atomic 
propositions s in ce  their truth or fa ls ity  depends upon the truth or 
fa ls ity  of the atomic propositions of which they are com posed.
From this b a s ic  position R usse ll  carried the a n a ly s is  further by 
recognizing that there are general fa c ts  a s  w e ll  a s  atomic fa c ts .  The 
proposition, "all debaters are in te l l igen t , " for exam ple, is  not merely
56
This statem ent and the general reconstruction of Logical 
Atomism which fo llow s is  from Warnock, op. c i t . ,  3 4 -4 2 .
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a conjunction of propositions, meaning "this debater is  in te l ligen t and 
that debater is  in te l l ig en t .  . . , " and so on until the universe of debaters  
has been exhausted; for even if  a l l  debaters could be enumerated, it would 
st i l l  be n ecessa ry  to say  in the end that the debaters thus enumerated 
were a ll  the debaters there were; and there the elem ent of generality  
would have reappeared. The statem ent, if  true, cannot be a co n ­
junction of singular fac ts  but must be  an irreducibly general fact.
Further, he argued that the e x is te n c e  of negative  facts  w as the 
only way to account for the truth or fa ls ity  of negative  propositions.  
Finally , he came to a c cep t  facts  corresponding to such propositions  
as "Jones b e l ie v e s  that the world is  f lat, " or "Smith hopes the sun 
v/ill be shining tomorrow. " The problem is  that, although these  
propositions iook com plex, they cannot be said  to be m olecular. The 
truth of "this is  red and that is  brown" depends in part on the truth of  
"that is  brown"; but the truth of "Jones b e l ie v e s  that the world is  flat" 
is  entirely independent of the truth of "the world is  f la t ."  In other 
words, Jones may b e liev e  what is  not a fac t .  As a resu lt  of th ese  
further a n a ly se s ,  R usse ll  was forced to admit that atomic fac ts  alone  
were insuffic ient to make clear in what the truth or fa ls i ty  of such  
propositions c o n s is te d .  Warnock summarized the effort to rev ise  the 
atomic theory in this way;
It is not n ecessa ry  now to go into the attempts that were made 
to d isp en se  with th ese  additional sp e c ie s  of fa c ts .  W ittgenstein ,
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Ramsey, W isdom, and R usse ll  h im self a l l  made great efforts from time 
to time to elim inate them. But at present the important point to 
apprehend is  that they a l l  shared a s ingle  ambition, that i s ,  of  
estab lish in g  the th es is  that there v/ere in reality  only atomic fa c ts ,  
and in language only atomic and molecular propositions. These  
"atoms, " l in g u is t ic  or factual, were the final, or the nearest  
approach to the f in a l, "residue in a n a ly s is .  " They laid bare the 
e sse n t ia l  character of language and of the world.^
The A tom ists' View  
of Language
R u sse ll 's  approach to language was influenced largely  by recent 
developments in log ic  for which he h im self had been in a large part 
respon sib le . In the Principia M athem atica, he and Whitehead had 
sought to e s ta b lish  a notation for stating not only  the whole of log ic ,  
but of mathematics a s  w e l l .  This notation w as ex p lic it ly  truth- 
functional. That is  to say , even the most elaborate formulae statable  
in it were constructed out of a few very simple forms. R ussell often  
spoke of this notation a s  constituting a lo g ic a l ly  perfect language.
Of course , a s  s e t  forth in his book it had no vocabulary; there, the 
pursuit of complete generality  had required the use  o f variables only, 
not particular words; but it included, he thought, at l e a s t  the syntax  
of a perfect language. The relation of this perfect language to common 
language in R u sse l l ’s v iew  was clearly  exp ressed  by Warnock;
Here R ussell appears simply to have assum ed that it was the
language we commonly employ, as  that would look if removable
57
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im p e r f e c t io n s  w e r e  r e m oved;  that  i s ,  tha t  h i s  n o t a t i o n  e m b o d ie d  
t he  e s s e n c e  o f  l a n g u a g e ,  and th a t  w h e r e  l a n g u a g e s  d i f f e r e d  or  
common l a n g u a g e  a p p e a r e d  to d i v e r g e ,  i t  w a s  m e r e ly  that  t h i s  
e s s e n t i a l  s k e l e t o n  w a s  c o n c e a l e d .  It w a s  for t h i s  r e a s o n  that  
the  e n o r m o u s  a s s u m p t i o n  w a s  made  that  a l l  p r o p o s i t i o n s  w h a t e v e r  
w h ic h  do not  t h e m s e l v e s  s t a t e  s i m p l e  f a c t s  m ust  b e  tru th-  
f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h o s e  w h i c h  d o .  S om e th in g  l ik e  t h i s  w a s  m a n i f e s t l y  
true o f  the  "perfect" l a n g u a g e ,  and h e n c e  i t  w a s  a s s u m e d  to be  
true,  though  c o v e r t l y  o f  c o u r s e ,  o f  a n y  l a n g u a g e  w h a t e v e r ,^ ®
The M e t a p h y s i c a l  
B a s i s  of  Atomism
C l e a r l y ,  R u s s e l l  w a s  not  j u s t  w r i t ing  a b o u t  com m on and s c i e n t i f i c
la n g u a g e  but  w a s  o f fe r in g  w h a t  he  ad m it t ed  w a s  a kind o f  m e t a p h y s i c s .
He w a s  o f fe r in g  w h a t  " u l t i m a te l y ,  " "in the  f ina l  a n a l y s i s ,  " e x i s t s  in  the
U n i v e r s e  and  th is  d o c t r i n e  w a s  o b v i o u s l y  not  an  e m p ir i c a l  o n e .  He
d e d u c e d  i t  from a n o n - e m p i r i c a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  l a n g u a g e ,  to  the  na ture  of
59that  r e a l i t y  w h ic h  l a n g u a g e  d e s c r i b e s .  For, a s  the  P y t h a g o r e a n s  
tr ied to g i v e  an a c c o u n t  o f  the world in terms o f  their  g e o m e t r y  and  
L o c k e ' s  m e t a p h y s i c s  c a n  b e  s e e n  a s  a g e n e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  a t o m i s t i c  
m e c h a n i c s ,  s o  i t  i s  that  "the s h o r t e s t  a c c o u n t  o f  l o g i c a l  a t o m i s m  that  
c a n  be  g i v e n  i s  that  the wor ld  h a s  the  s tructure  o f  R u s s e l l ' s  l o g i c .
The f o l l o w i n g  s t a t e m e n t  from P r o f e s s o r  Urmson both  s u m m a r i z e s  
■the b a s i c  t e n e t s  of  l o g i c a l  a t o m i s m  and m a k e s  c l e a r  i t s  m e t a p h y s i c a l  nature:
58 59
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R u s s o l l ,  it a p p e a r s ,  c o n s i d e r e d  that  a l o g i c  from w h i c h  the w h o l e  
o f  m a th e m a t i c s  w i th  a' i t s  c o m p l e x i t i e s  c a n  be  d e r iv e d  m u st  be  
an a d e q u a t e  s k e l e t o n  (minus the e x t r a - l o g i c a l  v o c a b u l a r y  w h ic h  
the v a r i a b l e s  r e p l a c e )  of  a l a n g u a g e  c a p a b l e  of  e x p r e s s i n g  a l l  
that  c a n  be a c c u r a t e l y  s a i d  a t  a l l .  H o ld in g  t o o ,  th a t  "the s tu d y  
o f  grammar i s  c a p a b l e  o f  throwing  far more l i g h t  on p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
q u e s t i o n s  than i s  c o m m o n l y  s u p p o s e d  by p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  " he  c a m e  
to think that  the world w o u ld  ha v e  the s tructure  o f  t h i s  l o g i c ,  
w h o s e  grammar w a s  s o  p e r f e c t ,  u n l ik e  that  o f  the  m i s l e a d i n g  
natural  l a n g u a g e s .  As the l o g i c  had i n d i v id u a l  v a r i a b l e s  in i t s  
v o c a b u l a r y ,  S') the world  w o u ld  c o n t a i n  a v a r i e t y  of  p a r t i c u l a r s ,  
the n a m e s  o f  w h ic h  w o u ld  be  c o n s t a n t s  to r e p l a c e ,  a s  e x t r a -  
l o g i c a l  v o c a b u l a r y ,  t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s ;  a s  the l o g i c  required  o n l y  
e x t e n s i o n a l .  t r u t h - f u n c t i o n a l ,  c o n n e c t i v e s  b e t w e e n  i t s  e l e m e n t a r y  
p r o p o s i t i o n s , s o  the  world  w o u ld  c o n s i s t  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t ,  
e x t e n s i o n a l l y  c o n n e c t e d  f a c t s ;  a s  the  t e c h n i q u e s  o f  l o g i c  c o u l d  
d e f i n e  and th us  make t h e o r e t i c a l l y  s u p e r f l u o u s  th e  more c o m p l e x  
and a b s t r u s e  c o n c e p t s  o f  m a t h e m a t i c s ,  s o ,  b y  the app l ica t i cm  o f  
the  s a m e  t e c h n i q u e s  the  l e s s  c o n c r e t e  i t e m s  o f  the  furniture of  
h e a v e n  and earth . . . c o u l d  be  d e f i n e d  and t h e o r e t i c a l l y  e l i m i n a t e d .  
The s tructure  o f  the  world  w o u ld  t h u s  r e s e m b l e  the  s tructure  of  
Princ ip ia  M a t h e m a t i c a  . That i s  the  s im p l e  ar gu m en t  o f  the  p lo t .  ^
C r i t i c i s m  of  L o g i c a l  Atomism
L og ic a l  .Atomism b e g a n ,  l i k e  M o o r e ' s  C om m on S e n s e  P h i l o s o p h y ,
with  an  a t t a c k  on the I d e a l i s m  o f  B r ad le y  and c o n c e r n e d  i t s e l f  w i th  an
a n a l y s i s  of  l a n g u a g e .  U n l ik e  M o o r e ' s  v i e w ,  i t  fa v o re d  a s c i e n t i f i c
lanciuace  to tiiat o i  the com m on man a n d ,  a g a i n  u n l i k e  M o o r e ' s  v i e w ,
en d e d  up s u b j e c t  to much the s a m e  c r i t i c i s m  a s  did B r a d l e y ' s .  It had
s o m e t i m e s  be  u . .ud  of  Bradley  that  h i s  ow n  t h e o ry  w a s  s u i c i d a l .  H is
i n s i s t e n c e  ■ ' :ie n o n - c o n t r a d i c t o r y  nature o n l y  of  the  A b s o l u t e  s e e m e d
to imply ' n e c e s s a r y  f a l s i t y  of  e v e r y  s t a t a b l e  truth" - -  that  the  o n ly
u ;
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r e a l l y  a c c e p t a b l e  s t a t e m e n t  w o u ld  be  one  w h ic h  s ta t e d  e v e r y t h in g
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,  but  wh ic i .  o f  c o u r s e  c a n n o t  p o s s i b l e  be  m a d e .  If
s o ,  the a s s e r t i o n s  o f  w h i c h  h i s  own b o o k s  c o n s i s t e d  m ust  fa l l  under
th i s  u n i v e r s a l  c o n d e m n a t io n ;  i f true t h e y  t h e m s e l v e s  c a n n o t  p o s s i b l y
be  true .  It w a s  s o o n  p o in ted  o u t ,  a s  W arnock ob s e r v e d ;
. . . that  the d o c t r i n e s  o f  Log ica l  Atom ism ,  i f th e y  w e r e  true,  
c o u ld  not  be  s t a t e d .
This  w a s  the very  s in g u la r  c o n c l u s i o n  of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s  
T r a c ta te s  Loqico  - P h i l o s o p h i c u s , . . . The argument  w a s  t h i s .  
A ccording  tu the p u r e s t  d o c t r i n e s  of  Log ica l  A tom ism ,  a 
p r o p o s i t io n  can  be  s t a t e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  e i th e r  i f  there  i s ,  or 
c o u ld  b e ,  an a t o m ic  f a c t  to w h ic h  it. c o r r e s p o n d s ,  or i f i t  i s  a 
t r u t h - f u n c t i o n , h o w e v e r ,  c o m p l e x ,  o f  p r o p o s i t i o n s  o f  that  sor t .
But m o s t  of  the o r o p o s i t i o n s  w h ic h  Log ica l  A t o m is t s ,  in c lu d in g  
W i t t g e n s t e i n  h i m s e l f ,  purported to a s s e r t  w e r e  not  o f  e i ther  of  
t h e s e  k i n d s .  For t h e s e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  m o s t l y  did not  s t a t e  fa c t s ;  
they  purported rather to s a y  s o m e t h in g  a b o u t  f a c t s ,  in part icu lar  
ab ou t  the r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  f a c t s  and p r o p o s i t i o n s .  But a c c o r d in g  
to the theory i t s e l f  s u c h  p r o p o s i t i o n s  c a n n o t  b e  s i g n i f i c a n t ;  t h e y  
purport to s a y  w h a t  c a n n o t  be  s a i d .  Thus W i t t g e n s t e i n  w a s  led  
to ,  anci her' l i c a l l y  d r e w ,  the c o n c l u s i o n  that  m ost  o f  w h at  he  
h i m s e l f  had s a i d  w a s  s e n s e l e s s ;  in an  odd w a y ,  to u nd ers tand  h i s  
own book w a s  to s e e  that  t h i s  w a s  s o ,  and to r e a l i z e  tha t ,  a l th o u g h  
perhaps he had s u c c e e d e d  in s h o w i n g  s o m e t h i n g ,  he had not  r e a l l y  
sa id anyth ing  at  a l l .  This  t h e s i s ,  l a id  qu i te  e a r ly  l ik e  a sort  of  
tim.o-l iomb in the b a s e m e n t  o f  Log ica l  Atom ism, e s c a p e d  n o t i c e ,  
u w a s  p .e ivous ly  d i s r e g a r d e d ,  for a number o f  years ;  w h en  it  
w e n t  Its inventor  and  for tunate ly  many o th e rs  had a l r e a d y  
t ian ' - le i t r . i  t i i e rn so lve s  to other  p r e m i s e s .
TiVi'' V,' , in W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s  Tracta tus , the s e e d s  of  two k in d s
'f re \-o lts  ao l ist  L og ica l  Atomism a s  w e l l  a s  a carefu l  d e v e l o p m e n t  of  
a tom ism  ' . - e l i .  One  w a s  on the  grounds  that  " m e t a p h y s i c s  a s  a w h o le
62
O p . c i t .  , 4 1 .
- 4 2  -
he had gone to teach a t  Cambridge, and the group w as very much 
Influenced by h is  id ea s  . . . .  It i s  worth notic ing , however, that 
many of the v ie w s  which came to be regarded as  e sp e c ia l ly  
characteristic  o f  lo g ica l  positiv ism  had already been advanced by 
Schlick in his book on the theory of know ledge, Allgemeine  
Erkenntnislehre, which was published in 1918.®^
The membership of this group is  ind icative of its  sc ien t if ic
orientation a s  is  the roster of those who were a s so c ia te d  with it and
more or l e s s  remote in d is ta n ce ,  tim e, or opinion. Among th is  group
were Carl Hempel, Hans Richenbach, Richard von M ise s ,  Karl Popper,
Charles W. Morris, and A. J. Ayer. Many of th ese  men were not
philosophers by training, but shared a common interest in the philosophy
of sc ien ce  and a common d is ta s te  for the academ ic m etaphysics  then
prevailing in Germany and Central Europe. As Ayer h im self put it .
H istorica lly , their lo g ic  w as  the lo g ic  of Frege and R u sse ll ,  while  
their "positivism" owed l e s s  to Comte than to the "neo-positiv ism "  
of Mach and Poincare, E instein 's  general re la t iv ity , and by way of 
th ese ,  to Karl Pearson, John Stuart M ill ,  the writers of the 
Enlightenment and the earlier British em piric ists  (most notably  
Hume).^®
"The Vienna C ir c le , " The Revolution in Ph ilosophy, 70. Ayer's 
Language, Truth, and Logic (New York; Oxford U niversity  p ress ,  1936) 
w as the expression  of the b a s ic  ideas  of Logical Positiv ism  which most 
influenced British philosophical thought. An ex ce l le n t  exp lica tion  of h is  
v iew s  may be found in a transcript of a radio debate he had with F. C . 
C op elston , "Logical Positivism  - -  A D ebate , " A Modern Introduction to 
Philosophy, od. by Paul Edwards and Arthur Papp (Glencoe: The Free 
Press, 1957), 5 8 6 -6 1 8 .
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the m anifesto , the group found other w ays of d issem inating  their v iew s
which are described by Ayer;
In 1930 they took over a journal ca lled  Annalen der Philosophie  
renamed it Erkenntisfsicj, and used it a s  the principal v e h ic le  
for the d iffusion of their id eas  Its editors were Carnap and Hans 
Reichenbach, the leader of a similar though l e s s  important movement 
in Berlin. They a lso  in the th irties  brought out a ser ie s  of mono­
graphs with the c o l le c t iv e  t it le  o f  E in h e itsw issen sch a ft  (Unified  
Science) and a ser ie s  of books . . . .
Throughout the period contact w as  maintained with philosophers  
of similar ten d en c ies  in other countries , notably Poland, England, 
Holland, and Scandinavia, and further c o n g r esse s  were held at  
Prague, Copenhagen, Paris, and Cambridge. But by 1938, the year 
of the Cambridge c o n g ress ,  the Vienna C ircle  had practially  c ea se d  
to e x is t .
The group d isp ersed  to various parts of the world b ec a u se  of the
pressure of h o s t i le  r ight-wing governments and of the N a z is  who finally  
70succeed ed  them. Neurath made an attempt to keep the movement on
an international s c a le .  The tit le  of Erkenntnis w as changed to The
Journal of Unified Science  and its  p lace of publication to The Hague, and
an International Encyclopedia of Unified S c ien ce  w as begun in the United
States under the direction of Neurath. Further c o n g r esse s  were planned,
but the war intervened, and with Neurath's death in England the movement
lo s t  its  central d irection.
The D enial of the M etaphysical  
Basis  o f  Logical. Atomism
As a sser ted  earlier, in W ittgen ste in 's  Tracta tus are found the
69 70
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see d s  of two different revolts  aga in st the m etaphysics  upon which Logical
Atomism w as b a sed . Logical Positiv ism  w as the first of th e s e .  The
members of the Vienna C ircle  were already d isp o sed  to reject m etaphysics
on the old p o s it iv is t  grounds that it  w as an immature precursor of sc ien ce
and readily accepted  the anti-m etaphysica l strain in W ittgenstein . In
fact, they ca lled  th em selves  Logical P o s it iv is ts  "to em phasize  their
accep tan ce  of the v iew  of W ittgenstein  that m etaphysics w as not merely
outdated a s  old positiv ism  had it, but a lo g ic a l ly  im possib le  enterprise,
being excluded  by the e s s e n t ia l  nature of language; it  w as positiv ism  on 
71lo g ica l  grounds. " They did not object to the particular arguments in 
support of Logical Atomism's m etaphysical b a se  a s  did some of its  later  
cr it ics  but, rather, to the p o ss ib il i ty  of a m etaphysics  of any kind.
Some of the statem ents from W ittgen ste in 's  Tracta tus which seemed  
to su ggest  the lo g ica l rejection of m etaphysics  are included in the following  
list;
4 .0 0 3  M ost propositions and q u estion s, that have been written 
about ph ilosophical matters, are not fa ls e ,  but n o n sen s ica l .
We cannot therefore answer questions of th is  kind at a l l ,  but 
only state  their s e n s e l e s s n e s s .  Most questions and propositions  
of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand 
our language . . . .
4 .0031  All philosophy is  "Critique of language."
4 .1  A proposition exhibits  the e x is te n c e  and n o n -ex is ten ce  of  
atomic fa c ts .
71
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Their argument w a s ,  in brief form, of th is sort. If a l l  statements
are truth-functions of elementary propositions which report observations,
then they w ill  a l l  be either empirical th em selves  or e l s e  tau to log ies  or
contradictions. M etaphysical statem ents, however, do not seem to be
c la s s i f ia b le  under th ese  h ea d s .  This major attack on m etaphysics  led
to the development of the b a s ic  doctrine of Logical Positiv ism , "the
notorious verification  principle, " which Urmson expla ins  th is way;
The verif ication  principle is  not e s s e n t ia l ly  a very novel or 
obscure doctrine excep t in i t s  traditional formulation. This 
formulation is  that the meaning of a statement is the method of 
its  verif ica tion . C onsequently  to know the meaning of a s ta te ­
ment, to understand it ,  is  to know how to verify it; and an 
additional conseq uence  is  that if there is  no way of verifying a 
proposition at a l l  it has no meaning. Therefore m etaphysical  
propositions, and quite a number of other l in gu is t ic  performances 
which have usua lly  been counted as meaningful, turn out to be 
n o n s e n s ic a l .
The Basic Tenets of 
Logical Positivism
The verif iability  principle is  considered the central doctrine of the 
philosophy which emerged from the Vienna C irc le . It i s ,  however, only  
a part of their general position , which Albert Levi summarizes under six  
doctrinal th eses:
1. The function of philosophy is  log ica l a n a ly s is  . . . .  It should 
analyze a ll  pretentions to knowledge so a s  to clarify the meaning of 
terms and the log ica l relationships between id e a s .  In the end this  
w ill mean that philosophy has become the log ica l a n a ly s is  of sc ien t if ic  
la n g u a g e .
74
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2 . ^11 co g n it iv e ly  s ign ifican t (meaningful) d iscourse  is  
d iv is ib le  without remainder into analytic  or synthetic  p rop osit ion s .
This th e s is  permits a crucial d istinction  betw een (1) the formal 
sen te n c es  of lo g ic  and pure mathematics, which produce 
propositions that are "necessary" or "certain" and cannot be 
refuted by experience . . . and (2) the factual s c ie n c e s ,  where 
propositions may be judged probably true or probably fa lse  according  
to the principle of verif iab ility .
3 . Any proposition that purports to ^  factual or empirical has 
meaning only if it_i_s p o ss ib le  to describe a method for its  v er if ica t io n . 
This is  c lo s e ly  related  to the "operationalism" of the Einstein  
revolution , to the b e l ie f  that the m eaningfulness of concep ts  is  
esta b lish ed  by the operational procedures which support them . . . .
4 . ^ 1  m etaphysical a s s e r t io n s , being neither analytic  nor 
synthetic  p ro p o s it io n s , are m e a n in g le s s .
5. There is  _a s in g le  language for a ll  s c i e n c e ; it_ij similar in 
form to the language of p h y s ic s , and a ll  synthetic  propositions are 
reducible to elem entary exp erien ces  ex p ress ib le  in th is language . . . .
6 . All normative a s s e r t io n s , whether positing moral, a s t h e t i c , 
or re lig iou s  v a l u e s , are s c ie n t if ic a l ly  u n ver if iab le , and are therefore 
to ^  c la s s e d  as  forms of n on -cogn itive  d i s c o u r s e . Normative 
judgments, being neither tau to log ies  nor factu a lly  te s ta b le ,  cannot 
be said to have va lid ity  a s  log ica l  or informative modes of speech  . . . .
C ritic ism s of 
Logical P osit iv ism s
The program of the p o s it iv is ts  as  su ggested  above w as bold and 
dogm atic. However, a s  problems of interpretation em erged, various  
members of the movement offered different rev is io n s  o f the doctrine, and 
positiv ism  became subject to criticism  both from within and outside  its  
membership. Some crit icism  dealt with problems peculiar to positiv ism  
i t s e l f ,  like the nature of the verif iability  principle. Three problems, 
for exam ple, caused  a great deal of debate among the p o s i t iv is t s ,  and
^^Albert W Levi. Philosophy and the Modern World (Bloomington; 
Indiana University P r e s s , 1959), 3 4 3 -4 5 .
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the pages of Erkenntnis in the early thirties were filled  with such  
7 2controversy. The first problem w as that of the verif iability  of the
verif iability  principle i t s e l f ,  and the most common answer w as that
the principle was "a defin ition , recipe or criterion of meaning, not
73
an assertion  which could be either true or fa ls e .  " The second was
that the principle appeared to distort or deny the meaning of many
propositions accep tab le  in sc ie n c e  and everyday l i f e .  Historical
crop osit ion s , for exam ple, are not d irectly  verifiable by events  nor
can sc ien t if ic  genera lizations such a s  natural law s be verified by any
finite  number of ob servation s . The third, and most d ifficu lt , problem
v/as that of " so lip s ism . " Put in its  s im plest n on -tech n ica l terms,
the charge v/as made that the p o s it iv is ts '  conception  of meaning was
in any c a se  private, incommunicable, and variable from one observer 
74to another.
But another cr it ic ism , and that of a much more important nature, 
was directed aga in st the b as ic  notion of a n a ly s is  common to the whole 
"revolution" i t s e l f .  Since this criticism  led , a s  is  suggested  in the
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75could not be ser iou s ly  doubted.
Where Moore sought only clarity and never w ished  to depart from 
common se n se  b e l ie f s ,  R usse ll  sought m etaphysical truth and fe lt  that 
common s e n se  b e l ie fs  can be fa ls e  and ordinary language inadequate a s  
a means of d iscovering and expressing  truth. His aim w as  to g ive  a 
general account of the u n iverse , R u sse l l 's  picture o f  the world was  
that of one composed of "atomic fa c ts ,  " corresponding to each of which  
there would be a true "atomic statem ent. "
The Logical P o s i t iv is t s ,  who built upon the log ic  and techniques  
which R u sse ll ,  W ittgen ste in , and others had developed, took s t i l l  
another point o f  v ie w . They held that a l l  m etaphysical statem ents were  
m eaningless  s in ce  they could not be verif ied . A n a lys is ,  from the 
p o s it iv is ts '  point of v iew , w as a method for the elim ination of m etaphysics  
and for the c larification  of the language of s c ie n c e .
Areas of Similarity
In sp ite  o f  their d ifferences  in approach toward philosophy, the 
three positions have much in common. First, they a ll  arrived by their 
aifferent routes to the con c lu s ion  that the role of the philosopher co n s is ted  
in the a n a ly s is  of language. For Moore th is  was the route to clearer 
understanding; for the Logical Atomists it w as  regarded a s  the key to
75
"Analysis ,"  C o n c ise  Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and 
P hilosophers, 17 -18 .
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indeed without reference to fac t ,  but in other resp ec ts  in a total 
contextual vacuum, for the one so le  purpose of stating th ings truly 
or f a l s e l y . 77
There w a s ,  in the middle 1930's ,  a large measure of uniformity of
practice, overly ing, and to a great extent, concea ling  from v iew ,
considerable  d iversity  in aim s and doctrine. An apparent unity has
tempted "commentators ou tsid e  the professional ring" to identify  the
common preoccupation with the a n a ly s is  of language and to assu m e that
7 8a ll  those  who follow  th is path are Logical P o s i t iv is t s .  Yet it is  just
th is  area of agreement where an attack w as  made which ended one period
of analytic  philosophy and began another.
W e a k n esse s  hr A nalysis
A large number o f tech n ica l problems gradually began to c a s t  doubt
on the w hole program of a n a ly s is  which sought to reduce problems to
79estab lish in g  the truth or fa ls i ty  of factual sta tem ents . These problems, 
however, were not nearly a s  important a ca u se  for the abandonment of the
77
Ibid . , 59.
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Ib id . This confu sion  w ill  be reflected  in some of the cr it ic ism s  
of "linguistic" and "analytic" philosophy in later sec t io n s  of th is study.
79
A rather techn ica l d is c u s s io n  of these  problems, which are often  
alluded to but usua lly  p assed  over a s  they are in this study, is  presented  
in Urmson, Philosophical A n a ly s is , o p . c i t . , 130-62 .
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analytic  methods of the thirties a s  w as the fact that nobody w as producing
any satisfactory  a n a ly se s  . P. F. Strawson stated the point a s  follows:
The sen ten ces  of common speech  seem ed somehow to r e s is t  the 
simplifying expansions which theory had prepared for them. Even 
R u sse ll 's  earlier brilliant g lo s s e s  on the structure of ordinary 
se n te n c e s ,  in terms of the syntax of the new formal lo g ic ,  began  
in the end to seem  a lit t le  queer. And th ose  who went to work 
with fewer preconceptions about their resu lts  were apt to find that 
if  they preserved the s en se  of the orig inal, they a ch iev ed  no s im pli­
fication: and that if  they gained a s im plif ication , they did so at the 
c o s t  of lo s in g  the s e n s e .
Two New D irections
The failure to produce the desired  resu lts  led m ost philosophers
who had followed the old program of a n a ly s is  to a ccep t  one of two
alternative v ie w s .  One w as to conclude that s ince  ordinary, natural
languages are neither truth-functional nor modelled on some lo g ica l
ca lcu lu s  they are unsuitable as o b jec ts  of ph ilosophical in vest iga tion .
The other w as to continue to regard ordinary language a s  a tool and an
object for study and to alter and extend the conception  o f the nature and
techniques of a n a ly s is .  The first a lternative w as taken by Carnap, Quine,
and their a s s o c ia t e s  and is  now pursued mainly in the United S ta tes .  The
second was taken by W ittgen ste in , Ryle, and others and developed into
the present-day " linguistic  an a lys is"  in England.
8 0
I b id . , 149.
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"Construction and A n a ly s is , " The Revolution ^  Philosophy.
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Before turning to the British variant which i s  the primary subject  
of this study, some o f  the ch aracter is tics  of the other v iew  must be 
elaborated b eca u se  some cr it ics  have tended to confu se  the two and 
b eca u se  much of the crit icism  of the sp ec if ic  works examined in this  
study come from that frame of reference.
This group, like the A tom ists , r e l ie s  on the formal lo g ic  of Frege 
and R usse ll  which provides them with a skeleton  language in which the
meaning of every elem ent is  ab so lu te ly  p rec ise ,  and the articulation of
B2the e lem en ts  a b so lu te ly  c lear . By using this framework of lo g ica l  
sym b ols ,  "other sy stem s of con cep ts  can be constructed in which the 
mutual re la t ionsh ip s  of the parts w il l  have the same c larity  and precision
Q 3
as  in formal log ic  i t s e l f ."  These system s are, of co u rse ,  not natural
growths, like ordinary la n g u a g e , but ar tif ic ia l  c rea tio n s .  This
a r tif ic ia lity , they cla im , is  the very reason for the superiority of their
method of system  construction over the attempts to an a lyze  common
language. Such an attem pt, they argue,
is  defeated by the lo o s e n e s s ,  the u n tid in ess , the shifting  
com p lex ities  of common sp eech . Instead of pursuing it,  
then, we are to construct clear models of language in w hich a ll  
the e s s e n t ia l  log ica l relations of our con cep ts  can be made plain, 
w hile the irrcvelant [ s ic ]  tan g les  of actual u sage  are cut aw ay .
Of co u rse ,  some preliminary or incidental remark w ill  have to be 
made, connecting key ex p ress io n s  of the system  with ex p ress io n s  
we ordinarily u se .  Otherwise it would not be clear what the system
82 83
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w as about, what concep ts  it  w as intended to c larify . But once  
th ese  points of contact are made, the system  stands on its  own, 
a precise  and rigid structure to which our ordinary conceptual  
equipment i s  a rough and confusing approximation.®^
The orientation of th is  group is  s c ie n t i f ic .  They are very c lo se
to the tradition o f Logical Positiv ism , both in point of v iew  and in
membership. Rudolph Carnap, who is  one of the ch ie f  spokesmen
for the group, w as one of the authors of the "manifesto" o f the Vienna
C ircle . A new vocabulary including symbolic lo g ic  and general sem antics
has been added to some refinements in theory, but they are a s  c lo se  to
Logical Positiv ism  in point of v iew  a s  the "linguistic  analysts"  are to the
Common Sense  philosophy of G. E. Moore.
Contemporary "Linguistic Analysis"
Sources of Linguistic A nalysis
In reviewing the history of philosophy in England s ince  1900,
G. J. Warnock observed that "there can be no serious doubt that the most
powerful and pervasive influence upon the practice of philosophy in this
85
country today has been that of Ludwig W ittgen stein ."  In his Tracta tu s 
the p o s i t iv is t s  had found reason to reject the m etaphysics of atomism  
b ecau se  it su ggested  to them the grounds for discounting any metaphysical
84
Ib id . , 102.
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O p . c i t . , 62 .
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system , In the same work, as  has been previously  observed , the 
British followers of both atomism and p ositiv ism  found the seed s  of the 
rejection of R u sse l l 's  m etaphysics  a s  it led them to the d isco v ery , one  
by one, "of s p e c if ic  d e fec ts  in the m etap h ysics ,  gradually leading to 
the con c lu s ion  that it must be abandoned a s  fa iling to do the job it w as  
trying to do. Yet W ittgen ste in 's  philosophy in later years had a 
p osit ive  a s p e c t  which su ggested  the l in g u is t ic  alternative to the earlier  
forms o f a n a ly s is .
Here, however, the exact  influence of W ittgenstein  i s  d ifficult  
to e s ta b l ish .  For although philosophers generally  agree that he "had 
an enormous influence upon, " and w as "the main originator of , the new
philosophical methods" of lin gu istic  a n a ly s is ;  he did not public ize  his
8 7id e a s .  All that is  known for certain is  that from the time he returned
to Cambridge from Vienna in 1929 his work took on an entirely  different
88
character from that in h is  Tractat u s . He refused , however, to publish  
any of his new ideas and was strongly opposed to any publication of 
them by those to whom his ideas  were imparted. Several years passed  
before even a r t ic le s  reflecting his v iew s  were a v a i la b le .  Yet, a s  
Warnock pointed out,
. . .  at the same time interest in h is  work w as so strong in many
86
Urmson, Philosophical A n a ly s is , o p . c i t .  , 99.
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quarters  that  reports  o f  i t  did in f a c t  a c h i e v e  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  though  
h a l f - c l a n d e s t i n e  c u r r e n c y .  T h e s e  c o u l d  not  b e  r e g a r d e d ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
a s  f in a l  or au t h o r i t a t iv e ;  bu t  b y  1 9 5 3 ,  v/hen  h i s  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  
I n v e s t i g a t i o n s  w e r e  p o s t h u m o u s l y  p u b l i s h e d ,  a g o o d  many  p h i l o s o p h e r s  
had b e e n  for s e v e r a l  y e a r s  more or l e s s  fam i l iar  w i t h  h i s  w o r k .  It 
i s  th us  d i f f i c u l t  or e v e n  i m p o s s i b l e  to s a y  j u s t  w h e n  or h o w  h i s  
i n f l u e n c e ,  a f ter  1 9 2 9 ,  b e g a n  to o p e r a t e .  It w a s  c e r t a i n l y  w i d e l y  
d i f f u s e d  w e l l  b e fo r e  1953 , but  the  p e c u l ia r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o f  i t s  
d i f f u s i o n  b a f f l e  e x a c t  h i s t o r i c a l  d e s c r i p t i o n .^ ®
Thus far,  the c 'a i m  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  that  W i t t g e n s t e i n  w a s  the c h i e f  
s o u r c e  o f  " l in g u is t i c ' '  p h i l o s o p h y  and that  many  o f  h i s  more i n f l u e n t ia l  
i d e a s  w e r e  a d v a n c e d ,  in o n e  form or  a n o t h e r ,  by  t h o s e  w h o  w e r e  under  
h i s  i n f l u e n c e  be fore  a n y  o f  h i s  la te r  v i e w s  w e r e  p u b l i s h e d .  Two q u a l i f i ­
c a t i o n s  to t h i s  c l a i m ,  h o w e v e r ,  m u s t  b e  m a d e .  F i r s t ,  the  p e o p l e  who  
a d v a n c e d  W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s  thought  w e r e  o b v i o u s l y  i n f l u e n c e d  a l s o  by the  
w h o l e  a n a l y t i c  m o v e m e n t  a n d ,  in E n g land ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  by  G . E. M oore .  
S e c o n d ,  a l th o u g h  the  terms " l i n g u i s t i c  a n a l y s i s "  and " l i n g u i s t i c
p h i lo s o p h y "  h a v e  b e e n  u s e d  to d e s c r i b e  a g e n e r a l  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  i n c l i n a t i o n ,
90the  u s e  o f  t h e s e  term s  c a n  be  d a n g e r o u s l y  m i s l e a d i n g .  The f ir s t  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  i s  fair ly  o b v i o u s  but important;  the s e c o n d ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s
l e s s  o b v i o u s  and of  c r i t i c a l  im portance  to t h i s  s t u d y .
91The " l in g u i s t i c "  l a b e l  c a n  be  m i s l e a d i n g  w h e n  it i s  u s e d  to
89
^ I b i d .  . 5 2 - Ü 3 .
90 Antony  r’l e w , " P h i lo so p h y  and L a n g u a g e ,  " The P h i l o s o p h ic a l  
Q u a r te r ly , V Qanuary,  195 5 ) ,  2 1.
91
This  d e s i g n a t i o n  rs o n ly  o n e  of  a number of terms w h ic h  fa l l
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s u ' j g e 3 t. that Uinra i s  s om e  s c h o o l  o f  p h i l o s o p h y  or part icu lar  set. o f  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  p r o p o s i t i o n s  w h ic h  i t  r e p r e s e n t s ,  For,  a l t h o u g h  a 
number o l  p h i l o s o p h e r s  c a n  be  found who a g r e e  on c e r t a in  p o i n t s ,  t h e y  
w i l l  s u r e ly  d i s a g r e e  on othe i  very  important  m a t t e r s ,  and  no u s e  o f  the  
t o i m w i th o u t  a ':ar."ful dofinitlo.n w i l l  b o  o f  v a l u e .  For a s  J, 0 .  U im son  
' b s e r v e d  in d i s c u s s i n g  the dom in ant  trend in contem por ar y  E n g l i s h  
j'iii ioSophy:
. . . t h e s e  p h i l o s o p h e r s  do not  c o n s t i t u t e  a s c h o o l  or m o v e m e n t  . . . .  
The conL'.rmjjr Id) p!uho<"'phers w o  are  ncnw c o n s i d e r i n g  . . .  do not  
a c c e p t  any  comrno.i' t i t l e ;  s u c h  a s  are a p p l i e d  d y s l o g i s t i c a l l y  by  
their  o p p o n e n t s  . . . .  The u n w i l l i n g n e s s  to a c c e p t  a com m on t i t l e  
] rr.lects an abs.-n-:;.: c i  s i u u e d  b a s i c  tenct .s;  n;o:st o f  t h e s e  p h i l o s o p h e r s  
I in hi. s h y  o f  the n:,rl o f  g e n e r a l  p h i lo sop h ic .a l  p i o n o u n c e m e n t s  w h ic h  
ecu.Id .:;onnt a s  brj.v.i.r t.-n.L.;,  In a n y  c a s e ,  apart  from a r e l u c t a n c e  
I' s u b s c r i b e  in ..x.ir.nvn 'n' a n y  g e n e r a l  formula,  there  i s  a g o o d  dea l  
' I: qu i te  s e r i o u s  ■) is igi ■: en'ent  a m o n g s t  them: w h i l e  there  i s  u n d o u b te d ly  
r "f.'inuly r-s^unblene.'  i . . tween t h e u  v i e w s  and the ir  m e t h o d s  it  
A--'Uld b-,' bar if lO r - j c s c r  i p t i n p , h o w e v e r  l o o s e  an'i e l a s t i c ,  w h ic h  
YOU Id .iï.'ply 1,0 a l l  o; oven  most.'"''
CIO till : i d  •■--ry. -Oidirmry l .anquaoe p h i l o s o p h y ,  " "E; it* sh a n a l y s i s , "  
and I'u- "G '•'■•bn re-  F e r r o  I " arc o ther  term s  o f t e n  u s e d  in t h e  same  
■I'.• •-1 :-ediro •■■■ I ' 1er c ic ' c r  to a v a ' j u - area  o f  a g r e e m e n t  or to a
.ic,. l i e  ^ I  . ' I Ir V'p'utca.i v i e w s .
oi i ica i  A n a l y s i s ,  op. c i t . ,  'f.5 6 4 .  Anth ony  Quinton
• i;, ■ rh. , i o i n t  lurth'/r by s t a t i n g , "T'm'i*; i s  not  much more common  
■ -ç a j y t i c  ' ii; 1'v.cpi'oi.s o' Oxfru'd b e y . n d  the i i  l i v i n g  in Oxford and  
"I a c t '  s i n e  a i .ab tu . .  i )h i lo 5, ,; .phy. " "Fhil'  ^ ' '^'g.'hy and  B e l i e f s ,  " Th,r
r ‘‘.biij.- r.'i Vll ( )u n / ,  1 9 5 5 ) ,  5X1.  Norman M a l c o l m  a l s o
r.a V: d fol  !c'v.;r s rd U i t tu on s t e i n  ‘ s lat'U p h i lo s o p h y :  "This  i s  a v ci y
' '' u ' o n u s  to nd wh :,;h c a n n o t  be c o v  n I I, \ oiu-; n a m e .  Even tin.
G  a  i i  ; i : i :  c  . - ' l o i  1 '  ] : ;  not  a c c u r a l  . I t  ;s • - n  to mo appic,prialo
. u! \  c< S'-' f-e 11 ;• miu Is ' uie o f  the  ji.'ct wli ich s o m e  prom inent  t e a c l v !  s 
! : ' crbrn.ln : yfr '/ c; ' • lea i inn  a phihc.  oo5i'.,.i I . i tm o s p h e r e  t y p i c a l  of  our 
" d r  ; O'. I i n -  A Memoii  (I  -m.dou: Oxford U n i v e i s i t y  Pr..:.sr,
O l d ) ,  i .
“60 “
This problem o f  m i s l e a d i n g  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  a b o u t  " l in g u is t i c "  
a n a l y s i s  i s  important  n o t  o n l y  b e c a u s e  i t  c a n  l e a d  to an  h o n e s t  
m is u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a b o u t  t h i s  very  g e n e r a l  a p p r o a c h  to  p h i l o s o p h y ,  but  
a l s o  b e c a u s e  i t  h a s  b e e n  u s e d  b y  s o m e  to d i s c r e d i t  the  work o f  many  
p h i l o s o p h e r s  by  c r i t i c i z i n g  s o m e  o f  the  i d e a s  o f  s o m e  o f  the  " l in g u i s t i c "
p h i l o s o p h e r s  and draw ing  the  c o n c l u s i o n  th a t  the b a s i c  p r e c e p t s  o f
— 9 3" l in g u i s t i c "  p h i l o s o p h y  had b e e n  d e s t r o y e d .
P h i l o s o p h i c a l  i d e a s  are not ,  h o w e v e r ,  m o s t  p rof i tab ly  d i s c u s s e d  
on  su c h  a l e v e l  o f  g e n e r a l i t y  and  for t h i s  r e a s o n  the  s p e c i f i c  t h e o r i e s  
o f  o n e  man in t h e  am orp hous  grouping of  " l in g u i s t i c "  p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  
Ste p h e n  Toulmin ,  i s  the s u b j e c t  o f  the  p r e s e n t  s t u d y .
H o w e v e r ,  in order to prov ide  a broad c o n t e x t  from w h i c h  to v i e w  
t h e s e  s p e c i f i c  i d e a s ,  s o m e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  a b o u t  " l in g u i s t i c "  p h i l o s o p h y  
m ust  be  m a d e .  K eep ing  in mind the  pr ob le m s  in h e r e n t  in su c h  an  
e n t e r p r i s e ,  o n e  may  i n d i c a t e  s o m e  "family  r e s e m b l a n c e s "  among the  
f o l l o w e r s  o f  M oore  and W i t t g e n s t e i n .
93
This  o b s e r v a t i o n  s e e m s  to a p p l y  to G e l l n e r ' s  V/ords and  
Thin g s , o p . c i t . Th is  e v a l u a t i o n  i s  i n d i c a t e d  in a number o f  r e v i e w s  
o f  h i s  book  in v a r i o u s  pio i , ' . ' . s ional  j o u r n a l s .  Of part icular  i n t e r e s t  
are two w h ic h  support  th is  point  par t ic u lar ly  w e l l ;  Arnold I s e n b e r g ,  
The Tournai of  P h i l o s o p h y , LVIII (February 16,  1961) ,  1 1 0 -1 2 ;  and  
W i l l i s  D o n o y ,  Ph i l o s o p h i c a l R e v i e w , IJOd (April, 1962) ,  2 5 2 - 6 7 .
In f a i r n e s s  to Mr. G e l l n e r ,  not  a l l  the r e v i e w s  are h o s t i l e  and the  
in troduct ion  to the  b o o k ,  wr i tt en  by Bertrand R u s s e l l ,  i n d i c a t e s  
that o n e  fam ous  p h i l o s o p h e r  supports  G e l l n e r ' s  v i e w s .
•-61 ■'
F u n ct io n a l  A n a l y s i s
In order to do s o ,  i t  m a y  b e  w e l l  to borrow two terms iTom 
Frederick Ferre w h ic h  h e l p  d i s t i n g u i s h  b e t w e e n  two  t y p e s  o f  c o n ­
temporary  p h i l o s o p h y .
A root  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  f u n c t i o n a l  and v e r i f i c a t i o n a l  
a n a l y s i s  w i th  f a r - r e a c h in g  c o n s e q u e n c e s  may b e  found in the  
d if fer in g  m o d e l s  under w h i c h  e a c h  v i e w s  l a n g u a g e .  This  b e g i n s  
a s  a matter o f  e m p h a s i s ;  w h e r e  v e r i f i c a t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  t e n d s  to 
c o n c e i v e  of l a n g u a g e  l a r g e l y  on  the m odel  o f  a u s e f u l  i n v e n t i o n , 
f u n c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  ten^^ to p ic ture  l a n g u a g e  more a s  a natural  
growth or an  o r g a n i s m .
T h e s e  ternes a t e  u s e d  to d i s t i n g u i s h  b e t w e e n  the  two trend s  w h ic h  
w e r e  noted e a r l i er  to i iavo s tar ted  in r e s p o n s e  to the fa i lure  o f  the  o ld  
m e t h o d s  o f  a n a l y s i  5 to produce  r e s u l t s .  W h at ,  t h e n ,  i s  the  g e n e r a l  
vi.cv/ o f  l a n g u a g e  and p h i l o s o p h y  w h i c h  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  " funct iona l  
a n a j y s i s  ?
F u n c t i o r ' a  I a n a l y s i s  r egard s  l a n g u a g e  a s  a natural  p h e n o m e n o n ,  
and no a  prion  g r o u n d s  a r c  g i v e n  for e x c l u d i n g  a n y  o f  the u s e s  o f  
l a n g u a g o .  L- n q u e g o  h a s  a s o c i a l  b a s i s  In that  i t i s  through s o c i e t y  
t : i a t  l a n g u a g e  n . ^ v  - s a i r l  t o  h a v e  grown n a t u r a l ly .  S i n c e  i t  did grow  
n a t u r a l l y  i t  o n e s  i r ' ' t  c o r i  . - ' s p o n d  to an y  s im p le  model  i m p o s e d  upon i t .
Ü4
O p . c_U . , J h .
Tlio sh ir t  !n tin u s e  o f  terms liore from " l i n g u i s t i c  ph i lo so p h y "  
t ’ ' " fur i i r t ior  a l  a . u a ! ' - " u ' not d e s i g n e d  to a v o i d  the p e r i l s  o f  the  u s e  o f  
t former tt irn a s  r ite i e bs 've .  O b v i o u s l y ,  g e n e r a l i z i n g  a b o u t  "funct iona l  
a n a l y s i s "  i s  j u s t  a s  d m  n tears , but  i t s  u s e  a v o i d s  som e  of the s t e r e o t y p e d  
1. annota t ioi ,a of the !oi ti-.:r
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L i n g u i s t i c  u t t e r a n c e  h a s  o n l y  the  o n e  g e n e r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  Lliat i t  h a s
/
s o m e  s o c i a l  c o n t e x t  and s o m e  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t s .  Ferre e x p l a i n s  the
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  s o c i a l  c o n t e x t  in t h i s  way:
S o m e t i m e s ,  i t  i s  t ru e ,  w e  try to e m p lo y  l a n g u a g e  w h e r e  i t  h a s  
no s o c i a l  c o n t e x t  or r u l e s ,  but  in e a c h  c a s e  w e  f ind that  w e  are  
v i o l e n t l y  t ear in g  l a n g u a g e  ou t  o f  i t s  ord inary  and  proper r o le  in 
the  a f fa i r s  o f  l i f e ;  w h e n  w e  e x a m i n e  the  t a s k  o f  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  a n a l y s i s  
w e  s h a l l  s e e  w h a t  pr o b le m s  may be  c a u s e d  by  s u c h  a g r a tu i t o u s  
r e m ova l  o f  l a n g u a g e  from i t s  matrix in s o c i a l  e x i s t e n c e .  L a n g u a g e , 
for f u n c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s , i £  a c o m p l e x  s o c i a l  product  w i t h  many  
l e g i t i m a t e  u s e s .
S i n c e  l a n g u a g e  h a s  a v a r i e t y  o f  l e g i t i m a t e  u s e s  and no  a priori  
method i s  a l l o w e d  to h e l p  d e ter m in e  i t s  m e a n i n g ,  the f u n c t i o n a l  a n a l y s t s  
argue  that  the m ea n in g  of  l a n g u a g e  i s  to be  found in i t s  u s e .  Th is  v i e w  
i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from the c r i t er io n  o f  m ean ing  o f  v e r i f i c a t i o n a l  
a n a l y s i s .  For a s  J. L. Evans  o b s e r v e d ,  "To s a y  o f  a g i v e n  s e n t e n c e  
that  it c a n  be v e r i f i e d  i s  n o t  to s a y  a n y t h i n g  a b o u t  the m e a n i n g f u l n e s s
o f  the s e n t e n c e  but to c h a r a c t e r i z e  i t a s  b e i n g  a s e n t e n c e  o f  a c e r t a in
9 7t y p e ,  n a m e ly ,  an e m p ir i c a l  s e n t e n c e . "  '  M e a n i n g ,  t h e n ,  i s  more  
a d e q u a t e l y  undet s t o o d  in r e la t io n  to the  u s e s  or f u n c t i o n s  o f  l a n g u a g e  
than o f  a c t u a l  e x p e r i e n c e .
Th is  ap p r oac h  toward the problem o f  m ean ing  i s  a t  the hear t  o f  
f u n c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s ;  the g o a l  o f  a n a l y s i s  i s  to s o l v e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l
96
O p . c i t . , 6 0 - 6 1 .
97
"On M e a n in g  and V e r i f i c a t i o n , "  M i n d , LXII (January,  1 953 ) ,  16.
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p rob lem s  b y  d i s c o v e r i n g  th e ir  m e a n i n g .  For a s  W i t t g e n s t e i n  s t a t e d ,
q  q
" P h i l o s o p h i c a l  p rob lem s  a r i s e  w h e n  l a n g u a g e  g o e s  on  h o l i d a y .
C r i t i c i s m  o f  F u n c t i o n a l  A n a l y s i s
Tbe c r i t i c i s m  w h i c h  s e e m s  j u s t i f i a b l y  to a p p l y  to  f u n c t i o n a l  
a n a l y s i s  i s  a s  l im i t e d  a s  are the  a r e a s  o f  a g r e e m e n t  am ong  t h e  
p h i l o s o p h e r s  t h e m s e l v e s .  Two important  c r i t i c i s m s , h o w e v e r ,  c a n  
be  i d e n t i f i e d .  One  i s  t h a t  t h e s e  p h i l o s o p h e r s  "want  to e x tr u d e  from 
p h i l o s o p h y ,  and  . . . the ir  c r i t i c s  w a n t  to s e e  put b a c k  into i t ,  . . . 
W e l t a n s c h a u u n g : r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o f  a m ora l ,  p o l i t i c a l  and r e l i g i o u s  
order .  To t h i s  c h a r g e ,  the  f u n c t i o n a l  a n a l y s t s  w o u ld  p r ob ab ly  c la i m  
that  a W e l t a n s c h a u u n g  c a n  and  s h o u l d  be  s e p a r a t e d  from p h i l o s o p h y  but  
that  t h i s  d o e s  no t  m ean  th a t  s u c h  mora l ,  s o c i a l ,  or p o l i t i c a l  r e c o m ­
m e n d a t i o n s  are u n im portant .  For, a s  Anthony  Q uin ton  put it;
. . . i t ' s  q u i t e  wrong to think tha t  a n a l y t i c  p h i l o s o p h e r s  m ean  to 
s u g g e s t  that  a t t i t u d e s  or b e l i e f s  are unimportant  w h e n  t h e y  s e p a r a t e  
them o f f  from p h i l o s o p h y .
I 'd be t ter  s a y  a t  o n c e  that  for my ow n  part ,  my moral  a nd  
p o l i t i c a l  v i e w s  are  much more important  to me than my p h i l o s o p h i c a l
98
P h i l o s o p h i c a l  I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , t r a n s . G . E. M . A n s c o m b e  
(Oxford; B a s i l  B l a c k w e l l ,  1 9 5 3 ) ,  19.
99
Q uin ton ,  o £ .  c i t . , 4 9 5 .  This  s t a t e m e n t  i s  part o f  a d i s c u s s i o n  
b e t w e e n  four Oxford p h i l o s o p h e r s ;  An thony Q uin ton ,  Stuart  H a m p s h ir e ,  
Iris M urdoch ,  and  I s a i a h  B e r l in .  The w h o l e  d i s c u s s i o n  p e r ta in s  to the  
two  c r i t i c i s m s  r a i s e d  a t  t h i s  p o in t  and  i s  an  e x c e l l e n t  s t a t e m e n t  o f  the  
p o i n t s  a t  i s s u e .
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o n e s .  To c h a n g e  the  former w o u ld  i n v o l v e  a much greater  d i s t u r b a n c e  
than  to c h a n g e  the la tter  ! 1^0
F u n c t io n a l  A n a l y s i s  i s  an  a c t i v i t y ,  and a t e c h n i c a l  o n e .  It i s  not  
to b e  i d e n t i f i e d  w i th  a n y  part icu lar  r e l i g i o u s ,  s o c i a l ,  or p o l i t i c a l  v i e w .
It h a s  a s  i t s  f u n c t io n  the  s o l u t i o n  of  pr ob le m s  w h i c h  c a n n o t  b e  s o l v e d  
b y  e m p ir i c a l  m e t h o d s .
The s e c o n d  c r i t i c i s m  i s  that  "the s tu d y  o f  ordinary  l a n g u a g e ,  
g i v e s  an  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  b e i n g  in i t s e l f  a t r iv ia l  a c t i v i t y ,  in t h a t  i t  
i n v o l v e s  d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  s m a l l  p o in t s  o f  a c t u a l  u s a g e .  "
And, the  f u n c t i o n a l  a n a l y s t  i s  qu ic k  to po int  ou t ,  a s  I s a i a h  B er l in  put  
i t ,  that
. . . w h a t  p h i l o s o p h e r s  are  t a lk in g  a b o u t  i s  n o t  w o r d s  qua w o r d s ,
b u t  a b o u t  c o n c e p t s  and c a t e g o r i e s ;  the  m o s t  g e n e r a l  and p e r v a s i v e
among them  w h i c h  part icu lar  u s e s  o f  w o r d s  c o n s t i t u t e s  (for thought
i s  l a r g e l y  a matter i f  [ s i c l  u s i n g  w o r d s ) .  Words  are  not  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e
from the  c o n c e p t s  t h e y  e x p r e s s  or i n v o lv e :  but  i t  d o e s  not  f o l l o w  that
a l l  there  i s  b e f o r e  u s  i s  "mere words"  —  tr iv ia l  q u e s t i o n s  o f  l o c a l  
102u s a g e .
The v a l i d i t y  o f  the  c h a r g e  that  f u n c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  i s  t r i v i a l  i s  not  
on e  w h i c h  c a n  be  properly e v a l u a t e d  b y  c i t i n g  o p i n i o n s  o f  p h i l o s o p h e r s  
for, in the e nd ,  the a n s w e r  c a n  o n l y  be  a v a l u e  judgment;  and s u c h  
ju d g m e n ts  c a n  b e  made o n l y  by  e x a m i n i n g  s p e c i f i c  a t t e m p ts  a t  s u c h  
a n a l y s i s  . The f o l l o w i n g  chapter  w i l l  b e  d e v o t e d  to s u c h  an e x a m i n a t io n  
o f  the u s e  o f  f u n c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  by S t e p h e n  Toulmin .  For, i f  f u n c t i o n a l
^ ° ° I b id .  . 5 2 1 .  ^Murdoch,  Ib id .  , 506  .
^^^Ibid.  , 5 0 9 - 1 0 .
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a n a ly s is  can clarify  co n c ep ts ,  Toulmin's observations on reasoning about 
eth ica l,  s c ie n t if ic ,  and ordinary questions may w ell be of value to the 
rhetorician.
CHAPTER II
THE ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF 
STEPHEN TOULMIN
Introduct ion
Toulmin an  A n a l y t i c  P h i l o s o p h e r
S t e p h e n  Toulmin p l a c e s  h i m s e l f  in the  c o n t e x t  e s t a b l i s h e d  in the
p r e c e d in g  c h a p te r  b y  s t a t i n g  tha t  h i s  brand o f  p h i l o s o p h y  i s  n o t ,  a s
so m e  c r i t i c s  c o n t e n d ,  L o g i c a l  P o s i t i v i s m  but  " i t s  yo u n g e r  brother  c a l l e d
A n a ly t i c  or L i n g u i s t i c  p h i l o s o p h y .  He p a y s  tribute to M a c h  a nd  the
Vienna C i r c l e  and  t h e n  o b s e r v e s ;
The other  c h i e f  s o u r c e  o f  r e c e n t  a n a l y t i c  p h i l o s o p h y  h a s  b e e n  the  
work o f  P r o f e s s o r  G . E .  M oore  . . . .  In t h i s  c o u n tr y  i t  h a s  b e e n  
the  param ount  i n f l u e n c e :  i n d e e d ,  I and  many o f  my c o l l e a g u e s  
w o u ld  r e j e c t  th e  t i t l e  o f  L o g i c a l  P o s i t i v i s t s ,  no t  o n l y  on d o c t r in a l  
g r o u n d s ,  but  a l s o  partly  o u t  o f  c h a u v i n i s m .  W e  may s y m p a t h i s e  
w ith  the i d e a s  o f  Ayer and  the  Vienna C i r c l e ,  but  w e  do  n o t  b e l o n g  
w ith  t h e m . ^
S i n c e  Toulm in  s e e m s  to prefer the u s e  o f  the  term " a n a l y t i c  
ph i lo so p h y "  a nd  b e c a u s e  o f  the s o m e t i m e s  q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g  u s e  of
"L og ica l  P o s i t i v i s m  and  After or Back to A r i s t o t l e ,  " U n i v e r s i t i e s  
Q u a r te r ly , XI (Augus t ,  1957) ,  3 3 6 .
"Ibid.  , 3 3 8 .
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the term " l i n g u i s t i c  p h i l o s o p h y "  b y  i t s  c r i t i c s ,  the  former term and  
" func t iona l  a n a l y s i s "  w i l l  b e  u s e d  in t h i s  s t u d y .  W h e n  th e  term 
" a n a l y t i c  p h i l o s o p h y "  i s  e m p l o y e d ,  i t w i l l  be  u n d e r s t o o d  h e n c e fo r t h  
to refer  to the  " funct iona l"  branch o f  a n a l y t i c  p h i l o s o p h y .  For,  a s  
Toulmin h a s  i n d i c a t e d ,  h e  o w e s  a s p e c i a l  d e b t  to  th e  w o r k s  o f  Ludwig
3
W i t t g e n s t e i n .
Toulmin i s  a p r o l i f i c  wri ter  on  a w i d e  v a r i e t y  o f  t o p i c s .  Like  
the a n a l y t i c  p h i l o s o p h e r  p r e v i o u s l y  d e s c r i b e d  b y  Q u in to n ,  he  regard s  
p h i l o s o p h y  a s  a t e c h n i c a l  job  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  s p e c i f i c  p r o b l e m s ,  
e s p o u s e s  no W e l t a n s c h a u u n g , an d  e x p r e s s e s  o p i n i o n s  on  current  a f f a i r s  
a s  a c i t i z e n  a nd  not  a s  a p h i l o s o p h e r .  He h a s  w r i t t e n  s e v e r a l  b o o k s  in 
p h i l o s o p h y ,  nu m e r ou s  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  a r t i c l e s ,  r e v i e w e d  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
w o r k s  for v a r i o u s  p r o f e s s i o n a l  j o u r n a l s ,  a n d  e x p r e s s e d  h i s  v i e w s  on  
e d u c a t i o n a l ,  s c i e n t i f i c ,  a nd  p o l i t i c a l  m a t t e r s . ^
The v o l u m e  o f  work he h a s  p r o d u c e d  and  h i s  s ta t u r e  in p r o f e s s i o n a l  
p h i lo so p h y  arc r e m ar k ab le  in v i e w  o f  h i s  a g e .  H i s  f i r s t  major work,
The Pin 1' soph  y of  S c i e n c e  (London; H u t c h i n s o n  and  C o . , L t d . ,  
1053) ,  7 .
4
I b i d . , 344 4 7 .  This  v i e w  i s  a l s o  e x p r è s s e d  in h i s  a r t i c l e  
" i’l in c ip h .  s o f  M o r a l i t y , "  P h i l o s o p h y , XXXI (Apri l,  1 9 5 6 ) ,  1 4 2 - 5 3 .
5
A br ief  look at  the t i t l e s  o f  h i s  w o r k s  i n c l u d e d  in the b i b l io g r a p h y  
w i l l  bear out  t h i s  o b s e r v a t i o n  and g i v e  o n e  an  id e a  o f  the number and  
v a r ie t y  of  w o r k . ■ h a s  p r o d u c e d .
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An Examination of The Place of Reason in E th ic s ,  ^ appeared in 1950 
when he w as tw en ty-e igh t years of a g e .  This was hailed as  "probably
7
the most important book on e th ic s  s in ce  Moore's Principia E thica . " 
and w as "the e a r l ie s t  book on e th ics  to present the viewpoint of modern
O
lin g u is t ic  a n a ly s is ,  " In v iew  of his youth, one can expect that his
future contributions w il l  extend those covered in the present study and
that he w ill  continue to re-sh ap e  and perfect h is  th eor ies .
The Scope of This Study 
of Toulmin's Works
In v iew  of the volume and d iversity  o f Toulmin's writings only
a portion of them w ill  be reviewed in this study. None of h is  non-
ph ilosophical contributions w ill  be considered and only a fev/ o f  h is
ph ilosophical a r t ic les  w ill  be examined. The cho ice  of works and the
degree of em phasis  placed upon them w ill  be determined by their potential
utility  to the fie ld  of rhetoric.
The in vestigation  of Toulmin's works w ill be divided into three
sec t io n s  which re f lec t  the major top ics  upon which he has written, i .  e . ,
s c ie n c e ,  e th ic s ,  and argument. The re levance of the la s t  two top ics
6
(Cambridge: University P ress, 1950).
^Tho Times Literary Supplement (London), January 26, 1951, p. 57
a
"Stephen Toulmin, " The C on c ise  Encyclopedia of Western  
Philosophy and P h ilosophers, ed. J. O. Urmson (New York: Hawthorne 
Books, I n c . ,  1960), 380.
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T o u lm in 's  P h i l o s o p h y  o f  S c i e n c e  
The P h i l o s o p h y  o f  S c i e n c e  h a s  b e e n  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  a s  "the f ir s t
c o m p r e h e n s i v e  in te r p r e ta t ion  b y  a s tu d e n t  o f  the  la ter  W i t t g e n s t e i n  . , .
13to u nd ers tand  the p r o c e d u r e s  and  t er m in o lo g y  o f  s c i e n c e . "  Tou lm in 's
purpose  w a s  to e x p l a i n  to the laym an  the typ e  o f  r e a s o n i n g  i n v o l v e d  in
the  work o f  the p h y s i c a l  s c i e n t i s t  in o p p o s i t i o n  to the v i e w  tha t  s u c h
r e a s o n i n g  i s  to b e  e q u a t e d  w i th  formal l o g i c .  His  method i s  t y p i c a l
o f  current a n a l y t i c  p h i l o s o p h y .  He b e g i n s  b y  pay ing  a t t e n t io n  to the
c o n f u s i o n  w h ic h  r e s u l t s  b e c a u s e  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  m is u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  The
s c i e n t i s t  and  the  p o p u la r i z e :  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  i d e a s  u s e  comm on w ords  in
a very  s p e c i a l i z e d  s e n s e  w i t h o u t  r e a l i z i n g  tha t  the laym an  w i l l  not
und er s tan d  the m ult i tud e  o f  s p e c i a l  a s s o c i a t i o n s  that  are b u i l t  into the
s c i e n t i f i c  u s e  o f  the v /ords .  Toulmin i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  problem by  sa y in g :
To a man tra ined  in the  u s e  o f  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  k in d s  o f  g e o m e t r y  the  
phrase  " t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l  sur face"  may no l o n g e r  be  a s e l f -  
c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  but  for him to u s e  i t  in ta lk in g  to a n o n - m a t h e m a t i c ia n  
i s  to in v i t e  i n c o m p r e h e n s i o n .  And w h a t  a p p l i e s  to " t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l  
s u r f a c e s "  a p p l i e s  e q u a l l y  to " i n v i s i b l e  l ight" and  the l ik e ;  v/hen  
s c i e n t i f i c  n o t i o n s  are b e i n g  p o p u la r i z e d ,  i t i s  n e c e s s a r y  to e x p l a in  
th e  po int  o f  s u c h  p h r a s e s ,  i n s t e a d  of  making an  u n e x p l a i n e d  u s e  o f  
t h e m .
To d e s c r i b e  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  of  l i n g u i s t i c  c o n f u s i o n  Toulmin Introduces  
the  term " l a n q u a g e - s h i f t .  " By t h i s  term he d i s t i n g u i s h e s  b e t w e e n  "an
13
M i c h a e l  S c r iv c n ,  Rovlcvv of  The Ph i lo  s o n h y  of  S c i e n c e , 
P h i l o s o p h i c a l  R e v i e w . LXIV (January, 1 Z 4 .
^^The P h i l o s o p h y  of  S c i e n c e , 13.
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account o f  the theory in the new terminology — in 'participant's  
language' — and an account in 'onlooker's l a n g u a g e . T h e  
problem here is  not Just l in g u is t ic ,  it is  lo g ica l  a s  w e l l .  When the 
ph ysica l s c ie n t is t  s ta te s  that light "travels" in a "straight l in e ,  " 
the layman understands "travel" and "straight line" but not the log ic  
which a llo w s  the p h y sica l  s c ie n t is t  to v iew  light and dark in th is  w ay .  
Toulmin draws an analogy betw een  explanation of sc ie n t if ic  id eas  by 
the s c ie n t is t  to the layman and the te llin g  of bed-tim e stor ies  to 
children:
Some nights we te l l  them stor ies  from h istory , other nights ancient  
myths; som etim es le g e n d s ,  som etim es fa b le s ,  som etim es accou n ts  
of things we o u rse lv e s  have done . . . .  A c lev er  ch ild , no doubt 
soon learns to spot from internal ev id en ce  what kind of story ton ight's  
story is; and what sort o f  people its  characters are— fabulous , 
legendary, or h is to r ica l .  But to begin  with w e have to expla in  in 
a s id e s ,  what the lo g ica l  sta tus of each character and story is  . . .  .
So a ls o  in popular sc ien ce :  the layman is  not just ignorant of  
the theories  of s c ie n c e ,  but a ls o  unequipped to understand the terms 
in which a s c ie n t is t  w il l  naturally begin  to explain  them. To explain  
the s c ie n c e s  to him only  by potted theories and v iv id  a n a lo g ie s ,  
without a good number of lo g ica l  a s id e s ,  is  accordingly  like  te ll in g  
a child a ll  the sorts of s tor ies  we do teU children and not warning 
him how very different they are . . . .
One must, therefore, not only  understand the literal meaning of 
the s tor ies  s c ie n t i s t s  te ll  about the facts  of the ph ysica l world but a lso  
understand the various lo g ica l  b a s e s  implied in their exp lan ation s . In 
order to reach th is  understanding Toulmin su g g e s ts  that one fo llow  the
15
Ib id .
16
I b i d . , 15 .
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th e  b a c k i n g *  for it; f i r s t ,  our e x p e r i e n c e  o f  e v e r y d a y  phenom ena  
l i k e  t h o s e  o f  l ig h t  and  s h a d e ;  s e c o n d ,  the  p r a c t i c a l  s k i l l s  and  
t e c h n i q u e s  w h ic h  h a v e  b e e n  d e v e l o p e d  a s  a r e s u l t  of  t h i s  e x p e r i e n c e ;  
and th ird,  t h o s e  r e g u l a r i t i e s  in o p t i c a l  phenom ena  w h ic h  are not  
s t a t e d  but  t a k e n  for granted  and  e n s h r in e d  in our e v e r y d a y  l a n g u a g e .
P e o p le  k n o w ,  for e x a m p l e ,  that  the  h igher  the  sun r i s e s  in t h e  s k y ,
th e  shorter are the  s h a d o w s  c a s t  b y  the  o b j e c t s  i t i l l u m i n a t e s ;  and  that ,
a s  i t  m o v e s  a c r o s s  the s k y ,  s o  do the s h a d o w s  turn w i th  i t .  This
k n o w l e d g e  l ed  to the t e c h n i q u e s  e m p lo y e d  by  th e  m akers  o f  s u n d i a l s , w h o ,
in the c o u r s e  o f  the ir  t r a d e ,  d e v e l o p e d  a fa m i l ia r i t y  w i th  o p t i c a l  phenom ena
w h ic h  prov ided  a s e c o n d  s tar t in g  po in t  for o p t i c s .  There w a s  a further
r a n g e  o f  p h y s i c a l  r e g u l a r i t i e s ,  w i th  w h ic h  e v e r y o n e  b e c a m e  fam i l iar  a t
an  e a r ly  a g e ,  but  w h ic h  w e r e  r a r e ly  s t a t e d .  Toulmin g i v e s  e x a m p l e s  o f
t h e s e  u n c o n s c i o u s  and o f t e n  u n s t a t e d  tr u i s m s  a s  f o l l o w s :
It i s  harder work running up h i l l  than down;  the s h o r t e s t  w a y  to g e t  
to the o p p o s i t e  corner of  a f i e l d  i s  to " fo l lo w  your  n o s e " ;  put  your  
hand in the f ire  and i t  w i l l  burn you - -  t h e s e  are t h in g s  w h i c h  a n y  
c h i l d ,  and many a n i m a l s  t o o ,  may b e  s a i d  to k n o w ,  y e t  th e y  s e e m  
a l m o s t  too t a u t o l o g o u s  w h e n  put into words;  for our r e c o g n i t i o n  o f
20
I b i d . 18. The w or ds  f o l l o w e d  by a * are o n e s  that  w i l l  appear  in 
the - se n se  in w h ic h  they  are u s e d  a b o v e  in T o u lm in ' s  " layout  o f  argument"  
w h i c h  w i l l  be  d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r .  This  no ta t io n  w i l l  b e  u s e d  in t h i s  chapter  
w h e n  d i s c u s s i n g  w orks  other  than h i s  U s e s  o f  Argument (Cambridge:  
U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1958) .  Its  purpose  i s  to i n d i c a t e  that e v i d e n c e  o f  
t h i s  particular pattern of  r e a s o n i n g  i s  to be  found in T o u lm in 's  w o r k s  
prior to h i s  s t a t e m e n t  o f  it in h i s  book on argum en t .  S i n c e  Toulmin  
d o e s  not  make r e f e r e n c e s  from o n e  book to another  nor d o e s  he  e x p l a i n  
e l s e w h e r e  the e v o l u t i o n  o f  h i s  i d e a s  nor the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  o n e  
work to a n o th e r ,  the * n o ta t io n  s h o u ld  o b v i a t e  the n e c e s s i t y  o f  c i t i n g  
numerous  e x a m p l e s  la ter  in order  to support  c o n c l u s i o n s  a b o u t  s u c h  
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
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them c o m e s  b e f o r e ,  rather than a f t e r ,  the d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  our e v e r y d a y  
l a n g u a g e .  The w a y  w e  ord inar i ly  u s e  the  word " s tr a ig h t" ,  for i n s t a n c e ,  
t a k e s  i t  for granted  that  th e  s h o r t e s t  and the  s t r a i g h t e s t  road are  both  
the o n e  you c a n  s e e  s tra ight  a lon g ;  and  our manner o f  u s i n g  w o r d s  
l ik e  "up" and " d o w n ” , "fire" and  "burns" l i k e w i s e  l i n k s  to g e th e r  
th in g s  w e  co m m o n ly  find g o i n g  to g e th e r  . ^
Toulmin then p o s e s  w h a t  i s  probably  the m o s t  important q u e s t i o n  
r e la t in g  to s c i e n t i f i c  r e a so n in g ;
The q u e s t i o n  that f a c e s  us  i s  the q u e s t i o n ,  w h a t  kind o f  s t e p  is  
token w h en  v'e p a s s  from t h e s e  data'-' to the  c o n c l u s i o n  that  " l ight  
t r a v e l s  in s tra ight  b i n e s " . What  t y p e  o f  in fe r e n c e  i s  t h i s ?  Or i s  
the very  word " in fe r e nc e "  a m i s l e a d i n g  name for s u c h  a s t e p ? ^ ^
In order to d e ter m in e  w h a t  kind  of  s to p  i s  i n v o lv e d  in s u c h  r e a s o n i n g ,  
Toulmin c o m p a r e s  it with two  e x a m p l e s  o f  i n f e r e n c e s  w h i c h  a t  f i r s t  g l a n c e  
‘-ecm to r e s e m b l e  i t .  One i s  the kind Rob inson  C r u s o e  w a s  s u p p o s e d  to 
Iv-.v'c made w h en  encounter  tng a foo tpr int  on the b e a c h  of  h i s  i s l a n d ;  he 
' o n c lu d e d  th-it a man had b e e n  w a l k i n g  t h e r e .  The other i s  the kind  that  
the n a tura l i s t  m a k e s  by  p lott ing  the o b s e r v e d  t ra c k s  o f  a l a r g e  number of  
I l o c k s  and c o n c lu d in g  th.at they  a l l  f l e w  a l o n g  "great  c i r c l e s .  " In t h e s e  
I" a s e s  , a s  in In . r r o n c e r n i  ng l ig h t ,  d i s c o v e r i e s  c a n  be sa id  to h a v e  b e e n  
'uade .
There are ,  i o v e v e i  , important  d i f f e r e n c e s . One  might  turn a corner  
and c o me  f ac e  n , C;ee wi t h  the man wiio v/a-s r e s p o n s i b l e  for the footpr int ,  
t u t  i r l l ' n q  f - i ' . ; ' ,  t i n -  a u d y  of s h a d o w s  th<<t l ight  t r a v e l s  in s t ra i ght  l i n e s  i s
2 1
I'm I isr)pi iv nj_ S c i e n c e  , 18 - 1S . 
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t h i s  w a y  o f  ta lk in g  a b o u t  o p t i c a l  phenom ena  —  the  ve r y  id e a  that  o n e
s h o u l d  ta lk  a b o u t  a n y t h i n g  a s  t r a v e l l i n g  in s u c h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  b e in g  
2 4the  r e a l  n o v e l t y .  "
T h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  po int  to  ano th e r ,  and larger ,  d i f f e r e n c e .  In
the e x a m p l e s  o f  R o b in s o n  C r u s o e  and o f  the n a t u r a l i s t ,  the c o n c l u s i o n
i s  e x p r e s s e d  in the  fam i l iar  l a n g u a g e  o f  e v e r y d a y  l i f e ,  and  there  i s  no
q u e s t i o n  o f  g i v i n g  n e w  s e n s e s  to a n y  o f  the  w or d s  i n v o l v e d .  In the
o p t i c a l  c a s e ,  h o w e v e r ,  "both the k e y  w ords  in oui' c o n c l u s i o n  - -  ' l ight '
and ' t r a v e l l in g '  - -  are  g i v e n  n e w  u s e s  in the v e r y  s t a t e m e n t  o f  the
d i s c o v e r y .  U n l i k e  the  s t a t i c  c o n c e p t i o n  that  o n e  may h a v e  had
be fore  the  " d i s c o v e r y ,  " c o m in g  to  think a b o u t  s h a d o w s  and p a t c h e s  of
l i g h t  in a n e w  w a y  l e a d s  o n e  to a s k  n e w  q u e s t i o n s  about  l i g h t .  One
may a s k  n e w  q u e s t i o n s  l ik e  "'Where f r o m ? ' ,  'Where t o ? ' ,  and 'How
f a s t ? ' ,  w h i c h  are i n t e l l i g i b l e  o n l y  i f o n e  th in ks  o f  the phenom ena  in 
2 6t h i s  n e w  w a y .  "
The d i s c o v e r y  o f  a n e w  w a y  o f  regard ing  o b s e r v a b l e  f a c t s  l e a d s  
both  to n e w  q u e s t i o n s  and to the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  drawing p ic tu r e s  and  
d e v i s i n g  m a th e m a t i c a l  formulae  to add n e w  k n o w l e d g e  w h ic h  w i l l  a l s o  
f i t  the  f a c t s .  Two q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  to t h i s  s t a t e m e n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  n e e d  to 
be m a d e .  First ,  the par ticular  t e c h n i q u e s  n e e d  not  be  a p p l i c a b l e  in a l l  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ;  it i s  e n o u g h  that  the f a c t s  c a n  be  a c c o u n t e d  for over  a
24  25 26
I b i d . , 20 I b i d . , 2 1 .  Ibid.
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w i d e  r a n g e  o f  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  If under  c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  r e f r a c t i o n ,  
d i f f r a c t i o n ,  an d  s o m e  o t h e r  p h e n o m e n a  l im i t  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e s e  t e c h n i q u e s ,  
or r e q u i r e  th em  to l ie  s u p p l e m e n t e d ,  th a t  d o e s  n o t  d e s t r o y  t h e i r  v a l u e  
w i t h i n  th e  w i d e  r e g i o n  to w h i c h  t h e y  a r e  a p p l i c a b l e .  S e c o n d ,  w h a t  i s  
or i s  n o t  to c o u n t  a s  f i t t i n g  th e  f a c t s  h a s  to b e  d e c i d e d ,  a n d  s o m e  
s t a n d a r d s  o f  a c c u r a c y  m u s t  b e  s e t .
T h e s e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  l e a d  the  p h y s i c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s  to r e g a r d  their
o w n  d i a g r a m s  d i f i e i e n t l y  than do l a y m e n .  Tor T o u lm in  p o i n t s  o u t .
The p h y s i c i s t ' s  d ia g r a m  i s  not  v a l u e d  for w h a t  t h e  i n a n - i n - t h e - s t r e e t  
w o u l d  re g a r d  a s  a l i k e n e s s ,  s i n c e  the  p h y s i c i s t ' s  n o t i o n  o f  l i g h t  
d e p a r t s  in impoirant  r e s p e c t s  from t h e  e v e r y d a y  o n e :  s t i l l  l e s s  i s  i t
v a l u e d  on a e s t h e t i c  g r o u n d s .  I t s  p o in t  i s  a more  p r o s a i c  o n e ,  th a t  
by  t h e  u s e  o f  d i a g r a m s  i t  h a s  b e e n  fo und  p o s s i b l e  to s h o w ,  nr to  
e x p l a i n ,  o v e r  a w i d e  r a n g e  o f  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a n d  to a h i g h  d e g r e e  
o f  a c c u r a c y ,  w h a t  o p t i c a l  p h e n o m e n a  a r e  to h e  e x p e c t e d .  ^^
W h a t  t h e  p h y s i c i s t  h a s  to o f f e r  i s  a v e r y  u s e f u l  m o d e l  w h i c h  a l l o w s  
o n e  TO  s a y  that p h e n o m e n a  c a n  b e  r e g a r d e d  in a c e r t a i n  w a y .  In f a c t ,  
s o m e  s c i e n t i s t s  w o u l d  smv that  s u c h  m o d e l s  a l l o w  o n e  to s a y  t h a t  t h e y  
•'lUSt b e  reciarded in <: p .m t icu la r  w a y .  S u p p o s e ,  lor e x a m p d e ,  a p h y s i c i s t  
a s k e d  to e x p l a i n  a partir ul a r p h e n o m e n o n ,  i . e .  , th a t  th e  s u n , from an  
a n g l e  o f  c l e v . i l i o n  o! 3()^\ i s  s h i n i n g  d i r e c t l y  o n  a s i x - f o o t - h i g h  w a l l  
c a s t i n g  a s h a d o w  ten an d  o n e  h a l f  f e e t  d e e p  on  the  l e v e l  gr ou n d  b e h in d  
a w . j l i .  'fr.)ub;n n . supp.ases  tiin a n s w e r  a s  f o l l o w s .
"Wel l ,  t ha ' s e a s y  e n o u g h , "  tlie p h y s i c i s t  wi l l  s a y .  "Light
7 /
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t r a v e l s  in s t r a ig h t  l i n e s ,  so  the  depth  o f  the s h a d o w  c a s t  by  a w a l l  
on w h i c h  the  sun i s  d i r e c t l y  s h i n in g  d e p e n d s  s o l e l y  on  the  h e i g h t  
o f  the  w a l l  and  the a n g l e  o f  the e l e v a t i o n  of  the s u n .  If the  w a l l  
i s  s i x  f e e t  h igh  and the  a n g l e  o f  e l e v a t i o n  o f  the su n  i s  3 0 ° ,  the  
s h a d o w  m u st  be  t e n  and  a h a l f  f e e t  d e e p .  In the  c a s e  d e s c r i b e d ,  
i t  j u s t  f o l l o w s  from the  P r in c ip le  o f  the R e c t i l in e a r  Propagat ion  o f  
Light that  the depth  o f  the s h a d o w  m ust  b e  whar it i s .  "
W hat  t y p e  o f  r e a s o n i n g  i s  i n v o l v e d  in the p h y s i c i s t ’s  a n s w e i  ?
N o t  a bare  i n f e r e n c e  from o n e  s tr a ig h t - fo r w a r d  m a t t e r - o f - f a c t  to  
a d i f f e r en t  o n e ,  for,  a s  Hume r ig h t l y  i n s i s t e d ,  there  c a n  be  no 
"must" a b o u t  a n y  s u c h  i n f e r e n c e  —  o n l y  a " u s u a l ly  d o e s " .  Not  
a d e d u c t io n  from a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n ,  the  p r in c ip l e  i s  j u s t  n o t  true: 
in d i f f r a c t i o n ,  r e fr a c t io n  and s c a t t e r i n g  l i g h t  c e a s e s  to t ra v e l  In 
s tra ight  l i n e s .  Further, there  i s  n o th ing  in the  p r i n c ip l e  a b o u t  
a l l  s h a d o w s  b e i n g  t e n  f e e t  s i x  i n c h e s  d e e p ,  rather than  f i f ty  f e e t  
or two f e e t ,  s o  the o n l y  i n f e r e n c e  o f  a s y l l o g i s t i c  kind  o n e  c o u l d  
look  for w o u ld  be  "al l  l i g h t  t r a v e l s  in s t r a ig h t  l i n e s ,  w h a t  v/e h a v e  
here i s  l ight ;  s o  w h a t  w e  h a v e  here  t r a v e l s  in a s t r a i g h t  l i n e " ,  and  
t h i s  l e a v e s  the  s u b s t a n t i a l  s t e p  u n a c c o u n t e d  for . In a n y  c a s e ,  i f  
the i n f e r e n c e  w e r e  o f  a s y l l o g i s t i c  k ind ,  i t  w o u ld  b e  o p e n  to the  
o b j e c t i o n  that  l o g i c i a n s  h a v e  a l w a y s  s a id  i t  w a s ,  that  of  c i r c u l a r i t y  - -  
s i n c e  o n e  w o u ld  be  j u s t i f i e d  in s a y i n g  o n l y ,  "Light, a l w a y s  h a s  
t r a v e l l e d  in s t r a ig h t  l i n e s ;  w h a t  w e  h a v e  here  i s  l ig ht ;  s o  w h a t  w e  
h a v e  here  w i l l  a l m o s t  c e r t a i n l y  trave l  in a s tr a ig h t  l i n e " .  S om e h ow  
none  o f  the k in d s  o f  i n f e r e n c e  w e  are  a c c u s t o m e d  to from the l o g i c -  
b o o k s  s e e m s  to f i t  the  c a s e .
Th is  s h o u l d  not  s u r p r i s e  u s .  The f a c t  o f  the matter i s  that  w e  
are  f a c e d  here  w i th  a  n o v e l  method o f  drawing I n f e r e n c e s  - -  o n e  w h ic h  
the w r i ters  o f  b o o k s  on  l o g i c  h a v e  not  r e c o g n i z e d  for w h a t  i t  i s .  The 
n e w  w a y  o f  regard in g  o p t i c a l  phenom ena  b r in gs  w i th  i t a f re sh  w a y  of  
drawing  i n f e r e n c e s  a b o u t  o p t i c a l  p h e n o m e n a . ' ' " '
There are  three i d e a s  w h ic h  Toulmin h a s  pursued up to th is  point  
w h ic h  are  par t icu lar ly  r e l e v a n t  to t fi is  s tu d y .  F i»st ,  the d i s c o v e r y  of  
n e w  w a y s  o f  v i e w i n g  p h y s i c a l  phenom ena i s  not  .in i n f e r e n c e  in the  
ordinary s e n s e  o f  the w ord .  S e c o n d ,  that  the l a n g u a g e  . .h o s e n  to d e s c v i l ’
^ ® I b i d . ,  2 4 .  “ •‘l i d d . ,  : - h
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n e w  w a y s  o f  v i e w i n g  p h y s i c a l ,  f a c t s  wi .l l  pdii.3a.l.!y d e t e r m i n e  wrtai  fn.rther 
q u e s t i o n s  are  r a i s e d  a b o u t  t h e s e  f a c t s .  And ü i i i d ,  th a t  th e  l a y m a n  u n d e r  
s t a n d s  t h e  l i t e r a l  m e a n i n g  o i  m a n y  s c i e n t i f i c  s t a t e i r c r ^ t s  b u t  n o t  t . f i c - i :
.more im p o r ta n t  u n d e r l y i n g  " l o g i c . "
A l t h o u g h  T o u lm in  p u r s u e s  t h e s e  a n d  m a n y  o t h er  ma tter s i n  
( . . o n s id e r a b le  d e t a i l ,  th e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  . s i . u d v  d o  n o i .  p e i n - i n  a  f u l l  
e l a b o r a t i o n  o f  h i s  v i e w s .  The  q u e s t i o n ,  h o w c v r  r ,  w h d c b  i s  c e n t n a l  t o  
th e  th r e e  o b s e r v a t i o n s  a l r e a d y  i n d i c a t e d  i s ;  w h a t  i s  the l o g i c a l  s t a t u s  
o i  " d i s c o v e r y "  in  t h e  p h y s i c a l  s c i e n c e s  and. w.hac f u r t h e r  o b s e r v a t i o n s  
c a n  b e  m a d e  in  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  s u c h  d i s c o  v o n  e s  ?
The " d i s c o v e r y "  i t s e l f ,  in  t h e  p h y s i c a l  s c i e n c e  s , i s  n o t a n  
i n f e r e n c e ,  b u t  i s  a u s e f u l  w a y  o f  r e g a r d in g  pheruimerc.i . f r o m  t h i s  w a y  
o f  v i e w i n g  r e a l i t y ,  m o d e l s  a r e  c o n s t r u c t e d  w h i c h  s u g g e s t  i'uithcm w a y s  u; 
w h i c h  p h e n o m e n a  c a n  b e  e x p l a i n e d .  The u t i l i t y  o f  th e  m o d e l s  Is tested  
b y  o b s e r v a t i o n  a n d  l a b o r a t o r y  e x p e r i m e n t ,  a n d  ".taws o f  n a tu re"  arc  id.-r 
f i o d .  To e v e r y  lav /  t h e r e  c o r r e s p o n d s  .-i - e t  o.< s t h t c n e p t s  of  th e  form "X 
1.:)w  h a s  b e e n  found  to h o l d ,  or n o t  to h o l d ,  loi  s u c h  -arid - s u c h  s y s t e m s
under  s u c h - a n d - s u c h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
,31) In or de  I to dis:., o v e r  h o v /  fai r..h'
r a n g e  o f  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  c a n  b e  e x t e n d e d ,  a g i e o t  d e a l  o f  r o u i i n c  rruscatch  
IS u n d e r t a k e n ,  " r e s e a r c h  w h i c h  c a n  in no v\-ay hv to c a l l  iû  q u e s t i o n
t'po truth,  or a c c e p t a b i l i t y ,  o f  the  l a w  i t s e l f . " ' ^  U n e  m a y  acoi . 't  a. pioi'O
^ ^ \ b i d .  , 7 8 . I I ' . ' i d
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Id w  t e n t a t i v e l y ,  h y p o t h e t i c a l l y ,  a s  a g u i d e  to furth.er e x p e r i m e n t s ,  to  
s e e  w h e t h e r  the  p h e n o m e n a  a l w a y s  h a p p e n s  s o .  On t h i s  l e v e l  o n e  m a y  
a s k ,  "Is X ' s  h y p o t h e s i s  true or f a l s e ? " ,  m e a n i n g ,  " H a v e  any l i m i t a t i o n s  
b e e n  fo u n d  to  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  h i s  f o r m u l a ? "  But ,  a s  T o u lm in  p o i n t s  
out;
. . . v e r y  s o o n  —  i n d e e d ,  a s  s o o n  a s  i t s  f r u i t f u l n e s s  h a s  Im-c-n 
e s t a b l i s h e d  - -  t h e  for mula  in our h y p o t h e s i s  c o m e s  to b e  t r e a t e d  
a s  a l a w , i . e .  , a s  s o m e t h i n g  o f  w h i c h  w e  m a y  a s k  n o t  "Is i t  t r u e ? "  
but  " W h e n  d o e s  i t  h o l d ? "  W h e n  t h i s  h a p p e n s ,  i t  b e c o m e s  part  o f  
t h e  f r a m ew o r k  o f  . . .  a t h e o r y ,  a n d  i s  t r e a t e d  a s  a s t a n d a r d .  
D e p a r t u r e s  from t h e  l a w  a n d  l i m i t a t i o n s  or; i t s  scot .'e . • • c o m e  to  
be s p o k e n  o f  a s  a n o m a l i e s  and  t h o u g h t  o i  a?, t h i n g s  In n e e d  o f  
e x p l a n a t i o n  . . . a n d  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  ti ie s t a t e m e n t  o f  th e  l a w  
c o n i e s  to b e  s e p a r a t e d  from s t a t e m e n t s  a b o u t  th.r. s c o p e  and  a p p l i  - 
c a t i o n  o f  t h e  l a w .
T o u l m i n  f e e l s  t h a t  o n e  c a n  d i s t i n g u i s h ,  in a- ,y  S'si;;no.e, b e t w e e n  
p r o b l e m s  w h i c h  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  u n d er  di scu.s  s i o n , .and Luo s e  •Vir!.v-.r pcûi.dçm 
wùiose  s o l u t i o n s  h a v e  to  b e  t a k e n  for g r a n t e d  i f  . .uriru t m e b t t  nis are e v r n  
to bo s t a t e d .  It i s  in t h i s  s e n s e  th a t  he  c o n t r n h s  t e a t  " ih : pro p u s :  t i e r  s 
o i  an  e x a c t  s c i e n c e  form a r i i e r a rch y ,  and  a c  .b>;.;.:r ncvin e r o t ’r p. --nd. 
j u s t  a s  a b r i c k l a y e r  i s  o n l y  c a l l e d  u po n  a t  a  qi.,c,n ;r.;nri..;nt to n c t o ; m i n e  
the  p o s i t i o n s  o i  th e  b r i c k s  in a s i n g l e  <:ourse w.;ndi  in t h e n  turn w i i i  
b e c o m e  th e f o u n d a t i o n  foi t h e  n e x t  coui .- ie • s c  tin - i'Ci'>nti;d. i s  .only  
c a l l e d  upon  at  a n y  o n e  t i m e  to in \  e  s t n y  t, the ’ i c H - ih ty  o i  st.j t r - p- 
a t  o n e  l e v e l .  " e s t a b l i s h e d "  . u d  "h" I'c i. .. i i " u s ' s i  .n. 'e. ’s
32 i i
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therefore  n e e d  to be  u n d er s to o d  in terms o f  the d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  the
parts of a s c i e n c e  that  are  a c t u a l l y  b e in g  c a l l e d  in q u e s t i o n ,  and t h o s e
34w h ic h  m ust  be  tak e n  for granted in order to s t a t e  working p r o b le m s .
Tou lm in 's  F o r e s ig h t  and U n de rs tand ing
F o r e s ig h t  and U n d e r s t a n d i n g : An Enquiry in to  the A im s  o f  S c i e n c e
i s  a rewrit ten  and e x p a n d e d  v e r s i o n  of  a s e r i e s  of  l e c t u r e s  Toulmin
p r e s e n te d  at  Indiana U n i v e r s i t y  in March,  1 960 .  It i s  o n l y  115 p a g e s
in l ength  and i t s  b r e v i ty  i s  o n e  o f  i t s  main c r i t i c i s m s . Yet ,  a lthough
th i s  c r i t i c i s m  i s  v a l i d ,  Toulmin a t te m p ts  o n l y  l im ited  o b j e c t i v e s  and
p r o p o s e s  on ly  o n e  main t h e s i s .  H is  t h e s i s  and the method by  w h ic h
he  proposed  to support  i t  w e r e  c l e a r l y  summarized  by the  author in the
in troduct ion  to h i s  work.
Oui d i s c u s s i o n  w i l l  h a v e  three p h a s e s .  The f ir s t  n e e d  i s  to e x o r c i z e  
the dream o f  s ta t in g  the  c e n tr a l  a im o f  s c i e n c e  in a s i n g l e ,  a l l -  
embracing  p h r a s e .  (Words l ik e  "pred ic t ion" ,  a s  w e  s h a l l  s e e ,  
c o n c e a l  h idden  a m b i g u i t i e s .  S c i e n c e  i s  c e r t a i n l y  not  a matter o f  
f o r e c a s t i n g  a l o n e ,  s i n c e  w e  ha v e  to d i s c o v e r  a l s o  e x p la n a to r y  
c o n n e c t i o n s  betweer .  the h a p p e n in g s  w e  p r e d i c t . )  Our s e c o n d  and  
c h i e f  b u s i n e s s  i s  to e x a m i n e  some s e l e c r e d  e x a m p l e s  w h ic h  i l lu s tr a te  
what  s c i e n t i f i c  e x p l a n a t i o n s  i n v o l v e  in p r a c t i c e .  (We s h a l l  be  forced  
at  th is  s t a g e  to r e c o g n i z e  the importance  of  cer ta in  " i d e a l s  o f  natural  
order" and "exp lanatory  parad igm s" ,  . . . w h ic h  h a v e  e s t a b l i s h e d  
t h e m s e l v e s  and d e v e l o p e d  in the c o u r s e  o f  m e n ' s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  h i s t o r y . )  
F i n a l ly ,  w e  s h a l l  c om e  to s e e  that  there i s  o n e  a n a l o g y  in terms o f  
whic h  the d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  i d e a s  c a n  be made i m m e d ia t e ly
34
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This  point  i s  made by Jacques  Barzun in h i s  foreword to the b o o k ,  
o p . c i t .  , 12,  and by R D.  Bradley ,  M i n d , LXXI (October ,  1962) ,  568 .
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i n t e l l i g i b l e  w i t h o u t  g r o s s  o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n .  In e v o lu t i o n a r y  
b i o l o g y ,  the "s u r v i v a l - v a l u e "  o f  a s p e c i e s  n e e d s  to be  r e l a t e d  both  
to i t s  e n v iron m e n t  and  to i t s  a n c e s t r y .  And the  problem o f  " s c i e n t i f i c  
merit" w i l l  turn out  to be  a s im i lar  one;  it i s  the problem o f  s e e i n g  
in  how many w a y s  a n o v e l  s c i e n t i f i c  id e a  may,  in the  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
i t s  i n tr o d u ct io n ,  b e  "better adapted"  than i t s  p r e d e c e s s o r s  or r i v a l s .
Pred ic t ion  and  E xp lan at ion
Toulmin b e g i n s  h i s  s tu d y  by  com paring  t h e  problem o f  d e f in i n g  the
3 7g o a l  o f  s c i e n c e  w i th  d e f in i n g  the  g o a l  o f  s p o r t s .  The l e s s o n  l ea r n e d  
from t h i s  a t tem pt  i s  that  no s i n g l e  g o a l  c a n  b e  a t tr ibuted  to e i t h e r ,  d e s p i t e  
the fact, tha t  som e  s c i e n t i s t s  i n s i s t  on  c la i m in g  th a t  p r e d ic t io n  i s  the 
s i n g l e  b a s i c  g o a l  o f  s c i e n c e .  "The pur p ose  o f  an  e x p l a n a t o r y  s c i e n c e ,  " 
th e y  c l a i m , "is to  e x p l a i n  —  t h a t  i s , to l e a d  to p r e d i c t i o n s ;  and  the  
meri ts  o f  a s c i e n t i f i c  theory  are  in proportion to the c o r re c t  p r e d i c t i o n s  
w h ic h  i t  i m p l i e s . "
After adm it t ing  that  he o n c e  h e l d  t h i s  theory  (it  i s  im p l i e d  in h i s  
P h i l o s o p h y  o f  S c i e n c e ) , he s e e k s  a further c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  th e ory  by  
a n a l y z i n g  what  the term "predict ion" m e a n s  in ordinary  l a n g u a g e .
In p h i l o s o p h y ,  a s  in the  l a w - c o u r t s ,  w ords  v /h ich  are not  
d e f in e d  e x p l i c i t l y  m ust  a t  the o u t s e t  be  in terpreted  in the ir  current  
ve r n a c u la r  s i g n i f i c a t i o n .  So here: the terms 'p r e d ic t ' ,  ' p r e d ic t io n ' ,  
and 'p r ed ic t iv e '  c a n  m o s t  n e a r ly  be  u n d e r s t o o d  in their  f a m i l i a r , n o n -  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  s e n s e  . . . .  On t h i s  s tra ight forward in te r p r e ta t ion  the
36
F o r e s ig h t  and U n d e r s t a n d i n g , oj i^. c i t . , 1 6 - 1 7 .
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This  method o f  a n a l y s t s  i s  very  s imilar to that  u s e d  l^y V / i t l g e n s t c l ;  
in comparing  the many u s e s  of  l a n g u a g e  to the  many t y p e s  o f  garr'.us wtdch  
can be  p laye d  This  c o n c e p t  of  " language  g a me s " i s  c e n tr a l  o ilrc a i l  y 
period of  l i n g u i s t i c  a n a l y s i s .
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v a r ia t io n  s o m e t i m e s  a p p e a r s  in a p o p u la t io n  f ir s t  by  c h a n c e ,  conferr in g  
a t  the t ime no par t icu lar  a d v a n t a g e  on i t s  p o s s e s s o r s ;  y e t  t h i s  sam e  
v a r ia t io n  may s u b s e q u e n t l y  b e c o m e  o f  ex trem e  v a l u e  to  the ir  d e s c e n d a n t s  
a s  the  r e s u l t  o f  c h a n g e s  in the  e n v ir o n m e n t .  6
S c i e n t i f i c  u n d e r s t a n d in g  r e s u l t s  from n o v e l  v i e w s  o f  nature ,  or 
the  k i n d s  o f  q u e s t i o n s  o n e  a s k s  o f  nature ,  c o m b in e d  w i t h  s y s t e m s  o f  
p r e d ic t io n  w h ic h  l e a d  to the temporary e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s .  
The s u r v iv a l  v a l u e  o f  s u c h  t h e o r i e s  i s  d e ter m in ed  b y  the  w a y  in w h i c h  they  
c a n  p rof i tab ly  be  a d a p t e d  to the  e v e r - c h a n g i n g  e n v iron m e n t  in w h ic h  t h e y  
m u s t  w o r k .
Tou lmin on  E th ic s  
The v e r y  t i t l e  o f  T o u lm in ' s  major work on  e t h i c s  s u g g e s t s  i t s  
r e l e v a n c e  to a n  e x a m i n a t io n  o f  the i n t e r r e l a t io n s h ip  o f  l o g i c ,  e t h i c s ,  and  
r h e t o r i c . ^  E xam inat ion  o f  the  P l a c e  o f  R e a s o n  ki  E t h ic s  i s  more than
j u s t  the s t a t e m e n t  o f  an  e t h i c a l  p o s i t i o n .  It i s  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  the  
f u n c t i o n  and d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  e t h i c a l  r e a s o n i n g  a b o u t  part icu lar  e t h i c a l  
q u e s t i o n s ,  and  o f  th e  l im i t  o f  r e a s o n i n g  in d e a l i n g  w i th  e t h i c a l  and  other  
t y p e s  o f  p r ob le m s .
B e c a u s e  i t w a s  h i s  e a r l i e s t  major work,  o n e  may s e e  in it th e  germs  
o f  i d e a s  w h ic h  h e  w a s  la te r  to d e v e l o p  in greater  d e t a i l .  For t h i s  r e a s o n ,  
the  primary c o n c e r n  in t h i s  s e c t i o n  o f  the s tu d y  w i l l  be  w i th  T ou lm in 's
^ ^ i b i d . ,  113
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s i g n i f i c a n t .  For t h e s e  are  e s s e n t i a l l y  n e g a t i v e  t er m s ,  i n d ic a t in g  
how t h in g s  w i l l  b e h a v e  o f  t h e m s e l v e s ,  if no th ing  i s  don e  to them 
from the o u t s i d e .
Evolut ion  o f  S c i e n t i f i c  I d e a s
Tou lm in 's  ar gu m en ts  c o n c l u d e  in h i s  t h e s i s  tha t  w h a t  g i v e s
s c i e n t i f i c  i d e a s  merit  i s  i d e n t i c a l  wi th  "the D a r w in ia n  formula; 'What
g i v e s  them s u r v iv a l  v a l u e  This  su r v iva l  v a l u e  i s  a fu n c t ion  of
both their  a n c e s t r y  and  e n v iro n m e n t .  Toulmin e x p l a i n s  the Darw in ian
a n a l o g y  in t h i s  way:
To b e g i n  w i t h ,  w e  know from b i o l o g y  how a v a r ia t i o n  w h ic h  c o n f e r s  
an a d v a n t a g e  on o n e  s p e c i e s  in o n e  env iron m e n t  may h a v e  no merit  
a t  a l l  for another  s p e c i e s ,  or e v e n  for the sam e  s p e c i e s  in a 
di f f e r en t  e n v ir o n m e n t .  So ,  in s c i e n c e ,  the s a m e  t h e o r e t i c a l  move  
c a n  h a v e  merit  in d e a l i n g  w i th  o n e  group o f  p r o b le m s ,  and  y e t  prove  
an o b s t a c l e  to p r o g r e s s  in another  f i e ld  or s i t u a t i o n .  W e  met th is  
e a r l i e r ,  w h e n  w e  s a w  how  argum en ts  w h ic h  had merit  in the  theory  
o f  i l lu m in a t io n  w e r e  o u t  o f  p l a c e  in g r a v i t a t io n  theory;  and t h e o re t i c a l  
patterns  w h ic h  w e r e  l a r g e l y  unfruitful  in c h e m i s t r y  s u b s e q u e n t l y
b o i e  fruit in g e n e t i c s . ^
B i o l o g i c a l  s p e c i e s  survive,  s o  Toulmin a r g u e s ,  not  by  m eet in g
any  s i n g l e  e v o lu t i o n a r y  de m and,  but b e c a u s e  t h e y  a l o n e ,  from the
a v a i l a b l e  v a r ia n ts  of  ear l i er  forms,  h a v e  "s u c c e s s f u l ! y  met the mult iple
4 Sde m ands  of  the e n v ir o n m e n t .  " What may ha v e  b e e n  at  o n e  l ime an 
unproduct ive  s c i e n t i f i c  theory may in a d i f feren t  e n v l io n m e n t  b e c o m e  
hig h ly  u s e f u l .  For in s c i e n c e ,  a s  w e l l  a s  in b i o l o g y ,  "an i n h ' i  ir.-ibie
4 2  43 44
I b i d . , 7 9 .  I W .  , 111. I b i d .
'^^Ibid.
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v i e w  on  e t h i c s ,  and w i t h  th e  w a y s  in w h ic h  he  d i s c u s s e s  r e a s o n i n g  and
rhetor ic  in a d i f f e r en t  manner  than  he  d o e s  in h i s  other  w o r k s .
Toulmin d i v i d e s  h i s  work into  four p a r t s .  Part One e x a m i n e s
the  "tradit ional" m ethod o f  e t h i c s .  This  method o f  e t h i c s  i s  d i v id e d
in to  three  s e c t i o n s ;  "tlie o b j e c t i v e  approach";  "the s u b j e c t i v e  approach";
and the " imperat ive  a p p r o a c h .  " After d e v o t in g  a ch ap te r  to e a c h ,
Toulmin s u m m a r iz e s  them a s  f o l l o w s :
Each o f  the three  l i n e s  o f  approach  s tar t s  w i th  the  f a l s e  a s s u m p t i o n  
that  som eth ing  w h i c h  i s  s o m e t i m e s  true o f  our e t h i c a l  j u d g m e n ts  i s  
e s s e n t i a l  to  them;
(i) the a d v o c a t e s  o f  the o b j e c t i v e  d o c t r in e  ta lk  a s  though two  
normal,  f a c t u a l l y - i n f o r m e d  p e o p l e  c o u ld  not  h e l p  a g r e e i n g  a b o u t  
v a l u e s  (in the w a y  in w h i c h  t h e y  a g r e e  a b o u t  proper t ie s ) ;
(ii) the a d v o c a t e s  o f  the s u b j e c t i v e  d o c t r in e  ta lk  a s  though  
p e o p le  c o u l d  not  h e l p  h a v i n g  d i f f e r en t  s tan d ar d s  o f  v a l u e  (in the  
w a y  in w h i c h  t h e y  h a v e  i n d e p e n d e n t  t e s t s  o f ,  s a y ,  p l e a s a n t n e s s ) ;
(ii i)  the  a d v o c a t e s  of  the im perat ive  d o c t r in e  ta lk  a s  though
the pure ly  hortatory nature o f  s o m e  e t h i c a l  a r g u m en ts  w e r e  s o m e th in g  
w h ic h  a p p l i e d  to a l l  e t h i c a l  a r g u m e n ts ,  and  c o u ld  no more b e  h e l p e d  
than the hortatory nature  o f  exhorta t ions . '^^
In Part Two Toulmin d i s c u s s e s  ordinary and s c i e n t i f i c  r e a s o n in g
in preparation for h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  the p l a c e  o f  r e a s o n i n g  in e t h i c s .
The g i s t  of  h i s  argument i s  that  there  a t e  many v a r i e t i e s  o f  r e a s o n i n g ,
e a c h  with i t s  ow n  purpose  and e a c h  with i t s  own cr i ter ia  w h e t e b y  good
and bad r e a s o n in g  o f  e a c h  type i s  d i s t i n g u i s h e d .  One c a n n o t , liov^e''-.
47
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hope to answer the question: "What is  good and bad reasoning in 
general ?
The first two parts of The Place of Reasoning Ethics are but 
necessary  preliminaries to the central theme o f his work. In the third 
and fourth sec t io n s  he makes his most important observations . Since  
the points which he makes are numerous and not of equal relevance to 
th is study, only some o f his observations w il l  b e  d is c u s se d  under 
topical headings which depart from his organization of the work.
The Function and Developm ent of Ethics
Toulmin fe e ls  that a l l  communities have some kinds of moral
codes:
In any particular community, certain principles ^Te current — that 
i s  to sa y , attention i s  paid to certain types of argument, a s  appealing  
to accepted  criteria of "real g ood n ess" , "real r ightn ess" , "real 
ob ligation" , e tc .  From th e s e ,  the members of the community are 
expected  to try and regulate their l iv e s  and judgments, ^nd such  
a se t  of princip les , of "prima fac ie  o b lig a t io n s" , of "categorical 
im peratives", is  what we ca ll  the "moral code" of the community.
At the primitive s ta g es  o f  the developm ent of s o c ie t i e s ,  such moral 
cod es  are something fixed and unalterable. However, a s  a resu lt of  
contacts  with other cultures or changes within the community, people begin  
to question not only the r ightness o f  particular a c t io n s ,  but a lso  the 
standards laid down in the co d e . When, and if ,  members of a community 
have the recognized right to cr it ic ize  the ex ist in g  p ractices , and to
48 49
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su g g est  new o n e s ,  a new phase in the development of e th ic s  b eg in s .
Toulmin d escr ib es  this phase a s  fo llows;
In this p h ase , it is  the m otives of ac tion s  and the resu lts  of so c ia l  
p ra ctices ,  rather than "the letter o f  the law", which are em phasized .  
The "deontological" code w as  at first supreme; the "teleological"  
criterion now am plifies  it ,  and provides a standard by which to 
cr it ic ise  it .  This d o es  not mean that morality becom es w holly  
te le o lo g ic a l ,  a s  U tilitarianism  would su g g e s t .  All that happens  
i s  that the in it ia lly  in f lex ib le  system  of taboos is  transformed 
into a developing moral code — a code w hich , in unambiguous 
c a s e s ,  remains mandatory, but w h ose  interpretations in equivocal  
c a s e s  and future developm ent are controlled by appeal to the function  
of eth ics;  that i s , to the general requirement that preventable suffering 
shall be avoided.
Reason in Particular Ethical Q uestions  
Toulmin's v iew  o f the function of e th ic s  is  cr it ica l to an under­
standing o f the role which he fe e ls  reason plays in answering eth ica l  
q u estio n s .  For, a s  the previous quotation im p lies ,  there is  more than 
one kind of reasoning involved  in the proper solution of e th ica l q u estio n s .  
Simple Moral Q uestions
In some moral qu estion s  a rule of action  may be unambiguously  
appropriate. In driving a car on the proper side of the street a person 
fo llow s a law of proper conduct and v io la tes  the code if  he does not. If
50
Ibid . , 1 4 1 -142 . Toulmin quotes Broad to define the terms 
"deontological" and “te leo lo g ica l"  a s  follows:
D eonto log ica l theories  hold that there are e th ica l  propositions of 
the form: "Such-and-such a kind of action  would a lw ays  be right (or 
wrong) in su ch -a n d -su ch  c ircu m stan ces , no matter what its  con seq u en ces  
might b e . "
T eleo log ica l theories hold that the r ightness or wrongness of an 
action Is a lw ays determined by its  tendency to produce certain c o n s e ­
quences which are in tr insica lly  good or bad.
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Reasoninq about the Tustlce 
of Social Practices
Q uestions of so c ia l  ju st ice  are simple to determine in a primitive
so c ie ty  where there can be no appeal from authoritarian rules or taboos.
When one turns to the second , or democratic, phase in the development
of eth ica l standards, there is  room for questions about the standards of
morality th em se lv es .  If a so c ie ty  has a "developing moral cod e , "
changes in the econom ic, so c ia l ,  p o lit ica l,  or p sych o log ica l situation
may lead people to regard the ex ist ing  practices a s  u n n ecessar ily
restrictive or dangerously la x .  "If th is  happens, " Toulmin s a y s ,  "they
may come to a sk ,  for in stan ce , 'Is it right that women should be debarred
from smoking in public?' or 'Would it not be better if there were no mixed
bathing after dark?', in each c a se  questioning the practice concerned a s
a w h o le . " Remembering the function of e th ic s ,  as Toulmin described
it, the answer to these  questions w ill  be reached by estim ating the
probable con seq u en ces  of retaining the present practices , and of adopting
the suggested  alternative.^^ Toulmin put the matter a s  follows:
If, a s  a matter o f  fact, there is  good reason to suppose that the so le  
con seq u en ces  of making the proposed change would be to avoid some 
ex ist in g  d is t r e s s e s ,  then, as  a matter of e th ic s ,  there is  certainly a 
good reason for change . . . .  And what stake may reasonably be risked  
for any particular likelihood of gain is  something ta  be sett led  with 
confidence — if then — by appeal to experience .
So far, Toulmin has d isc u sse d  two kinds of moral reasoning between
54 55 56
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one borrows a book, he should return it or v io la te  the moral code by 
not honoring a promise. In either c a s e  a sp ec if ic  application of an 
artic le  of "the code" is  made. If, however, one a sk s  whether the law  
should be followed or promises kept, no answer by reasonable  appeal to 
the code is  p o s s ib le .  Under some c ircum stances , then, one can e a s i ly  
reason about "the r ightness of a c t io n s .  ^
C onflicts  of Duty
Toulmin illu strates  the problem of co n fl ic ts  in duty with a simple  
example:
. . . the fact that I promised to le t  Jones have his  book back w ill  
seem to me reason enough for taking it to him on time — if that is  
a ll  that there is  to i t .  But, if  I have a cr it ica l ly  il l  relative in the 
h ou se , who cannot be le f t ,  the i s s u e  is  com plicated . The solution  
is  not su ffic ien tly  unambiguous for reasoning from the practice of 
prom ise-keeping to be conclusive: I may therefore argue, "That's a ll  
very w e ll  in the ordinary w ay, but not when I've got my grandmother 
to look after: whoever heard of risking someone e l s e ' s  l i fe  just to 
return a borrowed book?" U n less  ev id en ce  is  produced that the r isk s  
involved in breaking my promise to Jones are even  greater than those  
attending my grandmother, if she i s  le ft  a lo n e ,  I shall conclude that 
it i s  my duty to remain with her.^Z
Given two conflicting  claim s one has to w eigh the r isks a s  w e ll  a s
one can and ch o o se  the le s se r  of two e v i l s .  The appeal to a s ing le  current
principle, although it i s  the primary te s t  of the r ightness o f  an action ,
"cannot therefore be relied on a s  a universal test: where this fa i l s ,  we
53are driven back upon our estim ate o f  the probable co n seq u en ces .  "
51 52 53
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doing so ,  the nature of the inquiry is  clear; someone is  suggesting  
that in the future, when a student w alks around on campus in shorts,  
people should not regard it a s  inappropriate nor condemn such a practice.  
The change proposed is  su ff ic ien t ly  clear for people to d is c u s s  it a s  it 
stands and to make a d ec is io n  about it on its  own merits.
On the other hand, one may a sk  an entirely different kind of moral 
question which Toulmin d i s c u s s e s  a s  follows:
If . . .  I a sk , "Is it  really  right to have only  one w ife ,  like the 
C hristians, or would it be better to have anything up to four, according  
to the old Mohammedan practice ? ", my question is  a good deal l e s s  
in te l l ig ib le .  In the first p la ce ,  there seem s to be a su ggestion  that 
we abandon our present practice in favour of an alternative one; but 
the exact  nature of the change proposed is  not clear; so how can one  
begin to estim ate i t s  probable c o n seq u e n c es?  Secondly, it is  
questionable  whether the practices compared can be regarded as  
"alternatives" at a l l .  The ram ifications, both in Christian and in 
Muslim s o c ie t i e s ,  of the institution of marriage, its  relations to the 
institu tions of property, or parenthood and so on, are so complex  
that there i s  no question of sim ply replacing the one institution  by 
the other.
The two questions seem  to be of the same type s in ce  the suggestion
is  made in each c a se  that currently held va lu es  should be replaced by
others. Both offer a lternatives  to the present value system , but the
a lternatives  cannot be reasoned about in the same w ay. B ecau se , as
Toulmin su ggests;
. . .  if one is  to reason about so c ia l  p ractices , the only o c c a s io n s  
on which one can d is c u s s  the question which of two practices is  the 
better are those on which they are genuine alternatives; when it
^ S b id ,
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w h ic h  i t  i'ô important  to di s t ing  i.ii‘.'h . "Each pro v id e  3 i t s  own l o g i c a l
criteria - -  cr it er ia  whic.h are appropr iate  to the c r i t i c i s m  o f  in d iv id u a l
5  7ac t ion . s ,  or s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e s ,  but  not  b o t h ." '  ' One c a n  j u s t i f y  in d iv id u a l
c o n d u c t  by  r e a s o n i n g  b ac k  to the a c c e p t e d  c o d e  o f  a s o c i e t y  but c a n n o t
.r.-sti.fy i t by  s a y i n g  that  "one m ust  not  i n f l i c t  a v o i d a b l e  su f fe r in g .  "
Tills kind  o f  r e a s o n  i s  appropriate  o n l y  w h e n  d i s c u s s i n g  whether  a s o c i a l
p r ac t ice  s h o u ld  be  r e ta in e d  or c h a n g e d .  Toulmin i l l u s t r a t e s  th is
d i ;P i ’'.ction by  c i t i n g  the e x a m p le  o f  S o c r a te s ;
it v/a s t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  betv.-een the " r eason s"  for a n  in d iv id u a l  
a c ' i o n  and the " r e a so n s"  lor a s o c l e  I p r a c t i c e  'vhich S o c r a t e s  made  
a 5 he v /a i t e d  for the h e m lo c k  l i e  w a s  ready  to d i e  rather than  
r e p u d ia te  U - -  r e f u s i n g ,  w hen  g i v e n  the c h a n c e ,  to e s c a p e  from the  
pr ison  and so  avo i i i  e x e c i t i o n . As an Athcrcan c i t i z e n ,  he s a w  
That  i t  w a s  h i s  dutv  ( l e g a r d J e s s  of  the at  dual  c . o n s e q u e n c e s  in h i s  
part icu lar c a s e )  to rç.- pev.t the verdir't  and s e n t e n c e  o f  the cour t .
'o  h a v e  e ^ i 'apcd  woidr' have  b e e n  to ignore  t in s  duty. ' By do ing  
s o .  he v.'ouid not  mcirdy r.svvc q u e s t i o n e d  the j u s t i c e  o f  the  v e r d ic t  
in h i s  r:a?é; he wou Id ha-, e .re  non ne e d  the Athenian  c o n s t i t u t i o n  
and moral c o d e  a s  a 'v h o le .  '’ '’
T'o? I.i.mited S c o p e  of  
■d. uari son-; B e t w e e n  
Pracr..  e.:
'" .'in :' s  - .ope o f  . - i l i n  . , 1  i c r ;  a o n i n g  , " Ton I min c . on t en r i s  , "is iim.itnd 
a:' c i o l i n c d  i y t'nc n a m e  work o f  o c t i v  ruf'? in w h ic h  it p l a y s  i ts
It for e x a m p le  , ' 'eon le  regard the w ear ing  of  shorts  on c am p us  
!• '-g j r tmig , e id e - t  a ks  it he re ,^ i iy should  l.-e prohib i ted  from
b / - -T
: P i d . . 1 ,1 . I tdd.  , I S O-91
' Ip'dl.  , • bj . ' ' ' i b i d .  , 1S2 .
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would be practical to change from one to the other within one  
so c ie ty  . . . .  If th is  condition Is not sa t is f ie d ,  there i s ,  morally 
speaking, no reasoning about the question , and pretended argu­
ments about the merits o f  rival system s^— personal preference  
apart - -  are o f  value only  a s  rhetoric.
What can be said of the place of reason In e th ic s .  In general,
as  a result of Toulmin's examination of particular s ituations in which
people are led to reason about e th ica l q u estio n s?  The answer is  that
he does  not attempt to g ive  any "theory of e th ic s ,  " but to describe  what
con stitu tes  proper reasoning In certain kinds of moral q u es t io n s .  His
purpose Is to show "how. In particular types of eth ical question and
argument, good reasoning Is d istinguished  from bad, and valid argument
from invalid - -  to be s p e c i f ic ,  by applying to Individual judgements the
te s t  of principle, and to princip les the te s t  of general fecundity.
Beyond the Limits of Ethics 
In Toulmin's v iew  the lim its to the place of reason In e th ic s  a lso  
determines the scope of e th ic s  as a study. Q uestions asked  about e th ics  
to which no valid reason s  can be given are like qu estion s asked  of the 
sc ie n t is t  which are beyond the scope of sc ien t if ic  reasoning. A mother 
can ask a s c ie n t is t  why her child died and get  a s c ie n t if ic  account of  
the death. But a mother who has three children, each of whom died on 
his birthday, cannot ask  the s c ie n t is t ,  "Why?" and rece ive  a sc ien t if ic  
account. Similarly, one may ask in e th ic s ,  "Is this action  co n s is ten t
62 63
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with the moral code?" or "Should th is  part of the moral code be revised  
in th is manner?" But one may not valid ly  ask in e th ic s ,  "Why ought 
one to do what is right?
Toulmin d efin es  several su b jects ,  which are important parts of 
his work on e th ic s ,  a s  being beyond the lim its of eth ica l reasoning.
Before d isc u ss in g  th e s e ,  however, mention should be made of h is  reason  
for c la ss ify in g  them in th is  manner. The reason is  to be found in 
Toulmin's notion of "limiting q u estion s. "
Limiting Questions
Toulmin introduces the idea of "limiting questions" by summarizing 
one of the le s s o n s  to be learned from his a n a ly s is  of reasoning:
In a ll  the modes of reasoning analysed  so far, we found that 
the "reasons" which could lo g ica lly  be given in support of any 
statement formed a finite chain. In every c a s e ,  a point w as  
reached beyond which it  w as no longer p o ss ib le  to g ive "reasons" 
of a kind given until then; and eventually  there came a s tage  beyond  
which it seemed that no "reason" of any kind could be g i v e n . ^5
No reason of any kind could be g iven , Toulmin contends, because  
up until this point he had been interested "in literal answ ers only: so ,  
when faced with requests  for reasp.ns of any kind beyond the point at
66
which th ese  cea sed  to be appropriate we d ism issed  them as  i l lo g ic a l .  "
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Just because  they may be "illogical" does not mean, however, that
people w ill not continue to w ish to ask  them. One may wonder why
he should do what everyone agrees is  "right" and others may seek  non-
sc ien t if ic  explanations to account for the deaths of three children on
their birthdays. Q uestions of th is type, Toulmin s a y s ,  are
. . . questions borrowed from a familiar mode o f reasoning, but 
not doing the job which they normally do within that mode of  
reasoning. It is  characteristic  of them that only  a small change  
is  required, either in the form of the question , or in the context in 
which it i s  a sk ed , in order to bring it unquestionably back into the 
scop e o f  its  apparent mode of reasoning. But it i s  equally  
characteristic  of them that the w ay of answering suggested  by the 
form of words employed w ill  never com pletely sa t is fy  the questioner, 
so that he continues  to ask  the question even after the resources  
of the apparent mode of reasoning have been exhausted . Q uestions  
of th is kind I shall refer to a s  "limiting questions": they are of  
particular interest when one is  examining the lim its and boundaries  
of any mode of reasoning — and eth ica l reasoning in particular.
The important point is  this: there is  a limit to the questions that
can reasonably be ask ed  within any fie ld  of inquiry which are meaningful
within the lo g ic a l  structure of that f ie ld . This may sound like the argument
of the Logical P o s it iv is ts  and their followers who, b eca u se  they fee l that
a ll  utterances which cannot be taken literally  are n o n sen se ,  reject
metaphysical and eth ica l q u est io n s . Toulmin fe e ls  they are m eaningless
only within particular log ica l  structures and are o f  value when understood
for what they are. They "help us to accep t the world, ju st  a s  the
fi  Aexplanations of s c ie n c e  help us to understand it .  " They may a lso
67 68
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be of genuine value within the fie ld s  of rhetoric and relig ion , as  w ill  be
seen , but "limiting questions" can be found in a ll  f ie ld s  as  one attempts
to go beyond the log ica l lim its of that f ie ld . A "limiting question" asked
in one context may be an appropriate one in another.
Reason and Faith
Toulmin s ta te s  very c o n c ise ly  the way in which he v iew s  the
relationship betw een e th ics  and relig ion . "Ethics, " he s a y s ,  "provides
the reasons for choosing  the 'right' course: relig ion  helps us to put our
hearts into it. " A limiting question in e th ic s  may be an appropriate one
for re lig ion . Toulmin g iv e s  the following example:
"Why.ought one to do what is  right, anyway? "
"That is  a question which cannot a r ise ,  for it is  to query the  
very defin ition of 'right' and 'ought'. "
"But why ought one to?" _ .
"Because it is  God's w il l .  "
"And why should one do His w ill ? "
"Because it is  in the^gature of a created being to do the w il l  of 
its  Creator", e t c .
Matters of faith in general and religion in particular are a lso
subject to limiting q u es t io n s .  The sp ec if ic  arguments supporting this
assertion  are not relevant to this study and can be found in Toulmin's
chapter on "Reason and Faith, " but the fact that the lim its of reason
70
are "field dependent" is  c learly  implied in what already has been
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The term " f i e l d - d e p e n d e n t "  i s  o n e  w h i c h  Toulmin i n t r o d u c e s  in
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The u s e  o f  the  term in t h i s  part icular  s t a t e m e n t  i s  c l e a r  in i t s  c o n t e x t .
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Toulmin expla ins the kind of reasoning involved in philosophical
eth ics  in a section  entitled  "Ethical Theories; Rhetoric and Reason. "
As compared with straightforward e th ic s ,  with its  defin ite criteria 
of truth and fa ls ity ,  of va lid ity  and fa l la c io u sn ess ,  of "good" and 
"bad" reasoning, philosophical e th ics  - -  a s  used p o lit ica lly  - -  looks  
very like pure persuasion . Apart from the elementary rules of 
deductive and inductive inference, no fixed log ica l criteria can be 
applied to it; and even those  that do apply help us only to te l l  argu­
ments which appear to be valid from th ose  which do not even appear 
to be . The notion of "logical validity" itse lf  can hardly be applied:  
the only t e s t  by which to decide whether or not a particular argument 
is  appropriate in a g iven  situation l ie s  outside the mode of "reasoning" 
if the philosophical argument lends colour to an eth ical conclusion  
which is  i t s e l f  a just one, then, as  a matter of e t h ic s , it can be 
accepted: if not, we ought to reject it.^^
Toulmin does not mean to g ive  the impression that such arguments
are concerned v/ith the emotions a lo n e . A political use of philosophical
e th ics  "is l e s s  characteristic  an instance  of 'reasoning' than ordinary
75ethics; but that does not make it 'pure persuasion . '" By "pure 
persuasion" Toulmin means the kind involved in a "hell-fire" sermon or 
a politica l oration. In such situations, he f e e ls ,  there is  such a thing 
a s  "a direct appeal to the em otions, a s  arguments designed to ac t  — and 
acting — on the heart a lone , arousing rear and subm ission, affection  or 
sympathy, with the minimum of reasoning. These arguments are 
effect ive  in moving both the uneducated m asses  and the in te l l igen t few. 
Philosophical arguments, Toulmin c la im s, differ In this way:
. . . they act more strongly on the intelligent and sophisticated
^"^Ibid. , 199. ^ ^ I b id . ,2 0 0 .  ^^Ibid.
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sa id . So, too, is  the fact that not a il questions of value can be
answered by appeal to eth ical criteria alone and be totally satisfactory
to the common man.
Ethics and Rhetoric
Toulmin’s brief references to rhetoric in his Place of Reason in
Ethics may be both rewarding and frustrating to the rhetorician. They
may be rewarding b ecau se  he d i s c u s s e s  rhetoric as a means of persuading
people about e th ica l types of q u estion s. They may be frustrating because
Toulmin often im plies that reason and rhetoric are a n t ith e t ica l .
His treatment of rhetoric is within the context of h is  d is c u s s io n
of "philosophical e t h i c s .  ^ In examining this topic, Toulmin argues
that many philosophers put forth e th ica l theories not as an unbiased
search for truth but becau se  such theories have "a rhetorical force useful
7 2in forwarding their particular p o l ic ie s .  " The works of Bentham, Hobbes, 
H egel, and Marx are d isc u sse d  by Toulmin in this manner under the 
interesting heading "Ethical Theories a_s Rhetoric. " All these  men "seem 
to have believed  in the soundness of their arguments, and of their 
conclusions - -  but they all to some extent d isp lay , in their fa l la c ie s ,  
Marx's own se l f -c o n fe s se d  desire not so much to understand the world as  
to change it.
71
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than on the under-edi:cated or stupid; they rely for their e ffec t  on 
familiarity with quite advanced types of reasoning, rather than on 
sim ple-hearted respon se; and the simple are l e s s  prone to be dazz led  
into accepting  them a s  the literal truth than are the educated, for they  
Just m iss  the point. There is  therefore something to be said for 
regarding this type of argument as  a form of "reasoning" — a s  
appealing to a kind of reason , rather than to pure emotion: but it is  
a type of reasoning lo g ic a l ly  l e s s  t y p ic ^ a n d  more complex than 
those  which w e have considered so far.
By the d ist in ct ion s  which he has drawn, Toulmin ind icates  the 
different types o f  reasoning that can be d e tec ted . Within e th ic s ,  reason  
can be used  profitably up to the point o f  limiting q u e s t io n s . In 
philosophical e th ic s ,  reasonin g , "of a type, " can properly be used with 
a limited kind of au d ien ce . With the m a s se s ,  "emotional persuasion"  
would appear to be the only  appropriate to o l.  None of th ese  i s  superior 
to the other on any s c a le  o f  value; each has its  own proper and important 
use  in human affa irs .
Toulmin on Argument 
Introduction
Toulmin's works on e th ics  and sc ie n c e  s tr essed , among other
th ings, the lim its o f  formal log ic  and the fact that reasoning has different
forms and lim itations within various f ie ld s  of inquiry. These ideas  are
78developed further by Toulmin in h is  U ses  of Argument. Although he 
does not mention his earlier works in the book on argument, tliere is  a
77 78
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clear indication that the ideas  expressed  in the U se s  of Argument are 
derived in part from h is  Philosophy o f Science and Place of  Reason in 
Ethics and are a lo g ica l  extension  of his earlier v ie w s .  Since he has  
returned, alm ost e x c lu s iv e ly ,  to writing on sc ien t if ic  to p ics  s in ce  the 
publication of th is  one work on argument, one might even conclude that 
he simply organized, ex tended , and refined h is  earlier id eas  about 
reasoning and took a temporary excursion into the fie ld  of argumentation.
The U se s  o f  Argument i s  more directly related to the study of  
rhetoric than any of h is  other works. It h a s ,  in fac t,  had a good deal
79o f  influence upon recent works in the field of argumentation and d is c u s s io n .
For th is  reason , l e s s  attention w ill  be paid to the parts o f  th is  book which
others have d is c u s se d  than otherwise would be warranted.
Probably the b e s t  description of the U se s  o f  Argument is  that given
by Toulmin himself:
The purpose of th ese  s tu d ies  is  to ra ise  problems, not to so lv e  
them; to draw attention to a fie ld  of inquiry, rather than to survey  
it  fully; and to provoke d is c u s s io n  rather than to serve a s  a system atic  
trea t ise .  They are in three s e n s e s  " e s s a y s " , being at the same time 
experimental incursions into the fie ld  with which they deal; a s s a y s
79
The most ex te n s iv e  use  of Toulmin's U se s  of Argument is  found 
in D ouglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, D e c is io n  by Debate (New 
York: Dodd, Mead and C o . ,  1963). See a lso  Wayne Brockriede and 
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Quarterly Journal of S p ee c h . XLVI (February, 196 0), 44 -  53; Austin J. 
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Francisco: Wadsworth Publishing C o . , 1961), 115-18; and Halbert E. 
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or examinations of specim en concepts drawn rather arbitrarily from 
a larger c la s s ;  and finally  ballons d ' e s s a i , trial ba lloons designed  
to draw the fire of o th e r s .
The problems which he a n a ly zes  are "log ica l  problems" rather
than "problems l o g i c . " He is  concerned not with the kinds of
problems which arise  in the study of formal lo g ic ,  but how log ica l
theories apply in practice and "what connections they have with the
canons and methods we u se ,  in everyday l i fe ,  when we actually  a s s e s s
81the sound ness , strength and c o n c lu s iv e n e ss  of arguments."
Toulmin beg ins h is  inquiry into the nature of argument by posing
what he considers  to be a central question , i . e . , "how far log ic  can
hope to be a formal s c ie n c e ,  and yet retain the p o ss ib il ity  of being
applied in the crit ica l a s se s s m e n t  of actual arguments. " Logic is
concerned, he f e e l s ,  "not with the manner of our inferring, or of questions
of technique: its  primary b u s in ess  is  a retrospective justificatory one - -
with the arguments we can put forward afteiivards to make good our claim
that the con c lu s ion s  arrived at are accep tab le , b eca u se  ju st if iab le ,
82
c o n c lu s io n s . "
The Jurisprudential Analogy 
Logic, Toulmin a r g u e s , Is generalized jurisprudence. In law , and 
argument In general, he questions how far their forms and crit ica l criteria
8 ,;
U ses  of Argument, o p . c i t . , 1
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a ' e  th e  s a m e  for c a s e s  of a l l  t y p e s  a n d  h o w  far t h e y  a re  d e p e n d e n t  upon
the t y p e  of  c a s e  under c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  H e a r i s w e i s  a s  f o l l o w s ;
The s o r t s  o f  e v i d e n c e  r e l e v a n t ,  in c a s e s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  k i n d s  w i l l  
n a t u r a l l y  b e  v e r y  v a r i a b l e . To e s t a l d i s b  n e g l i g e n c e  in  a c i v i l  
c a s e ,  w i l f u l  i n t e n t  in a c a s e  o f  murder ,  th e  p r e s u m p t i o n  o f  
l e g i t i m a t e  birth:  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  w i l l  r e q u i r e  a p p e a l  to  e v i d e n c e  
of  a d i f f e r e n t  k i n d .  On th e  o t h e r  h a nd  th e r e  w i l l ,  w i t h i n  l i m i t s ,  
be  c e r t a i n  b ro a d  s i m i l a r i t i e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  order s o f  p r o c e e d i n g s  
a d o p t e d  in th e  a c t u a l  tr ia l  o f  d i f f e r e n t  c a s e s ,  e v e n  w h e n  t h e s e  a r eÛ O
c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  i s s u e s  o f  a v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  k i n d .
W h e n  o n e  tu r n s  from t h e  c o u r t  o f  l a w  to e v e r y d a y  a r g u m e n t ,  th e
s i t u a t i o n  i s  m u ch  llie s a m e .  The c a s e  w h i c h  o n e  p r e s e n t s  in  d e f e n s e
o f  p a r t i c u l a i  c l a i m s  or s o l u t i o n s  n o r m a l l y  c a n  h e  p r e s e n t e d  in a  s e r i e s
o f  s t a g e s .  " T h e s e , "  T o u l m i n  w a r n s  , " i t  m u s t  b e  r e m e m b e r e d , do n o t
n e c e s s a r i l y  ro rre i -p o n d  to s t a g e s  in  t h e  p r o c e s s  b y  w h i c h  w e  a c t u a l l y
84r e a c h e d  th e  c . i n r - i u s i o n  w e  a r e  n o w  tr y in g  to j u s t i f y . "
A r g u m e n t  a n d  M o d a l s  
In c lm u a c r c i  :.tjr.g "the s t a g e s  i n t o  w h i c h  a j u s t i f i c a t o r y  a r g u m e n t  
.'■■Mturally f a l l s . "  Toulc . in  f i n d s  i t  n e c e s s a r y  to i n t r o d u c e  c e r t a i n  m o d a l  
*: rr>;,s 1 tito tho d w i  I 'o u . ^ F o r  th e  f ir st  s t a g e  o f  a j u s t i f i c a t o r y
83 8 4
[bid . , 1 ( ' .  I b i d . , 1 7 ,
*^ '’Althou',jh Touimi' i  d i s c u s s e s  modal  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  he d o e s  not  de f i ne  
"■rod,i l s . "  Thc  ^ Ui r i t i onirv  of  P h i l o s o p h y , e d . 1. M.  Bal dwin ( Ne w York: The 
M , 1-mil Ion d o . , l ' 'U3) ,  8h , d e i i n c s  mod,,  I ity a s  f o l l o ws ;  "There i s  no a g r e e -  
M'ent mong logic i a-r !o w h a t  moda l i t y  c o n s i s t s  iri; but i t  i s  the l o g i c a l  
u'.;abiic.iti.-ui o f  a  pr opos i t i on  or i t s  c o p u l a ,  or the c o r r e s po n d i n g  q u a n t i f i -  
■ di.on of a [..,rt or i t s  form, in w a y s  e x p r e s s e d  by  the m o d e s  p o s s i b l e .
1 " l u o s s i b l e  , r.or.t i ngnns  . ner o s s a i  i u m . " More s i m p l y ,  m o d a l s  m a y b e  
m r d o d  a s ter ms l ike  "c i r i , "  " p o s s i b l e , "  " n e c e s s a r y , "  and their c o g n a t e s  
■; u'd in the s e n s e  d e s i n b o d  a b o v e .
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a r g u m e n t  i s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  p o s s i b l e  s o l u t i o n s  to p a r t i c u l a r  p r o b l e m s  
under  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  S o m e  s o l u t i o n s  w i l l  b e  more d e s e r v i n g  o f  c o n ­
s i d e r a t i o n  than  o t h e r s ,  e v e n  a t  f i r s t  g l a n c e .  " O n c e  w e  b e g i n  to c o n ­
s i d e r  t h o s e  s u g g e s t i o n s  w h i c h  h a v e  b e e n  a c k n o w l e d g e d  to d e s e r v e  out  
a t t e n t i o n , an d  a s k  w h a t  i s  the  b e a r i n g  on  t h e s e  s u g g e s t i o n s  o f  a n y  
in f o r m a t io n  w e  h a v e  in  oui p o s s e s s i o n ,  a n um be r  o f  t h i n g s  m a y  h a p p e n ,  
in  e a c h  o f  the l e s u l t i n g  s i t u a t i o n s  further  m o d a l  t e r m s  c o m e  in t o  t h e
O C
c e n t r e  o f  th e  p i c t u r e . " It m ay  h a p p e n ,  for e x a m p l e ,  t h a t  o f  th e  s e t
o f  p o s s i b l e  s o l u t i o n s , o n e  m a y  b e  v i e v / e d  a s  i n e s c a p a b l e  or n e c e s s a r y
in t h e  part i cu l . i r  c a s e .  D i s m i s s i n g  for t!io t ime a l l  s o r t s  o f  t e s t s  that
are  n e c e s s a r y  to l e a d  to s u c h  c e r t a i n t y ,  T o u lm in  s u g g e s t s  s o m e  c o m m o n
e x a m p l e s  o f  t hi s  s t a t e  .d  r j ? a , r s .
. . . th ere  i s  om; per s o n  w h o s e  current,  form d e m a n d s  h i s  i n c l u s i o n  
in a t e n n i s  tea-'' d ie  c  . o d e n e e  l e a v e s  no d o u b t  t h a t  t h e  man in th e  
d o c k  comrpuited t!io ' r i me ,  a w a t e r - t i g h t  t h e o r e m  i s  c o n s t r ^ t ^ t e d , a  
s c i e n t i f i c  th eo r y  p a s e s i l l  our t e s t s  w i t h  f l y i n g  c o l o u r s .
In o t h e r  c a s e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  th e r e  m a y  b e  no o b v i o u s  a n d  c e r t a i n
c o n c l u s i o n .  Y e t  i t  mav be p o s s i b l e  to d i s m i s s  s o m e  o f  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n s
whir.'h e a r l i e r  w e r e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  " a s  b e i n g ,  in t h e  l i g h t  o f
88our o t h er  i n ^ o rm a i io n ,  no l o n g e r  d e s e r v i n g  o f  c o n s i d e r a t i o n . "  If o n e  
o f  th e  o r i g i n a l  s u g g e "'fions tu rn s  o u t  to b e  i n a d m i s s i b l e ,  fu rt her  moda l
tff.Tis si i ' .h a s  "(.aruîüt" a n d  " i m p o s s i b l e "  n e e d  to b o  a p p l i e d 89
86„
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Of the remaining poss ib le  so lu tion s, one may seem  to be more 
probable than the rest .  In this ca se  one needs to qualify his co n ­
c lu s io n s  with statements like "probably," "presumably," "almost certain ly , " 
and other such ex p ress io n s .
Toulmin summarizes th ese  s tages  in setting out a justificatory  
argument and indicates their relevance to a ll  f ie ld s  of inquiry in the 
following statement:
In a ll  th is ,  one thing should be noted: in characterizing the 
different s ituations which may arise  in the sett in g -ou t of a justificatory  
argument, one can rely on finding exam ples in many different sorts of  
f ie ld s .  The various phases — first, of setting out the candidate-  
solutions unequivocally  indicated by the ev id en ce ,  ruling out some of  
the in itial p o s s ib i l i t ie s  in the light of the ev id en ce , and the rest — may 
be encountered equally  whether our argument i s  concerned with a 
question of ph ysics  or mathematics, e th ics  or law , or an everyday  
matter of fac t.  In extra-judicial a s  w ell a s  in judicial arguments, 
th ese  b a s ic  s im ilarities  of procedure hold good throughout a wide range 
of fie lds; and, in so far a s  the form of the argument we present ref lects  
th ese  s im ilarities  of procedure, the form of argument in different fie lds  
w ill  be similar a l s o .
The Fields o f  Argument
From this introductory point, Toulmin g o es  on to examine the kinds
of arguments advanced in real life  and to determine in what w ays "the
formalities and structure of arguments change and do not change as  we
move from one sort of claim to another, or between arguments in different 
91
'f ie ld s .'"  Here, Toulmin u ses  the term "field of argument" in a sp ec ia l
Ç0 91
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sen se  which he describes  a s  follows:
Two arguments w il l  be said  to belong to the same fie ld  when the 
data and con clu s ion s  in each of the two arguments are, resp ec tiv e ly ,  
of the same lo g ica l type: they w ill  be said to come from different 
f ie ld s  when the backing or the con clu s ion s  in each of the two_ 
arguments are not of the same log ica l t y p e .9%
Some a sp ec ts  of the argumentative p ro cess ,  in Toulmin's v iew ,  
are "field-dependent" and have their own sp ec ia l ized  crit ica l standards. 
Others are "field-invariant, " like the s tages  in setting out justificatory  
arguments which were described earlier.
Force and Criteria
Toulmin u s e s  the notions of fie ld -dependence  and fie ld -invariance  
in d iscu ss in g  modal terms used in everyday argument. By analyzing the 
way in which such words a s  "possible" and "cannot" vary and remain 
constant in certain a sp e c ts  of their u se ,  he makes another distinction  
between the "force" o f  such modals and the "criteria" for their u s e .
The meaning of a modal term, such a s  "cannot, " has two 
asp ects:  th ese  can be referred to as the force of the term and the 
criteria for its  u se .  By the "force" of a modal term I mean the 
practical im plications of i ts  use: the force of the term "cannot" 
inc lu des, for in stan ce , the implied general injunction that som ething-  
or-other has to be ruled out in th is -o r -th a t  way and for su ch -a -rea so n .  
This force can be contrasted with the criteria, standards, grounds and 
reason s , by reference to which we decide  in any context that a 
particular modal term is  appropriate. We are entitled to say that 
some p o ss ib il ity  has to be ruled out only if we can produce 
grounds or reasons to justify  this claim, and under the term "criteria" 
can be included the many sorts of things we have then to produce.
92 93
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The word "cannot" w ill  have the same force regardless of whether
one "cannot" do something in a ph ysica l,  a lo g ica l ,  or a moral sen se
of the term. One must, however, turn to a particular fie ld  in order to
determine whether the use  of the word "cannot" i s  ju stif ied . The force
of the modal i s ,  in other words, f ie ld -invariant, and the criteria, f ie ld -
dependent. As a resu lt , Toulmin generalized  that "all the canons
for the criticism  and a s se s s m e n t  of arguments . . . are in practice
fie ld -dependent, w hile  a l l  terms of a s se s s m e n t  are fie ld -invariant in 
94their force . " This con c lu s ion , he f e e l s ,  differs greatly from the
professional lo g ic ia n s ' desire  to produce a system  of log ic  which is
fie ld -invariant both in the forms it employs and in the criteria it  s e ts
95out for the crit icism  of argument.
Probability
Before outlining the fie ld -invariant forms of arguments, Toulmin 
d evotes  an e s s a y  to a d is c u s s io n  of the term "probability. " Since  
everyday arguments deal with statem ents which are probable rather 
than certain and s in ce  the nature of probability is  the subject of a great
94 95
Ib id . , 38. I b id . , 39.
^^Ibid. , 4 4 -9 3 .  Not only is  the word "probable" of great 
importance in everyday argument, but TouImin a ls o  makes his d is c u s s io n  
somewhat of a t e s t - c a s e  for the way in which he d i s c u s s e s  a l l  m odals.
He a lso  u s e s  this e s s a y  to attack the v iew s  expressed  in two standard 
works on the subject of probability; Rudolph Carnap, Logical Foundation 
of Probability (Chicago: University  of Chicago P re ss , 1950); and William  
Kneale, Probability and Induction (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1949).
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deal of ph ilosophical controversy, the author presents his approach to
the practical use  of the term. One cannot ask what the word "probability"
d esign ates;  this word is  applicable  only in the context o f  an assertion
where it plays the role of a qualifying term of a kind which has no
d esignation . Nor can one inquire whether there are two s e n s e s  of the
word, one appropriate to matters of chance , one to inductive evidence;
"probable" is  a word which keeps an invariant force throughout a wide
variety of a p p lica tion s . This a n a ly s is  p laces  probability statem ents
in argument on the same plane a s  other modals, i . e .  , maintaining the
same force in a l l  kinds of statem ents but having varying criteria for
their estab lishm ent and allow ing for their use  in what Toulmin regards
a s  their characteristic  function of presenting "guarded or qualified
97a sser t io n s  and co n c lu s io n s .  "
The Layout of Argument
After viewing argument as  generalized jurisprudence, determining
what a sp e c t s  of arguments are f ie ld -dependent and fie ld -invariant, and
making the crit ica l d istin ction  betw een the force and criteria for the use
of terms lik e  "probable, " Toulmin is  prepared to present h is "Layout of 
98Argument. " Turning again to the jurisprudential analogy , the author
97
U s e s  of Argument, op . e f t . ,  93.
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begins by ask ing , "What different sorts of propositions . . . are
uttered in the course of a la w - c a s e ,  and in what different w ays  can
99such propositions bear on the soundness of a lega l cla im ?" The 
answer to this question serves  a s  Toulmin's introduction to the "layout" 
of arguments:
Legal utterances have many d is t in ct  functions. Statements of 
claim , ev id en ce  of Identification, testim ony about even ts  in 
d isp u te . Interpretations of a statute or d iscu ss io n  of i ts  va lid ity ,  
c la im s to exemption from the application o f  a law, p leas in 
extenuation , verd icts ,  sen ten ces:  a l l  th ese  different c l a s s e s  of 
propositions have their parts to play in the lega l p rocess , and the 
differences  betw een them are in practice far from trifling. When 
we turn from the sp ec ia l  c a s e  of the law to consider rational 
arguments in general, we are faced at once by the question whether 
th ese  must not be analysed  in terms of an equally  complex s e t  of 
ca teg o r ie s .  If we are to s e t  our arguments out with complete  
lo g ic a l  candour, and understand properly the nature of "the log ica l  
p r o cess ,  " surely we sh a ll need to employ a pattern of argument no 
l e s s  soph istica ted  than i s  required in the law .
Toulmin beg ins his description of the layout o f  argument by 
examining the way in which c la im s or con c lu s ion s  are supported in a 
wide variety  o f  arguments. When c la im s are presented they may be 
challenged  and one has the right to ask  the person making a claim , 
"What have you got to go on?"^^^ U n le ss  the claim is  irresponsible,  
one should be able  to submit data or ev idence  in support of it .  If a 
man is  charged with violating a traffic law , the testim ony of two police  
officers who checked h is  speed  would serve a s  supporting data or facts
99 100 101
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bed "ing on the c la im . "We have, therefore, one d istinction  to start
with: betw een the claim or conclusion  w hose  merits w e are seeking
to e s ta b lish  (C) and the facts  we appeal to a s  a foundation for the
102claim — what I sh a ll refer to a s  our data (D )."
The presentation o f data may answer the qu estion , "What do 
you have to go on?" but this is  not the only challenge which can  
be made to a c la im . One may ask , "How do you g e t  there?"
Supposing w e encounter this fresh ch a llen ge , we must bring 
forward not further data, for about th ese  the same query may 
immediately be ra ised  again , but propositions of a rather 
different kind: ru les ,  princip les , in fe r e n c e - l ic e n se s  or what you 
w il l ,  instead of additional items of information. Our task is  no 
longer to strengthen the ground on which our argument is  con­
structed, but i s  rather to show that, taking th ese  data a s  a 
starting point, the s tep  to the original claim or con clu s ion  is  
an appropriate and legitim ate one.
Propositions o f this kind Toulmin ca lls  warrants (W) to distinguish
them from both co n c lu s io n s  and data. With the first three terms
v ita l to h is  layout of argument presented, Toulmin p la ces  them into
the first skeleton  of a pattern for analyzing arguments a s  follows:
We may now sym bolise  the relation betw een the data and the 
claim in support of which they are produced by an arrow, and 
indicate the authority for taking the step from one to the other 
by writing the warrant immediately belov/ the arrow:
102 103
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^ S o  C
Since
W
Or to g ive  an example;
Harry w as born________________________ ^ So Harry is  a
in Bermuda ' British subject
Since
A man born in Bermuda 
w ill  be a British subject
As th is  pattern makes c lear , the ex p lic it  appeal in th is  argument 
g o e s  d irectly  back from the claim to the data relied  on a s  foundation: 
the warrant i s ,  in a s e n s e ,  incidental and explanatory, its  task  
being simply to reg ister  e x p lic it ly  the leg itim acy  of the step  involved  
and to refer it back to the larger c la s s  o f  s tep s  w hose  leg itim acy  is  
being presupposed.^®'^
Warrants are of different kinds, and confer different degrees of 
force on the co n c lu s io n s  they ju st ify . Given the appropriate data, some 
warrants a llow  one to a ccep t  a claim unequivocally  and to qualify the 
claim with the adverb "necessarily"; others "authorize us to make the 
step  from data to con c lu s ion  either ten tative ly , or e l s e  subject to 
con d it ion s , e x cep t io n s ,  or qualifications - -  in th ese  c a s e s  other modal 
qualifiers, such a s  'probably' and 'presumably', are in p lace .
For th is  reason , the layout of argument must include modal qualifiers  
(Q) and conditions of excep tion s  or rebuttal (R). So now the form 
of the argument takes on a more complicated appearance:
1 0 4  1 05
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Slnce
I
W
Or to pursue the previous example;
Harry w as  born_ 
in Bermuda
Since
\  So, Q, G 
U n less
R
\ So, presumably, Harry is  a 
' British subject
I
U n less
A man born in 
Bermuda w ill  
generally  be a 
British subject
Both h is  parents were 
a l i e n s /  he has become  
a naturalized American/^
One final addition to the layout of argument must be made. 
Suppose one c h a l len g es  the propriety o f  the warrant and a sk s  why he 
should presume that a man born in Bermuda w il l  generally  be a British 
su b jec t .  If th is  question  is  raised one must present backing (B) to 
support the warrant. This backing, it i s  important to note, w il l  be 
f ie ld -d ep en d en t w hile  the general form or layout of an argument w il l  be 
f ie ld -in var ian t . Toulmin expla ins the matter th is  way:
The form of argument we employ in different fie ld s
So, 0 ,  C ,
Since
W
U n less
R
105
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need not vary very much betw een f ie ld s .  "A whale w ill  be 
( i . e .  is  c la s s i i ia b le  as) a mammal", "A Bermudan w ill  be 
(in the e v es  of the law ) a Briton", "A Saudi Arabian w ill  be 
(found to be) a Muslim" — the words in parentheses indicate  
what th ese  d ifferences  a r e . 1^7
To complete the layout of argument, Toulmin p laces  the backing
below the warrant, and the earlier example would take the following
shape in its  final form:
Harry was born 
in Bermuda
So, presumably, Harry is  a 
' British subject
Since U nless
A man born in 
Bermuda w ill  
generally  be a 
Bi’tish  subject
Both of h is parents were 
a H e n s /  he has become  
a naturalised Am erican/
On account of
The following statutes 108and other lega l provisions:
Backing diffei s from the warrant in that it involves  matters of fact  
lather than general poHlical or leg a l  morals. The warrant, in the c a se  of 
Harry's c;iti.nenshlp, is  not just a repetition of the facts  in the backing; 
it "is cl general moral ol a practical character, about the ways in which  
v/e can sa fe ly  argue in v iew  of these  fa c ts ."  The facts  in the backing
resornble those  in tlio data, but the ro les  which they play in argument are
107
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quite different. A claim without supporting data is  no argument at a l l ,
but warrants can and often must be advanced without backing in a real
argumentative s ituation . The backing o f warrants need not be made
e x p lic it ,  at le a s t  to begin with, and warrants may be conceded without
ch a llen g e . Further, Toulmin contends:
Some warrants must be accepted  provisionally  without further 
ch a llen g e , if  argument is  to be open to us in the field in question: 
we should not even know what sort of data were of the s l ig h test  
relevance  to a con c lu s ion , if w e had not at le a s t  a provisional  
idea of the warrants acceptab le  in the situation confronting u s .
The e x is ten ce  of considerations such a s  would e sta b lish  the 
a ccep tab ility  o f  the most reliable  warrants is  something we are 
entit led  to take for granted. ^
Analytic and Substantial Arguments
Toulmin's d is c u s s io n  of the layout of argument makes c lear that 
arguments can be se t  out in a valid  manner by using the form "D; W; so C" 
and that arguments of the form "D; B; so C" cannot be so regarded. "There 
i s ,  however, " he f e e l s ,  "one rather sp ec ia l c la s s  of arguments which  
appears at first s ight to break th is general rule, and th ese  we shall in 
due course christen analytic  arguments. " An example of an analytic  
argument would be:
Anne is  one of Jack's s isters;
All Jack's s is ter s  have red hair;
So, Anne has red hair. ^^^
If th is  is  formulated with the major premise a s  a statement of
110 111
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backing, it takes the form:
Anne is  one of Jack's s isters;
Each of Jack's s is ter s  has (been checked individually  to have) 
red hair;
So, Anne has red hair.
Or, writing the major premise a s  a warrant, it becom es:
Anne is  one of Jack's s isters;
Any s ister  of Jack's w ill  ( i . e .  may be taken to) have red hair;
So, Anne has red hair.
The reasoning about Jack and his  s i s t e r s ,  although it i s  an 
unusual type and not of the sort used  in everyday argument, appears  
to be one which a llow s an argument of the form "D; B; so C" to be regarded 
a s  va lid . When people make a sser t io n s  about lega l s ta tu s ,  declare support 
for sc ien t if ic  theories or po litica l c a u s e s  and the l ik e ,  the con c lu s ion ,  
however, is  not already stated im plic itly  in the data and the backing a s  
in analytic  arguments. Of th ese  two typ es  of arguments, Toulmin makes 
the following distinction:
In what fo llow s , I sha ll ca l l  arguments o f  th ese  two types  
resp ec t iv e ly  substantial and a n a ly t ic . An argument from D to C 
w ill be ca lled  ana ly tic  if  and only if  the backing for the warrant 
authorising it  in c lu d es , e x p lic it ly  or im plic itly , the information 
conveyed in the conclus ion  i t s e l f .  Where th is  is  so ,  the statem ent  
"D, B, and a ls o  C" w il l ,  a s  a rule, be tautological . . . .  Where
the backing for the warrant does  not contain the information conveyed
in the con c lu s ion , the statement "D, B, and a lso  C" w ilLnever be a 
tautology, and the argument w il l  be a substantial one.
The qualification in Toulmin's statement that ana ly tic  arguments
^ ^ ^ I b l d .  ^ ^ ^ I b l d , , 1 2 5 .
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w il l ,  "as a rule, " be tau to log ica l i s  important b eca u se  it lead s  him to 
search for some other criterion for determining if  a statem ent is  ana ly t ic .  
After demonstrating the ex is ten ce  of n on -tau to log ica l analytic  arguments 
and d isc u ss in g  a lternative criteria, he s e le c t s  one which he c a l ls  the 
"verification test" and argues that by its  use  a l l  analytic  arguments can  
be d e tec ted . In accordance with th is  t e s t ,  he  contends that an 
argument can be c la s s i f i e d  as  analytic  i f ,  and only if ,  "checking the 
backing of the warrant in vo lves  ipso facto checking the truth or fa ls ity  
of the co n c lu s io n . . . .
Genuine an a ly t ic  arguments, Toulmin in d ica te s ,  are extremely  
rare. Even the example about the color of Anne's hair is  substantial  
rather than a n a ly t ic .  Toulmin demonstrated the substantia l quality of  
the example by recasting  it in accordance with h is  layout of argument in 
th is  way:
Datum — Anne i s  one of Jack's s is ters;
Backing — All of Jack's s is ters  have previously  been observed  
to have red hair;
C onclusion  — So, presumably, Anne now has red hair.
The warrant re lied  on, for which the backing i s  here stated , w il l  be of 
the form, "Any s is ter  of Jack's may be taken to have red hair": (because  
the statement is  based  on past observation) th is  warrant can be regarded  
as  e stab lish in g  no more than a presumption:
114 115
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Anne is  one of_ 
Jack's S isters
Since
So, presumably Anne now 
’ has red hair
U n less
Any s is ter  of 
Jack's may be taken 
to have red hair
Anne has dyed /gon e  
w h i t e / l o s t  her hair . . .
On account o f  the fact that a l l  h is s is ters  
have previously  been observed to have red hair
It see m s ,  then, that I can defend my conclusion  about Anne's hair with 
an unquestionably analytic  argument only  if at th is  moment I have the 
assu ran ce  that every one of Jack's s is ter s  has red hair at th is  moment. 
But, in such a s ituation , what need i s  there o f  an argument to estab lish  
the colour o f Anne's hair? And of what relevance is  the other s isters '  
hair-colour? The thing to do now is  to use  o n e 's  e y e s ,  not hunt up 
a chain of reasoning.^
After the development of th is  example, Toulmin concludes that "it begins
to be a l i t t le  doubtful whether any genuine, practical argument could ev er be
117properly a n a ly t ic ."
D esp ite  the fact that there i s  l it t le  relation betw een analytic  argu­
ments and those  in u s e ,  lo g ic ia n s  u se  them a s  a standard by which to judge 
all forms of argument. For th is reason , Toulmin states:
Many of the current problems in the log ica l tradition spring from 
adopting the analytic  paradigm-argument a s  a standard by comparison 
with which a l l  other arguments can be c r it ic ised .  But ana ly t ic ity  is  
one thing, formal va lid ity  i s  another; and neither of th ese  is  a universal 
criterion o f n e c e s s i ty ,  s t i l l  l e s s  of the soundness of arguments.
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Working Logic and Idealized Logic 
Toulmin indicated in h is  introduction that he w as concerned with 
log ica l problems as  evidenced  in common exam ples of argument. Through­
out h is  a n a ly s is  of everyday arguments he found it n ecessa ry  to compare 
and contrast arguments from various f ie ld s  with each other and with the 
standards s e t  forth in formal lo g ic .  In doing so ,  he rejected  the formal, 
geometric paradigm of professional lo g ic ia n s  and ch o se  to v iew  argument 
in light of the jurisprudential analogy. In h is  e s s a y ,  "Working Logic 
and Idealised  Logic, " Toulmin attempted to explain why the analytic  
sy llog ism  had become the criterion of formal lo g ic ,  and why, a s  a result  
of its  adoption, there is  such a divergence betw een the "working logic"  
used in everyday argument and the "idealized logic" of the lo g ic ian .
Toulmin's explanation  for the alm ost e x c lu s iv e  em phasis on the use  
of the analytic  sy llog ism  i s ,  he adm its, a matter of specu la tion . He fe e l s ,  
however, that "having started like Aristotle, by studying sy l lo g is t ic  
arguments, and particularly analytic  sy llo g ism s, lo g ic ia n s  built up the
sim plest and most compact s e t  of ca tegories  which would serve them
119reasonably in cr it ic iz in g  arguments of th is first kind. " In doing so ,  
they were led to ignore several d is tin ctions  (which Toulmin Indicated in 
the previous e s s a y ) ,  b eca u se  th ese  d istin ctions are hidden when one  
stud ies  only the analytic  sy llo g ism . First, there is the d istinction
119
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between n ecessa ry  arguments and probable arguments. The analytic
argument u se s  or im plies the modal qualifier "necessarily" and a llow s
one to argue unequivocally  to the co n c lu s io n . M ost kinds o f  arguments,
however, must rely on warrants which entit le  one to draw only  tentative
con c lu s ion s  which need modal qualifiers like "probably" or to draw
conditional ones  or are qualified  by terms like "provided that. . . . "
The second d istin ction  Is betw een "arguments which are formally
120valid and those  which cannot hope to be formally v a l id .  " An argu­
ment Is formally valid  If It can be s e t  out In such a w ay that Its conclusion  
can be obtained by appropriate shuffling of the terms In the data and 
warrant. Such a notion of formal va lid ity  defines ana ly tic  arguments as  
formally valid  and equally  d en ies  va lid ity  to substantia l arguments.
The third d istinction  Is betw een arguments like the sy l lo g ism . In 
which a warrant Is re lied  on "whose adequacy and ap p licab ility  have
previously been e s ta b lish e d ,  and th ose  arguments which are th em se lves
121Intended to e sta b lish  the adequacy of a warrant. " in other words,
the backing for the warrant Is assum ed to have been previously  esta b lish ed
or Is un necessary  In formal lo g ic .
A fourth d istin ction  Is betw een  arguments expressed  "In terms of
122' log ica l con n ectives'  or quantifiers and those not so e x p ressed . "
Formal log ic  a llow s  only a few  words like "all, " "some, " and "or" to be
120 121 122
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used in th is  w ay, w hereas con n ectives  and quantifiers like "most" and 
"few" and "but" are v ita l  in arguments of the non -analytic  type.
The final d is tin ct ion , Toulmin argues, i s  "between analytic
arguments and substantia l o n e s ,  which can be g lo s se d  over only  so
long a s  we state  our inference-warrants in the traditional form, 'All
123
(or No) A's are B ' s . '"
Toulmin explained the decep tive  nature of  such arguments this
way:
As lo g ic ia n s  d iscovered  early on, the fie ld  of ana ly tic  arguments 
i s  particularly simple; certain com p lex ities  which inev itab ly  a ff l ic t  
substantia l arguments need never trouble one in the c a s e  of analytic  
ones; and when the warrant o f  an analytic  argument i s  exp ressed  in 
the form "All A's are B 's" , the whole argument can be laid  out in 
the traditional pattern without harm resulting  — for once in aw h ile ,  
the d istin ction  betw een  our data and the backing of our warrant 
c e a s e s  to be of ser ious Importance. This s im plic ity  is  very attractive,  
and the theory of analytic  arguments with universal major prem ises was  
therefore s e iz e d  on and developed with enthusiasm by lo g ic ia n s  o f many 
generations.
Perhaps, the most important way in which formal lo g ic  and working 
log ic  differ, using Toulmin's terminology and model a s  the paradigm of  
working lo g ic ,  i s  that formal log ic  d oes  not recogn ize  the notions of f ie ld -  
dependence, f ie ld -in var ian ce , and the difference betw een the force of  
modal terms and the criteria for their u s e .  Formal lo g ic  treats a ll  
arguments a s  if th ey  were fie ld  invariant and admits the u se  of only a 
limited number o f  qualifiers and con n ectives  which a lw ays  must mean
^^^I b i d . ^^\ b i d . , 1 4 3 - 4 4 .
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the same thing whenever they are u sed . In Toulmin's system , the form 
of the layout of argument, i . e . , data, warrant, c la im , are fie ld-invariant  
a s  is  the force of the qualifier. The backing for the warrant and the 
criteria for using the qualifier are f ie ld -dependent. This system  a llow s  
for the rational use  of qualified statem ents and for warrants that are not 
ob viou sly  true. Statements may be "probable" in a sc ie n t i f ic ,  leg a l ,  
or moral s e n se  and the term w ill  have a fie ld -invariant force, whereas  
their criteria for u se  w il l  be fie ld -dependent. Warrants need not be 
universal in their scop e  nor in their a ccep tab ility , but they  must have the 
kind of backing acceptab le  in the fie ld  of their u s e .  The backing for 
warrants and criteria for the use of modals are f ie ld -dependent and 
important, and yet formal log ic  makes no provisions for such d is t in ct io n s .
In everyday argument, one rarely finds a warrant which resem bles  
the major premise of a sy llog ism  b ecau se  men seldom argue over reco g ­
nized universal s ta tem ents . Yet such statem ents are n ecessary  in 
formal lo g ic ,  and for that reason "idealized logic" is  o f  lit t le  utility  in 
a s s e s s in g  arguments advanced in actual controversy. When, however, 
warrant-establishing support is  a part of the proper layout of an argument 
and te s ted  by the accepted  standards of a particular f ie ld , one can weigh  
the va lid ity  of arguments which could not be Judged by the analytic  
paradigm. For, a s  Toulmin stated:
Rational d is c u s s io n  in any field . . . depends on the p o ss ib ility  of  
estab lish in g  inference-warrants in that field: to the extent that there
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are common and understood inter-personal procedures for testing  
warrants in any particular f ie ld , a Judicial approach to our problems 
w ill  be p o ss ib le .  When we ask  how far the authority of the Court 
of Reason ex ten d s , therefore, we must put on one side the question ,  
how far in any fie ld  it  is  p o ss ib le  for arguments to be analytic: we  
must focus our attention instead on the rather different qu estion , to 
what extent there are already w e ll  e stab lish ed  warrants in s c ie n c e ,  
in e th ics  or morality, in law , art crit ic ism , character-judging, or 
whatever it  may be; and how far the procedures for deciding what 
principles are sound, and what warrants are a ccep tab le , are generally  
understood and agreed . Two people who a ccep t  common procedures 
for testing  warrants in any fie ld  can begin comparing the merits of 
arguments in that field: only where this condition is lacking, so that 
they have no common ground on which to argue, w il l  rational a s s e s s ­
ment no longer be open to them.
Toulmin offers a "working logic" based on the Jurisprudential paradigm 
a s  a substitute for the " idealized  logic" based  on the analytic  paradigm.
After examining many v a r ie t ies  of everyday argument, he made several  
crit ica l d is t in ct ion s  which he fe lt  were concea led  in the apparent sim plicity  
of the paradigm of formal log ic  and proposed a layout of argument which  
accommodated both the f ie ld -dependent and fie ld -invariant a sp e c t s  of a ll  
kinds of arguments. As a resu lt ,  he argues persu asive ly  that the "working 
logic" he d escr ib es  w ill  a llow  for the crit ica l study o f  a l l  va r ie t ies  of  
substantial arguments in a way which "idealized logic" never can.
C onclusion
All of Toulmin's major works which have been examined in this  
chapter have been concerned with the w ays in which man can properly 
reason about a wide variety of su b jec ts .  In a l l  c a s e s  he paid c lo se
^ ^ ^ I b i d . , 1 7 5 - 7 6 .
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attention to common sen se  and common language and noted where the 
terminology and patterns of reasoning of the s c ie n t is t ,  the philosopher,  
and the log ic ian  differed from ordinary u sa g e .  Although Toulmin has  
made no attempt to e s ta b lish  any interrelationship among h is  various  
works of a n a ly s is  o f  s p e c i f ic  problems, a summary of the id ea s  most 
pertinent to rhetoric from each of h is  works rev ea ls  such an interrelationship.
Summary of Toulmin's 
View of Reasoning
Reasoning in Science
Toulmin s e e s  the d ivergence betw een the way the ordinary 
individual and the s c ie n t is t  reason and talk about s c ie n c e  a s  due to a 
"language-sh ift . " The layman understands the literal meaning o f  s c ien t if ic  
statem ents but not the underlying lo g ic  and unstated reservations implied  
in the techn ica l use o f the term s. Some ch aracter is tic s  of sc ie n t if ic  
reasoning which are often not understood can be summarized (using some 
of the terminology developed  in the U se s  of Argument) a s  fo llows:
1. Scientific  d isc o v er ie s  are new w ays o f  regarding familiar 
phenomena in such a way that new co n c lu s io n s  can be drawn.
These d is c o v e r ie s ,  which often are regarded a s  s c ie n t if ic  la w s ,  
are warrants which a llow  one to move from accepted  data to cla im s  
which are thereby supported.
2 . The new d isc o v er ie s  or warrants need not be apjplicable in a ll  
circum stances; it is  enough that conditions of exception  or rebuttal 
can be accounted for over a wide range of c ircum stances .
3. Standards for the app licab ility  of the law or warrant must be 
estab lish ed  and are f ie ld -dependent.
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4. Warrants are not n e c e s sa r y  nor ab so lu te ly  true and may be replaced  
a s  more useful on es  are evo lved . Scientif ic  warrants survive in a 
Darwinian sen se  a s  long a s  experimentation provides proper backing  
for them and excep tion s  to their u se  can be expla ined .
5 . Scientific  warrants form a hierarchy and the s c ie n t is t  is  ca lled  
upon only to in vest iga te  the accep tab ility  o f  warrants a t  one le v e l  
at any one time. The terms "established" and "hypothetical"  
therefore need to be understood to d istinguish  betw een the parts
of a sc ie n c e  that are a c tu a lly  being ca lled  in question  and th ose  taken  
for granted in order to state  working problems. Warrants may be 
ca lled  into question at any tim e, but some warrant must be accepted  
at l e a s t  provisionally , or e l s e  reasoning or argument i s  im p oss ib le .
The layman regards sc ie n t i f ic  law s as  certain and the methodology
of sc ie n c e  a s  a sp e c if ic  app lication  of formal lo g ic .  The b a s ic  assum ptions
of s c ie n c e  are, however, a ccep ted  warrants which may be ca lled  into
question ju st  a s  warrants are in everyday argument.
Reasoning jji Ethics
Any g iven  so c ie ty  has a moral code of some kind, whether it is
unalterable and authoritarian or subject to change from popular pressure.
Reasoning about e th ica l problems in vo lves  comparing q u estion s of
individual conduct to the provisions of the accep ted  moral co d e . The
"code" i t s e l f  may be regarded a s  a ser ie s  of warrants for e th ica l reasoning,
and several kinds of e th ica l questions can be d istin gu ish ed  in which the
warrant plays the crucial ro le .  These kinds of qu estion s may be summarized
a s  follows:
1. In "simple moral questions" one need only use  a part of the moral 
code a s  a warrant to reason  from data to co n c lu s io n . If one does  not 
keep a promise, one can conclude that he has v io la ted  the code , if 
promise keeping is  an accep ted  warrant.
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2. In "conflicts  of duty" an accepted  moral warrant is  qualified  
b ecau se  the e x is te n c e  of another moral rule would p oss ib ly  lead  
to a contrary co n c lu s io n . For example;
Jones promised t o __
return a book today
So, presumably, He should
Since
Promises should  
be kept
U nless
return it  
today
It would mean 
leaving a cr it ica lly  
i l l  person who needed  
h e lp /  . . .
3 .  In reasoning about "the ju stice  of so c ia l  practices" the claim  
disputes the ju s t ic e  of a particular practice by the u se  of a general 
moral warrant which em bodies a b a s ic  e th ica l assumption like "not 
inflicting avoidable  suffering."
4. In e th ic s ,  and in other f ie ld s ,  there are certain "limiting questions"  
or warrants, which cannot be supported with additional arguments within  
the same "field. " An argument may be advanced beyond a limiting 
question , but when that happens the backing appropriate to the new  
warrant must come from a new fie ld .
Reasoning ^  General Argument
Toulmin fe e ls  that formal lo g ic ,  based  on the analytic  paradigm,
is  poorly adapted to the crit ica l a s se s sm e n t  of everyday arguments, and
he makes a number of d is tin ctions  which he fe e ls  provide a layout of
argument by which a ll  forms of argument can be judged. The most
important of Toulmin's observations may be summarized a s  follows:
1. The proper role of lo g ic  is  a retrospective, justificatory one.
It is  concerned with i.te arguments one can put forward afterwards to 
make good h is  claim that the con c lu s ion s  arrived at are accep tab le ,  
b ecau se  ju st if iab le , co n c lu s io n s .
2 . Argument may be viewed as  generalized jurisprudence, i . e .  , 
some a sp e c ts  of argument are fie ld -dependent and others are 
f ie ld -invariant.
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3. A justificatory argument has several s ta g es  which usually  involve  
the use  of modal terms. First, p oss ib le  so lutions are lis ted; second,  
inescapable  or n ec essa ry  so lutions are sought; third, some p o s s ib i l i t ie s  
may be excluded as im p o ss ib le ; and, finally , further information w ill  
allow  one to c la s s i f y  some so lutions as more or l e s s  probable.
4 . Modal qualifiers have two asp ects:  a force which is  fie ld  invariant 
and criteria for their proper u se  which are fie ld -dependent.
5. One who advan ces  a claim should be prepared to present data in 
i ts  support and to show that the movement from data to claim is  
appropriate by presenting a warrant which shows that the movement 
i s  a legitim ate one .
6. U n less  data and some warrant are accep ted , a complex argument 
is  im p oss ib le .
7. Warrants may be subject to conditions of exception  or rebuttal 
and need a modal qualifier to indicate the force of the warrant. The 
force of the qualifier w ill  be fie ld -invariant and the conditions of 
exception  or rebuttal w ill  be its  fie ld -dependent cr iter ia .
8. A warrant, even  if  qualified , may be subject to cha llenge  and, if  
so ,  backing must be presented in i t s  support. Backing, like conditions  
of exception  or rebuttal, is  f ie ld -dependent.
C ritic ism s of Toulmin's Works
Toulmin's works on s c ie n c e ,  e th ic s ,  and argument have been
subject to a great deal o f  criticism  in the professional journals. Some
review s have been very favorable, and others rather h o s t i le ,  yet only a
few objections to his id eas  are relevant to th is  study. These w ill  be
considered in the next chapter as Toulmin's conclusions are evaluated
and their relevance to rhetoric a s s e s s e d .
CHAPTER III
THE RELATION OF TOULMIN'S VIEWS 
TO RHETORICAL THEORY
Introduction
This study began with the Aristotelian assum ption that "rhetoric 
is  an offshoot of d ia lec t ic  and a lso  of e th ica l studies"  ^ and the further 
assum ption that the resu lts  of a rather dramatic revolution in philosophical  
thought might be valuable  to the rhetorician insofar as  they bear on 
reasoning and e th ic s .
The revolution in philosophy which occurred in the first half of  
th is century w a s ,  in large measure, an attempt to d iscover  a new  
purpose and method for philosophy. P sych o logy , so c io lo g y , and other 
new academ ic d isc ip l in es  had separated from the mother of the s c ie n c e s  
and could boast of a particular subject matter and appropriate methodology, 
and philosophers were challenged to state  the function and scope of their 
fie ld  and to clarify its  method.
1
A ristotle 's  Rhetoric and P o e t ic , trans. W. Rhys Roberts (New York: 
The Modern Library, 1954), 1355^"! Except where otherwise noted, 
references to A ristotle 's  Rhetoric w il l  follow  the Roberts translation.
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B ecause  of th is  ch a llen ge  and a growing distrust of ph ilosophical  
system building and m etaphysical specu lation  many philosophers took 
the position that the purpose o f  their fie ld  w as  to d iscover  the meaning 
of ph ilosophical, s c ie n t i f ic ,  and ordinary p rop osit ion s . Their method 
w as log ica l a n a ly s is  of propositions rather than descriptive or prescrip­
tive system  building. Moore's Common Sense  philosophy turned the 
tab les  on the m etaphysical and synoptic  philosophers and challenged  
them to prove, rather than to assu m e, that common sen se  id eas  are 
wrong and to prove that their own sp ecu la tion s  were right. The Logical 
Atomists in s is te d  that philosophy should be a s  rigorous and a s  exact  as  
sc ien ce  and sought to ana lyze  propositions in terms of atomic " fa c ts" 
in the same manner a s  the mathematical lo g ic  o f  the Prlnclpla M athem atica, 
The Logical P o s it iv is t s  fe lt  that only analytic  (formally valid) propositions  
or those subject to empirical verification are meaningful and that their 
meaning is  their method of verification .
All three ph ilosophical movements approached philosophy a s  a 
study of lo g ica l a n a ly s is  of propositions, and in particular, of factual  
propositions. Each attempted to formulate a kind of lin gu is t ic  equation  
with the term to be analyzed  on one s ide  and its  philosophical equivalent  
on the other. Yet th ese  lo g ica l a n a ly se s  fa iled  to produce the resu lts  
hoped for partly b eca u se  they failed to ana lyze  language in c o n te x t .
From this background two divergent ph ilosophical approaches
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emerged. Each w as concerned with the lo g ic a l  a n a ly s is  of propositions  
but they differ fundamentally. Verlficatlonal A nalysis  holds c lo se ly  
to the b a s ic  ten ets  of Logical Positiv ism , continues to be concerned  
with propositions of fa c t ,  regards eth ica l propositions and commonly 
held b e l ie f s  a s  m ea n in g less ,  and u t i l iz e s  the language o f  mathematics, 
symbolic lo g ic ,  and sem antics rather than the common idiom. Linguistic  
or Functional A n a lys is ,  particularly as  exp ressed  in Toulmin’s philosophy, 
upholds the b e l ie f  that analytic  sy llo g ism s provide a poor paradigm for 
argument and that s c ie n t i f ic ,  e th ica l,  and ordinary arguments are meaning­
ful and can be Judged by a standard derived from an evaluation of arguments 
in everyday u s e .
The purpose oi this chapter is  to su g g e s t  that Toulmin's v iew s  on 
lo g ic ,  argument, and e th ics  provide a more usefu l foundation for rhetorical 
argument than do the commonly accepted  sy l lo g is t ic  criteria. For, in 
spite  of the work oi some to em phasize the rhetorical sy llog ism , textbooks  
s t i l l  in s is t  upon dealing with the formal lo g ica l  sy llog ism  which Toulmin 
argues obscures  many log ica l  d is tin ction s  and i s  poorly adapted to matters 
about which men argue in practical c ircum stances .
Toulmin and the Nature and Purpose o f  Rhetoric
"Rhetoric, " Aristotle contended, "may be defined a s  the faculty
2
of observing in any g iven  c a se  the availab le  means of persuasion ."
2 b
O p. c i t . , 1355 .
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The practitioner of the art a ttem p ts , a s  Donald Bryant put i t ,  to adjust
3
"ideas to people and people to ideas" in order to "accomplish som e-
4
thing predetermined and directional with an au d ien ce . "
Such a capsu le  characterization of the c la s s i c a l  conception  
of rhetoric squares somewhat with what seem s to be Toulmin’s under­
standing o f the meaning o f the term. He seem s to recogn ize  that 
persuasion, accom plished  through various n on -lo g ica l  ap p ea ls ,  is  
n ecessa ry  for non -ph ilosoph ica l a u d ien ces .
One difficu lty  in relating Toulmin's v iew  to rhetoric, however, 
is  that Toulmin seem s neither interested in nor acquainted with 
rhetoric in its full c la s s i c a l  s e n s e .  In common with many other 
philosophers, he fe e ls  that the techniques o f  rhetoric should not be 
used in ph ilosophical argumentation.  ^ "Rhetoric, " to Toulmin and
3
"Rhetoric; Its Functions and Its Scope, " Quarterly Tournai of  
S p eech . XXXIX (December, 1953), 413.
" I^bid. , 4 1 1 .
5
A worthwhile d is c u s s io n  of th is  point may be found in Maurice 
N atanson's  ar tic le ,  "Rhetoric and Philosophical Argumentation, "
Quarterly Journal o f  S p eech . XLVII (February, 1962), 2 4 -3 0 .  In 
addition to the sources  c ited  in th is article  one should read Ch. Perelman's 
"Proof in Philosophy, " in which he contend s, "Rhetoric is  the study of the 
means of argumentation which a llow  us ^  obtain and to increase  the a s se n t  
of people to sp e c if ic  th e s e s  presented to them . . . only rhetoric , to th is  
sp ec if ic  s e n s e , a llow s us to understand the nature of proof to p h ilosophy. " 
Hibbert Journal, LII (July, 1954), 3 5 4 -5 9 .  For an attempted refutation of 
Perelman's general position s e e  Henry W. Johnstone J r . , "A New Theory 
of Philosophical Argument, " Philosophy and Phenomenological R esearch ,
XV (December, 1954), 2 4 4 -5 2 .
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some of h is  c o l le a g u e s ,  i s  merely the use of emotional a p p ea ls ,  an art 
which i s  antithetica l to reason in g .
The student of rhetorical theory w e ll  understands, o f  course ,
that the c la s s i c a l  tradition is  profoundly concerned with a lo g ic  based
upon probability which w il l  aid men in the rational ch o ice  of a lternatives
of ac tion . The following p a ssa g e  from A ristotle 's  Rhetoric characterizes
that philosopher's in terest  in everyday argument, an in terest altogether
co n s is ten t  with Toulmin's:
M ost of the things about which we make d e c is io n s ,  and into which  
therefore w e inquire, present us with alternative p o s s ib i l i t i e s .
For it is  about our a c t io n s  that w e deliberate and inquire, and a ll  
our action s  have a contingent character; hardly any of them are 
determined by n e c e s s i t y .  Again, co n c lu s io n s  that s ta te  what is  
merely usual or p o ss ib le  must be drawn from p rem isses  that do the 
sam e, ju st a s  "necessary" co n c lu s io n s  must be drawn from "necessary"  
prem isses.®
Furthermore, Toulmin's treatment of argument a ssu m es  that 
Aristotle would apply the sy llog ism  to ordinary argument, and he tota lly  
ignores A ristotle 's  cogen t observations concerning the enthymeme, the 
rhetorical argument, in the Rhetoric. What i s  true of Toulmin's sp ec if ic  
treatment of A ristotle 's  v iew  on argument is  a lso  true of h is  general 
attack on modern formal lo g ic .  He has been cr it ic ized  by his fe llow  
lo g ic ia n s ,  and with some ju st if ica tion , for assum ing that a l l  formal 
log ic  is  tied up with ana ly tic  sy llog ism s and for ignoring the treatment
^Op. c i t .  , 1357®.
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7
of modal terms by some formal lo g ic ia n s .  Aithough th ese  latter
crit ic ism s are not d irectly  relevant to th is  study, one observation
is  extremely important. None o f h is  cr it ics  have denied the utility
of Toulmin's layout of argument nor cr it ic ized  h is  d is t in ct ion s  between
the "force" and "criteria" of modal terms and the "field-dependent"
0
and "field-invariant" a s p e c ts  of argument.
The attempt to apply Toulmin's v iew s  on reasoning to the art of 
rhetoric, therefore, is  an attempt to determine the utility  of h is ideas  
to the c la s s i c a l  conception  of rhetoric, not to Toulmin's own incomplete  
v iew . In the pages that fo llow  the argument w il l  be advanced that 
Toulmin's v iew  of argument is  a novel and u sefu l on e , in prec ise ly  the 
same way the "discoveries"  in the ph ysica l s c i e n c e s ,  according to 
Toulmin, are novel and usefu l w ays of regarding phenomena As a new  
discovery  in s c ie n c e  becom es accepted  a s  it better accou nts  for a 
wider range of c a s e s ,  so Toulmin's theory of argument a lso  accounts
7
Some of the b e s t  evaluations of Toulmin's U se s  of Argument 
which relate to the points mentioned here are H. N. C astaneda, "On 
a Proposed Revolution in Logic, " Philosophy of S c ie n c e . XXVII (July,
1960), 279-92; J. C . C o o ley , "On Mr Toulmin's Revolution in Logic,"  
Journal of Philosophy, LVI (March 26 , 1959), 297-319; F. H. George, 
Review of The U se s  of Argument. U n iversit ies  Ouarterly. XII (May, 1958), 
326-330; J. Ch. Sim opoulos, Review of The U se s  of Argument, Hibbert 
Journal. LVII (October, 1958), 96-98; and, George E. Scott, "The Formal 
and Informal Logics of M odality ,"  Unpublished P h .D . d issertation .  
University of Virginia, 1961.
8
George Scott, although crit ica l of Toulmin's attack on formal lo g ic ,  
regards th ese  d is t in ct io n s  as  "very important and original. " 0 £ .  . c i t . , 59.
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for a wider range of arguments than does  the traditional v iew .
The Sources of Persuasion  
W hereas Toulmin identifies  rhetoric with emotional a p p ea ls ,  the 
rhetorical tradition recogn izes  three sources of persuasion . In 
Aristotle's  terminology, th ese  modes of persuasion are ethos "which is  
achieved  by the speaker's personal character when the speech  is  so  
spoken a s  to make him credible"; pathos which "may come through the 
hearers, when the speech  stirs their emotions"; and logos  or p is t is  
in which "persuasion i s  e ffected  through the speech i t s e l f  when we 
have proved a truth or apparent truth by means of the persuasive
q
arguments suitable to the c a se  in question . "
Aristotle further indicated that logos is  the most important and
demonstrates its  relationship to log ic  as  follows:
It is  c lear, then, that rhetorical study, in its  strict s e n se ,  
i s  concerned with the modes of persuasion . Persuasion is  c lear ly  
a sort of demonstration, s in ce  we are most fully  persuaded when 
we consider a thing to have been demonstrated. The orator's 
demonstration i s  an enthymeme, and th is ,  in general, is  the most  
e ffect ive  of the modes of persuasion . The enthymeme is  a sort of 
sy llog ism , and the consideration of sy llog ism s of a l l  kinds, without 
d istin ction , is  the b u s in ess  of d ia lec t ic ,  either of d ia lec t ic  a s  a 
whole or o f one of i ts  branches. It fo llows plainly, therefore, that 
he who is  b e s t  able to see  how and from what elem ents a sy llogism  
is  produced w ill  a lso  be b es t  sk illed  in the enthymeme, when he has  
further learnt what its  subject matter is  and in what resp ects  it  differs 
from the sy llog ism  of strict lo g ic .  The true and approximately true 
are apprehended by the same faculty; it may a lso  be noted that men
9 a
Op. c jt .  , 1356^.
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have a suffic ient natural instinct for what is  true, and usually  do 
arrive at the truth.
Brockriede and Ehninger's Application of the 
Toulmin Model to the Sources of Persuasion
This statement by Aristotle makes clear that Toulmin's a n a ly s is  
of argument is  related to the log ica l mode of persuasion . Wayne 
Brockriede and D ouglas Ehninger, however, argue that in addition to 
applying to the lo g ica l  mode of persuasion , "Toulmin's structural 
model and the vocabulary he has developed to describe  it are su ggest ive  
of a system  for c la s s i fy in g  artis t ic  proofs, using argument (defined a s  
movement from data, through warrant, to claim) a s  a unifying construct.  ^
Although th is  study d oes  not agree with their a n a ly s is  in a l l  r e sp e c ts ,  
theirs is  a very usefu l way of regarding the c la s s i f ic a t io n  of proofs and 
of laying out a ll  kinds of arguments after the pattern of the Toulmin model. 
The d e ta ils  of the system  they propose and the arguments and examples  
they offer in its  support are availab le  in their journal artic le  and in their
^ °Ib id . , 1355®.
"Toulmin on Argument; An Interpretation and Application, " 
Quarterly Tournai of S p ee c h . XLVI (February, 1S60), 47.
12
Later in this chapter two points of disagreem ent w ill  be developed:  
(1) When "authoritative" or "motivational" proof i s  used in the form of an 
argument in a sp eech , such proofs should be regarded as  logos rather than 
ethos or pathos as  suggested  by Brockriede and Ehninger; and (2) Some of  
their exam ples are warrant-establishing or inductive and not co n s is ten t  
with Toulmin's use  of h is  model.
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13D ec is io n  by D e b a te , but a brief summary w il l  indicate how the Toulmin 
model can be used in the c la s s i f ic a t io n  of arguments of a l l  three modes 
of persuasion .
The authors fee l  that s in ce  the warrant is  the crucial elem ent in
an artistic  proof and its  function is  to carry the data to the c laim , "we
may recogn ize  the p o ss ib le  routes which the warrant may travel in
14performing its  function. " One kind of proof, which Brockriede and 
Ehninger c a l l  "substantive" and i s  traditionally ca lled  " log ica l, " is  
one in which data is  carried to claim "by means of an assum ption  
concerning the relationsh ip  ex ist in g  among phenomena in the external 
world." Another, traditionally ca lled  "ethical" and dubbed 
"authoritative, " r e l ie s  on "an assum ption concerning the quality of the 
source from which the data are derived. The third, formerly known 
a s  "pathetic" and rechristened "motivational," carries data to claim  
"by means of an assum ption concerning the inner d r ives, v a lu e s ,  or 
aspirations which impel the behavior of those persons to whom it is  
a d d r e s s e d ."
Under the c la s s i f ic a t io n  of substantive arguments, Brockriede
13
(New York; Dodd, Mead and Co , 1963).
14
"Toulmin on  Argument ,  " 0 £ .  c i t .  , 4 8 .
^^Ibid.  ^^Ibld.  ^^Ibid,
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and Ehninger l i s t  the following common argumentative types: argument
from c a u s e , argument from s ig n , argument from gen era liza tio n , argument
from parallel c a s e , argument from a n a lo g y , and argument from c l a s s l f l -  
18c a t io n . Unlike substantive arguments, the warrants of authoritative
and motivational proofs assum e no relationship  among facts  of the
external world, and, "since the warrants of authoritative and motivational
proofs state  only  one kind o f relationship each , th ese  two c l a s s e s  of
19proof, unlike the substan tive , are not d iv is ib le  Into s p e c ie s .  "
After demonstrating the structural unity of the three modes of
artistic  proof by showing how they "may be reduced to a s in g le  Invariant
pattern using argument as  a unifying construct, " Brockriede and Ehninger
Indicate how "artistic proofs, so reduced, may con ven ien tly  be correlated
with the various typ es  of disputable questions and the c laim s appropriate 
2 0to each . " They begin by recognizing the four ca tegories  Into which
disputable  q u estion s are custom arily c la ss if ied :
(1) Whether something I s?  (2) What It Is?  (3) Of what worth It 
I s ?  (4) What course o f  action should be pursued? The first of th ese  
queries g iv e s  r ise  to a question of f a c t , and Is to be answered by what 
can be ca lled  a d es lgn atlve  c la im ; the secon d , to a question  of 
d efin it io n , to be answered by a defin itive  c la im ; the third, to a question  
of v a lu e , to be answered by an eva luative  claim; and the fourth, to a 
question  o f  p o l ic y , to be answered by an advocatlve  c la im .^  ^
18
Ibid . In D e c is io n  by D e b a te , the authors add a seyenth sub­
category of argument by s t a t i s t i c s . Op. c^t. 1 4 8 -54 .
19
D e c is io n  by D e b a te , o p . c l t . , 158.
20  21 "Toulmin on Argument, " op. c l t . , 52 . ibid.
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Each of these  ca tegories  is  d isc u sse d  and the types of argument availab le  
to the speaker a s  a means of substantiating h is  claim statements are 
considered. This a n a ly s is  lead s  Brockriede and Ehninger to summarize 
the types of arguments applicable  to various sorts of claims in the 
following tabular form:
D é s ig ­
na tive
D efin ­
itive
Evalu­
ative
Advo-
cative
Substantive
A. C ause  X
B. Sign X
C . Generalization X
D. Parallel C a se  X
E. Analogy X
F. C la ss if ica t io n  X
Authoritative X
M otivational X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
22
The preceding brief review of Brockriede and Ehninger's application  
of the Toulmin model of argument to the traditional d iv is ion s  of invention  
should indicate its  utility  in providing the speaker with lin es  of inquiry 
which he can sa fe ly  pursue in a search for valid  arguments. By identifying  
the kind of claim he w ish es  to make as  d es ig n a tiv e ,  defin itive , eva lu ative ,  
or advocative and then recognizing the kind of warrants which are applicable  
in these c a s e s ,  he has a good starting point for developing a reasonable
22
I b i d . ,  5 3 .
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argument, From this point the speaker w ill  be led  to recogn ize  the 
f ie ld -dependence of the backing he must seek  for warrants and to d iscover  
what qualifications must be recognized  in the statement of h is  claim . 
These qualifications w il l  depend upon the conditions of exception  or 
rebuttal which may be su ggested  to the inventor o f  arguments a s  he 
recogn izes  the kind of warrant which he em ploys.
If the speaker makes a designative  claim, for exam ple, and u se s  
a cau sa l relationship  for a warrant, a ll  of the t e s t s  of ca u sa l reasoning  
can su g g est  to him p o ss ib le  conditions o f  exception  or rebuttal aga inst  
which he must te s t  h is  argument and which might lead him to qualify  his  
claim . Whether the claim in vo lves  substantive , authoritative, or 
motivational warrants, numerous "tests" of that s p e c if ic  kind of argument 
are ava ilab le  to the speaker to ascerta in  the p o ss ib le  aven u es  o f  rebuttal 
to his c laim .
These "tests" of authority, s ign , generalization , e t c . ,  are
23d isc u s se d  in the Toulmin context in D ecis ion  by Debate and are 
traditionally treated in argumentation texts  under a wide variety  of 
c la s s i f i c a t io n s .  The d iversity  o f  th ese  c la s s i f ic a t io n s  is  confusing and 
does not indicate how the individual argumentative types relate  to the 
process o f  argument a s  a whole a s  can be done with Toulmin's sy stem .  
Argument from ca u se ,  for exam ple, is  often treated as  a type of
23
0 £ .  c l t .  , 1 2 5 - 1 6 2
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24 25deductive reason in g , som etim es a s  a form of Inductive reasoning,
26and o c ca s io n a l ly  a s  something d is t in ct  from either Induction or deduction.
In fac t,  the great advantage of Toulmin's treatment of argument would  
seem  to be that It s u g g e s ts  the e s s e n t ia l  Interrelationship of various  
typ es  and a sp e c ts  o f  argument which have been treated a s  separate and 
s ta t ic  e n t it le s  In the past.
Reservations about the Brockriede
and Ehninger C la ss if ica t io n  ^
The system  proposed by Brockriede and Ehninger for c la ss ify in g  
artis t ic  proofs, su g g ested  to them by the Toulmin model and terminology.
Is ,  a s  has been demonstrated, quite va luab le . There are, however, two 
ob jection s  to It which merit d is c u s s io n .  First, a different Interpretation 
of A ristotle 's  treatment of e t h o s , p a th os , and lo g o s  (or p ls t l s ) would lead  
one to question whether "authoritative" and "motivational" arguments
24
For exam ple, s e e  E. R. N ichols  and Joseph B a c c u s ,
Argumentation and Debating (New York: W W Norton and Co , 1936);
Alan N ich o ls ,  D is c u s s io n  and Debate (New York: Harcourt, Brace and C o . , 
1941); and, James H. McBurney James M. O 'N eil,  and Glen M ills ,  
Argumentation and Debate (New York: Macmillan C o . ,  1951).
25
Two books reflecting  th is  v iew  are: A. Craig Baird, Public 
D is c u ss io n  and D ebate (New York: Ginn and C o . ,  193 7); and Luther 
Courtney and Glenn R. Capp, Practical Debating (New York: J. B. 
Llpplncott and C o . , 1949).
26
This v iew  Is exp ressed  by William T. Foster, Argumentation and 
D ebating (New York: Houghton Mifflin C o . , 1917);and Lionel Crocker, 
Argumentation and Debate (New York: American Book C o . ,  1944).
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should not be c la s s i f i e d  under the heading of logos or p i s t i s . If one
agrees  with Rhys Roberts' summary o f A ristotle 's  treatment of the three
modes o f  persuasion in h is  translation of the Rhetoric, then any kind of
reasoned argument should be c la s s i f ie d  a s  lo co s  or p i s t i s . Roberts
d escr ib es  the three modes of persuasion as; "(1) the speaker's power
of evincing a personal character (l^9oS ) which w il l  make h is  speech
credible; (2) h is  power of stirring the emotions ) of h is  hearers;
(3) h is  power of proving a truth, or apparent truth, by means of per-
27su a s iv e  arguments. "
The interpretation o f Aristotle cited here su g g ests  that any  
argument, by virtue of being an argument, in vo lves  the use of the third 
mode of persuasion ( lo g o s ) . If one identifies  ethos a s  what the speaker  
adds to the total e f fec t  of proof by the credib ility  engendered by his  
image; pathos a s  what the aud ience contributes to proof by its  emotional 
reaction to certain stimuli; and logos  as  that which is  contributed toward 
proof by the fac ts  and reasoning about the subject matter of the speech  
i tse lf;  then there are three identifiable sources of persuasion which can
27
Op. c l t . , 3 ,  A ristotle 's  statement as  translated by Roberts 
w as quoted at the beginning of this major sec t io n . Another translation  
of A ristotle 's  statem ent r e a d s , "The first reside  in the character (ethos) 
of the speaker; the second  c o n s is t  in producing a certain (the right) 
attitude in the hearer; the third appertain to the argument proper, in so 
far as  it actually  or seem in gly  dem onstrates."  The Rhetoric of A ristotle , 
trans. Lane Cooper (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, I n c . ,  1932), 
8 .
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blend into a s ing le  item of proof. If proof is  defined a s  an accom plished
state of mind in the aud ience , rather than con c lu s ive  demonstration,
then each of the three sources could produce proof by i t s e l f  or could
be used together to e s ta b lish  a s se n t  to a proposition.
Of the three sources of persuasion , logos  differs from the other
two in an important resp e c t .  The emotional d isp osit ion  of the audience
and the persuasion inherent in the status of the speaker may be affected
by non-verbal stim uli. That which is  derived from the subject matter of
the speech  is  not. The term logos  in Greek means both "word" and
"reason" or " logic . " As Aristotle put it, logos dea ls  with proof or
2 8apparent proof, "provided by the words of  the speech  i t s e l f ,"
If one a ccep ts  the interpretation that any s ta te m e n t , presented a s  
an argument in the wording of a sp eech , is  l o g o s , then the Brockriede and 
Ehninger c la s s i f ic a t io n  of artistic  proofs according to the Toulmin model 
appears unorthodox . Yet the u se  o f  the "layout of argument" a s  a method 
of analyzing some "authoritative" and "motivational" appeals  can be 
justified  if one v iew s  the e th o s - pathos- logos trinity from the crit ic 's  
frame of reference rather than that of the speaker. In order to ach ieve  
maximum effect  in a sp eech , the speaker often w ill  ch oose  not to place  
the persuasion inherent in his status and the aud ien ce 's  motivations into
2 8
Op .  c U . , 1356 .
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the form of arguments. The crit ic , however, often may find it con ­
venient to place app eals  based  on ethos and pathos into the context  
of argument for eva luation . By doing so ,  the critic  may better account  
for the e ffec t  of proof and make eth ical evaluations about the way in 
which proof w as accom plished .
When the speaker u s e s  authoritative and motivational appeals  
in the form of an argument, such action is  an e x erc ise  o f  logos and he 
may w e ll  u se  the Toulmin model to evaluate h is  own argument. When
ethos and pathos are used by the speaker outside the context of a
2 9reasoned argument, the critic  may profitably u se  the Brockriede-  
Ehninger ex ten sion  of the Toulmin system  to c la s s i f y  and evaluate  such  
a p p e a ls .
The first objection to Brockriede and Ehninger's c la s s i f ic a t io n  of  
artis t ic  proofs by u se  of Toulmin's system  in vo lves  on ly  a difference in 
interpretation of terminology and does not l e s s e n  the utility  of their 
a n a ly s is .  A second objection , however, would su g g est  that their system  
for c la ss ify in g  arguments invo lves  a major departure from Toulmin's 
a n a ly s is  o f  argument. Since the difference between their interpretation  
of Toulmin's system  and that advanced in this study in vo lves  the
29
The term "critic" in this sen se  would apply to the members of the 
audience , an opposing speaker, the speaker h im self, or to anyone who 
would attempt to evaluate  the use of the three sources of persuasion in a 
given sp eech .
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distinction  betw een "warrant-using" or deductive reasoning and "warrant- 
estab lish ing"  or (usually) inductive reasoning, th is  sp e c if ic  criticism  
w ill be developed within the larger context of inductive and deductive  
argument.
Inductive and D eductive Argument
Aristotle contended , and others generally  a ccep t the v iew , that
With regard to the persuasion ach ieved  by proof or apparent proof: 
Just a s  in d ia lec t ic  there i s  induction on the one hand and sy llog ism  
or apparent sy llog ism  on the other, so it is  in rhetoric. The example 
is  an induction, the enthymeme is  a sy llog ism , and the apparent 
enthymeme is  an apparent sy llo g ism . I ca l l  the enthymeme a rhetorical 
sy llo g ism , and the example a rhetorical induction. Every one who 
e ffe c ts  persuasion through proof does in fact use  either enthymemes or 
examples: there is  no other w ay . . . .  When we b a se  the proof of a 
proposition on a number o f similar c a s e s ,  this i s  induction in d ia lec t ic ,  
example in rhetoric; when it i s  shown that, certain propositions being  
true, a further and quite d is t in ct  proposition must a ls o  be true in c o n s e ­
quence, whether invariably or u su a lly , this is  ca lled  sy llog ism  in 
d ia le c t ic ,  enthymeme in rhetoric.
Since the enthymeme is  such an important a sp e c t  of rhetorical proof 
and c lear ly  related to Toulmin's observations about induction and deduction, 
perhaps a brief examination of some contemporary thinking about the place  
of the enthymeme in rhetorical theory might indicate the relevance of 
Toulmin's works to this a sp e c t  o f  rhetorical theory.
The Enthymeme
In 1936, James H McBurney stated that "contemporary thetorical  
theory i s  e s s e n t ia l ly  Aristotelian; the enthymeme is  the focal point in
30 b
Op. c i t . , 1356 .
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the rhetoric of Aristotle; and the enthymeme is  ser iou s ly  misunderstood  
3 1today."  He argued that, whereas most rhetoricians and log ic ian s
regard the enthymeme a s  an e lided  or truncated sy llog ism ,
, . . it is  not the e s s e n t ia l  difference betw een the sy llog ism  and 
the enthymeme a s  originally conceived  and a s  it should be conceived  
tod ay . The real difference is  in the certainty of  the matter and the 
form. The lo g ic a l  sy llog ism  is  built on prem ises which are "materially" 
true . . . .  .ggThe rhetorical sy llog ism  or enthymeme is  built on "probable" 
p r em ises .
More recen tly , Charles S. Mudd complained that most textbooks
in public speaking , argumentation, and persuasion tend to ignore the
enthymeme and a sser ted  that their authors have slighted  the rhetorical
sy llog ism  b e ca u se  of  their accep tan ce  of two propositions which they
fe e l  are not compatible:
1) The value o f the enthymeme a s  a p iece  o f  proof i s  to be tested  
according to the principles o f  formal deductive lo g ic .  The method 
o f  testin g  to be used  is  to apply the rules o f  the sy llo g ism . If 
the enthymeme, i t s e l f  a lo g ica l form, m eets th ese  criteria, it is  to
31
"The Place o f the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory, " Speech  
Monographs. Ill (September, 1936), 50. Edward H. Madden noted a 
similar misunderstanding about the enthymeme among philosophers in 
his artic le  "The Enthymeme: Crossroads o f  Logic, Rhetoric, and 
M etap h ys ics ,"  Philosophical R eview . LXI (July, 1952), 3 6 8 -7 6 .
He c i t e s  sev en teen  different meanings of the concept "enthymeme, " 
takes a v iew  similar to McBurney's that it i s  a kind of truncated sy llogism  
based on probabilities and s ig n s ,  and takes the unusual v iew  that sc ien t if ic  
sy llo g ism s are b ased  on argument from c a u s e s  and that the enthymeme 
cannot be so b a se d .
32
Although th is  v iew  is  expressed  in h is  ar tic le ,  the more cogent  
statement quoted is  from James H. McBurney, James M. O 'N eill ,  and 
Glen E. M ills ,  o £ .  c i t . ,  1 1 9 -20 .
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be considered a valid argument.
2) A ll- in c lu s iv e  or a l l - e x c lu s iv e  ^ i^ e ., universal) statem ents are 
dangerous and should be avoided .
Mudd b e l ie v e s ,  s in ce  modern sc ien ce  and theories  of knowledge
do not permit the b e lie f  in absolute  universal statem ents such as  are
required a s  major prem ises in sy l lo g ism s, that
the solution to the d ifficu lty  seem s to lie  in the rev is ion  of our 
concept of probability. If we base  our arguments on premises 
that are probable universels  rather than particular a b so lu te s ,  we  
avoid d if f icu lt ies  formal valid ity  without v io lating  the requirements 
of material truth,
"This v iew  of probability, which Mudd attributes to Aristotle, is  
quite con s is ten t  with Toulmin's and may be regarded a s  one of the 
characteristics  of the enthymeme. Another characteristic  w as  demon­
strated by Lloyd Bitzer. He fe e ls  that the only e s s e n t ia l  characteristic  
of the enthymeme is  that it i s  based on premises granted by the audience  
whether by agreement to overt statements or by having the audience supply  
a premise which is  only implied by the speaker.
Bitzer arrives at th is conclusion  by analyzing the nature of 
"demonstrative, " "d ia lec tica l,"  and "rhetorical" sy llog ism s:
33
"The Enthymeme and Logical Validity, " Quarterly Tournai of 
Sp eech . XLV (December, 1959), 4 1 0 -1 1 .
^ \ b i d . .  414 .
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"Aristotle's Enthymeme Revlsted, " Quarterly Tournai of Sp eech . 
XLV (December, 1959), 405 .
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(1) Demonstrative sy l lo g ism s  are those  in which prem ises are laid  
down in order to e s ta b lish  sc ien t if ic  con c lu s ion s; (2) D ia lec t ica l  
sy llog ism s are th ose  in which premises are asked  for in order to 
ach ieve  criticism; (3) Rhetorical sy l lo g ism s, or enthymemes, are 
those in which prem ises are asked for in order to a ch iev e  persuasion .
His v iew  helps explain  why Aristotle regarded rhetoric a s  the 
counterpart of d ia lec t ic  and the enthymeme a s  the rhetorical counter­
part of the d ia lec t ica l  sy l lo g ism . As contrasted with the demonstrative  
sy llog ism , in both d ia lec t ic  and rhetoric "the s u c c e s s fu l  building of
arguments depends on cooperative interaction betw een the practitioner 
37and his  hearers. " Instead of using question and answer to ach ieve
interaction a s  in the c a se  of d ia lec t ic ,  "the speaker draws the premises
for h is  proofs from propositions which members of h is  audience would
supply if he were to proceed by question and answer, and the sy llog ism s
3 8produced in th is  way by speaker and audience are enthym em es. "
36
Ibid.
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Ibid. , 407 . For a worthwhile d is c u s s io n  o f the meaning of the 
term "dialectic" and one which supports B itzer's interpretation of Aristotle,  
see  N icola Abbagnano, "Four Kinds of D ia le c t ic ,  " Re v is ita  ^  F i lo so f ia . 
XLIX (April, 1958), 123-33 , reprinted in Philosophy Today. II (Fall,
1958 , 143-49) . See a lso  Charles Perelman and L. O lbrechts-Tyteca,
"The New Rhetoric, " Philosophy Today. I (March, 1957), 5 -6; and 
Cn. Perelman, "How Do We Apply Reason to Values ? " Tournai of 
Philosophy. LII, (December 22, 1955), 799 -8 0 0 .
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Bitzer, o £ .  c i l . ,  408 . For a further d is c u s s io n  of the kinds of 
premises which the speaker may draw from h is  aud ience see  Edward S tee le ,  
"Social V alues, the Enthymeme, and Speech C ritic ism , " Western S p eech . 
XXVI (Spring, 1962), 7 0 -7 5 ,  and Edward Stee le  and W. Charles Redding, 
"The American Value System: Premises for Persuasion, " Western S p eech . 
XXVI (Spring, 1962), 8 3 -9 1 .
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Toulmin on Induction and Deduction
Toulmin's v iew  of induction and deduction is  derived from his
treatment of warrant-using and w arrant-establishing arguments and is
pertinent, a s  is  h is  d is c u s s io n  of probability, to a re-eva lu ation  of
the enthymeme. In order to approach an understanding of his v iew s
on induction and deduction and how they relate to the enthymeme, his
d istinction  betw een  warrant-using and w arrant-establish ing arguments
must be c la r i f ie d .
W arrant-using and Warrant- 
estab lish in g  Arguments
Warrants, it w ill  be remembered, are b r idge-like  statements
which ind icate  the leg itim acy  of the s tep  from data to c la im . Some
warrants authorize c la im s which are "necessary" and others, con c lu s ion s
which may be a sser ted  a s  "probable." In any c a s e ,  however, an
3 9argument cannot take place u n less  some warrant is  a ccep ted .
Toulmin's is  a model for "warrant-using arguments, " a s  both h is  definition
of that term and h is  exam ples of the model in d ica te . Toulmin s ta te s  that
warrant-using arguments
. . .  w i l l  inc lude, among others, a l l  those in which a s in g le  datum 
is  relied on to e s ta b lish  a conclusion  by appeal to some warrant 
w hose  a ccep ta b il ity  is  being taken for granted — exam ples are 
"Harry w as born in Bermuda, so presumably, (people born in the 
c o lo n ie s  being entitled  to British c it izen sh ip ) Harry is  a British
39
A rather deta iled  d isc u ss io n  of the nature of warrants and the 
other e lem ents o f Toulmin's layout may be found in Chapter II.
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c it iz en " , "Jack told a l ie ,  so presumably (lying being generally  
reprehensible) Jack behaved in a reprehensible way", . . .^0
Toulmin's treatment of the term "warrant-establishing arguments"
is  somewhat con fu sin g . The example he g iv e s  is  clear enough:
Warrant estab lish in g  arguments w il l  be . . . such arguments a s  
one might find in a sc ie n t if ic  paper, in which the acceptab ility  
of a novel warrant is  made c lear  by applying it s u c c e s s iv e ly  in 
a number o f c a s e s  in which both "data" and "conclusion" have 
been independently verif ied . In th is  type o^^rgument the warrant, 
not the con c lu s ion  is  n ovel,  and so on tr ia l.
Yet h is  u se  of a sc ie n t if ic  example seem s to imply that a l l  warrants are 
esta b lish ed  in the same way a s  sc ie n t if ic  warrants. This v iew  is  co n ­
s is ten t  with what he has to say  about induction and deduction but is  not, 
a s  w il l  be argued later, c o n s is ten t  with Toulmin's own use  of h is  model 
of argument.
Warrant- using and Warrant- estab lish in g  
Arguments and Induction and Deduction
Toulmin qu estion s  the use  of the term "deduction" in contemporary 
l o g ic .  He fe e ls  that the common u se  of the term is  preferable to that of 
the lo g ic ia n . The log ic ian  equates deduction with arguments "in which  
the data and the backing posit ive ly  enta il the conclusion  — in which, 
that is  to say , to state a l l  the data and backing and yet to deny the 
con c lu s ion  would land one in a p osit ive  in co n s is ten cy  or contradiction."^^
40
U se s  of Argument (Cambridge: University Press, 1958), 120.
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Ibid. Ib id .,  122.
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Yet common u sage  r e f lec ts  the d istinction  he made between warrant-
using and warrant-establishing arguments. "Outside the study the family
of words, 'deduce', 'deductive', and 'deduction', i s  applied to argumetlts
from many fie lds; a l l  that is  required is  that th ese  arguments shall be
warrant-using o n es ,  applying e stab lish ed  warrants to fresh data to
43derive new co n c lu s ion ."  Toulmin g iv e s  severa l examples of the 
non-professional use  of "deduction" and its  cognates and c lar if ie s  the 
point as  follows:
Sherlock Holm es, at any rate, never hesita ted  to say that he 
had deduced, e. g . , that a man w as recently  in East S u ssex  from the 
colour and texture of the fragments o f  s o i l  he le ft  upon the study  
carpet; and in th is  he spoke like a character from real l i f e .  An 
astronomer would sa y , equally  read ily , that he had deduced when 
future e c l ip s e  would occur from the present and past positions of 
the heavenly  bod ies  involved . As Ryle im p lies ,  the meaning of  
the word "deduce" is  e f fe c t iv e ly  the same a s  that of "infer"; so  
that, wherever there are e stab lish ed  warrants or se t  procedures of  
computation by which to p ass  from data to conclus ion , there we may 
properly speak of "deductions''.'^^
A warrant-using argument, then, is  deductive and Toulmin argues
that warrant-establishing arguments, on the other hand, can be v iew ed
as inductive. As in h is  explanation of warrant-establishing arguments,
Toulmin defines  induction by relating it to the field of s c ien ce  only and
thereby implies that a l l  induction is  like sc ien t if ic  induction.
Sir Isaac Newton . . . regularly sp eak s  of "rendering a proposition  
general by induction"; by this he turns out to mean "using our 
observations of regularities and correlations a s  the backing for a
43 44
Ib i d . .  121.  Ibid.
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novel warrant". We beg in , he exp la in s , by estab lish in g  that a 
particular relation holds in a certain number of c a s e s ,  and then, 
"rendering it general by  induction". we continue to apply it  to 
fresh exam ples for so long a s  we can s u c c e s s fu l ly  do so: if  we 
get into trouble a s  a resu lt ,  he sa y s ,  we are to find w ays o f  
rendering the general statem ent "liable to exceptions"  i . e . ,  to 
discover  the sp ec ia l c ircum stances in which the presumptions 
estab lish ed  by the warrant are liab le  to rebuttal. A general 
statement in physica l theory . . . must be construed . . . a s  an 
open warrant or principle of computation; both data and con c lu s ion  
are independently known, then rendered general by induction, and 
finally  applied a s  a rule of deductjpn in fresh s ituations to derive  
novel co n c lu s io n s  from our data.
An Interpretation o f Toulmin's 
View of Induction and Deduction
Toulmin's v iew  on induction and deduction seem s c lea r .
Deductive arguments are those  in which a disputed claim is  esta b lish ed  
by the u se  o f an accepted  warrant which connects  data and c la im .  
Inductive arguments, on the other hand, are th ose  in which a disputed  
warrant is  e stab lish ed  by testin g  it in sample situations where both data 
and conclusion  are independently known.
Yet, although his  treatment of deduction a s  warrant-using is  clear  
and co n s is ten t  with a ll  of h is  u s e s  of h is  model, h is identification  of
45
Ibid. . 1 2 1 -22 . Toulmin's argument here is  very much like h is  
d iscu ss io n  of sc ien t if ic  reasoning described in Chapter II ex cep t  for his  
use  of the terminology he developed in h is  U se s  of Argument. It i s ,  
perhaps, to be expected  that he would illustrate his v ie w s  on induction  
and deduction by exam ples taken from the field in which he has  done most 
of his writing but such a c h o ic e ,  a s  w ill  be noted later, is  unfortunate. 
For a fuller d isc u ss io n  o f inductive reasoning and sc ien t if ic  "discovery, " 
see  Supra 71-73 .
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induction and w arrant-estab lish ing  arguments with the methodology  
of s c ie n c e  leads to ser ious d if f ic u lt ie s .  The warrants used  by Toulmin 
in his exam ples of the use o f  h is  model could not be e s ta b lish ed  by  
repeated s u c c e s s fu l  app lication  to accepted  data and claim: "A man 
born in Bermuda w ill  be a British subject, " "A Swede can be taken  
alm ost certain ly  not to be a Roman C atholic , " "A w hale w il l  be a 
mammal, " e t c .  These warrants are not derived in the w ay that warrants 
in the ph ysica l s c ie n c e s  are . A Swede w il l  not be a Roman C atho lic ,  
b ecau se  the data from a c en su s  makes it u n lik e ly . A Bermudan w il l  be 
a Briton b eca u se  of the various a c ts  of Parliament. A whale w ill  be a 
mammal b eca u se  of an agreed-upon method of taxonomical c la s s i f ic a t io n ,  
e t c . Warrants are fie ld  -dependent and are esta b lish ed  by fie ld -dependent  
criter ia .
Warrants need not be e s ta b lish ed  by the inductive methods of 
sc ie n c e ,  nor need they  be esta b lish ed  by any kind of induction . "A man 
w ill  be presumed innocent until proved guilty" is  an accep tab le  warrant 
and a fundamental rule of law in th is country, but not In France. This 
warrant is  not the resu lt  of induction but o f  so c ia l  c h o ic e .
In addition, a warrant may be supported (or estab lish ed ) deductively  
by a warrant-using argument. "Jones, " one may argue, "has not yet been  
convicted  of a crime: so he should not be ca lled  a k il ler ."  Here, one 
may rely on the warrant that a man shall be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty and introduce backing from legal authorities who say  that th is  is  the
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la w , If the warrant i s  rejected in spite of the backing, one may 
claim that a man should be presumed to be innocent by appeal to data 
which e s ta b l is h e s  that innocent men cannot a lw ays prove their innocence  
by using a warrant which s ta te s  the preference for a guilty  man to e sca p e  
rather than for an innocent man to suffer.
Perhaps the d ifficu lty  in interpreting Toulmin on warrant-establishm ent  
and induction is  due in part to h is  use  of sc ie n t if ic  exam ples in such a way  
a s  to imply that the example is the ru le . Yet there is  another important 
source of misunderstanding. Toulmin u se s  the term "warrant-establishing"  
to refer both to the backing which leads an audience or opponent to accep t  
a warrant and to the ultimate method of estab lish in g  a warrant to the s a t i s ­
faction o f the experts within a particular f ie ld .
The v iew  upheld in th is study is  that w arrant-establishm ent is  
both fie ld -dependent and aud ien ce-d ep en d en t. It i s  fie ld -dependent in 
that authorities in a f ie ld  w il l  e s ta b lish  the criteria for warrants in that 
f ie ld .  It is  aud ien ce-d ep en dent in that the s e le c t io n  o f backing is  
determined by the requirements of audience accep ta b il ity .  A lay  audience  
may a ccep t  the warrant that light may be presumed to travel in a straight 
line if one can c ite  s c ie n t i s t s  who say that this is  so .  An audience of  
s c ie n t is t s  may a ccep t  the warrant only  if the idea is  demonstrated to be 
usefu l in explaining phenomena over a wide range of c ircum stances in a 
way which accounts for a l l  e x cep t io n s .  In either instance  the warrant 
is  the sam e.
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Toulmin's model for argument is  deductive or warrant-uslng and 
a llow s for the resu lts  of pertinent induction in the sp a ces  reserved for 
backing, qualifiers, and conditions of accep tan ce  or rebuttal. All 
these  elem ents in an argument are fie ld -d ep en d en t. For as  Toulmin 
states: "Only once one is  c lear about the kind of problem involved in 
any ca se  can one determine what warrants, backing, and criteria of 
n e c e s s i ty  or p o ss ib il ity  are relevant to th is  case."'*^
Application of Toulmin's System  
to Rhetorical Deduction
The enthymeme or rhetorical deduction is  based  on probability, 
depends upon the audience to supply m issing  prem ises, and otherwise  
is  to be cr it ic ized  by criteria app licable  to the formal sy llo g ism . Because  
Toulmin's model is  a method of cr it ic iz in g  deductive arguments , depends  
upon audience accep tab ility , is  designed  for arguments based  on probable 
universal statem ents, and avoids  many o f the objection s to the use  of the 
sy l lo g is t ic  paradigm his  system  may w e ll  be superior to the s y l lo g is t ic  
model for evaluating enthym em es. If one v iew s  the enthymeme a s  a 
rhetorical deduction rather than a rhetorical sy llog ism , he can evaluate it 
in terms of data, warrant, cla im , qualifier, rebuttal, and backing and need  
not imply absolute  statem ents nor distributed middle terms. An enthymeme 
is  a common form of argument using common language and addressed to
46
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popular a u d ien ces .  It can probably better be a s s e s s e d  a g a in st  the 
paradigm which Toulmin derived from an a n a ly s is  of everyday argument 
than against the s ta tic  and abso lu te  standards of the sy llo g ism .
The enthymeme takes the form that it d oes  b ecau se  popular 
aud ien ces  cannot follow  chains  of sy l lo g is t ic  reasoning and b eca u se
47
the audience can, in many c a s e s ,  supply m issing parts of an argument. 
The enthymeme, a s  a rhetorical deduction, must be in a persu asive  form 
when introduced in the context of a speech  s ituation , and Toulmin's model 
certainly would not be a persuasive  form in which to c a s t  arguments for 
an aud ien ce . His model i s ,  however, an e x c e l le n t  one a ga in st  w hich to 
judge an enthymeme and for a n a ly s is  from which to form enthym em es.
For Toulmin recogn izes  that warrants must be accepted  before argument 
can take place and that a warrant, if very generally  a ccep ted , need not be
made exp lic it  in an argument. The role of lo g ic  i s  a "retrospective,
48justificatory one" and if the advocate  w ill  submit h is  c la im , during the 
preparation of the sp eech , to the detailed  layout of argument provided 
by Toulmin, he w ill not only  have a good idea of the va lid ity  of h is  
argument but a lso  may d iscover  what e lem ents in the layout he must or 
should make ex p lic it  to his aud ience and what e lem ents he can depend  
upon the audience to supply.
47 .
Aristotle, o £ .  e f t . ,  1356^ -1356°.
40
Toulmin ,  _op. c i t . ,  6 .
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If, for exam ple, an advocate  fe lt  that he should advance the claim  
that the threat of v^ar with Russia is  not a s  great as  in the recent past,  
he could simply connect th is  claim to data about the te s t  ban agreement, 
removal of troops from Cuba, and conciliatory statem ents by Khrushchev 
and rely upon the aud ience to provide a warrant which would make the 
movement from data to claim  a c cep ta b le .  If he did so and w ished  to 
lay  out the argument according to the Toulmin model to check its  va lid ity ,  
he would begin with something like;
The te s t  ban agreem ent. The threat of
removal of troops from war with Russia
Cuba, and c o n c i l ia to r y ____________________^ ^  is  not as  great
statements from Khrushchev ' a s  in the recent
indicate Since past
Conciliatory statem ents ,  
a c t io n s ,  and agreem ents  
are s igns of a reduction  
of warlike in ten t io n s .
The very act of specify ing  the warrant which the audience would supply
might e a s i ly  su g g est  to the advocate the n e c e s s i ty  of qualifying h is  claim
and openly admitting conditions of acceptance  or rebuttal. He might find
advisab le  including a modal qualifier like "probably" or "possibly" and
admitting, for exam ple, that a l l  of the s ign s  of peaceful intent might be a
screen for some new a g g r ess iv e  ac tion . Whether the advocate c h o o ses
to use the model or after its  use s t i l l  w ish e s  to advance an unqualified
claim w il l ,  in part, be a matter of h is  own eth ica l c h o ic e ,  and the critic
who would later judge h is  argument may be interested in this eth ica l
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d e c is io n ,  For the Toulmin model is  a useful way o f crit ic iz ing  an 
enthymeme whether one em ploys it  in the criticism  of h is own or someone  
e l s e ' s  arguments.
Application of Toulmin's System  
To Rhetorical Induction
All of Toulmin's exam ples o f the use  of h is  layout of argument
have been  deductive or warrant-using, and the earlier d is c u s s io n  o f his
v iew s on induction has indicated that he offers no sp ec ia l system  for
inductive argument. In fact, he recogn izes  that warrants which are
supported inductively  must be e stab lish ed  according to the accepted
inductive methods of some particular f ie ld .  For this reason he d oes  not
d isc u ss  argument from exam ple, w hich, along w th the enthymeme,
co n stitu tes  the tota lity  of lo g ica l proofs in Aristotle 's  sy stem . Although
Brockriede and Ehninger's ex tension  of the use  of the Toulmin model
provides a usefu l way of laying out inductive arguments, their use  of
general warrants rather than fie ld -dependent ones is  a departure from
49Toulmin's paradigm. Toulmin seem s to fee l  that s in ce  the criteria
49
This study is  not concerned with the d e ta ils  of the adaptation  
by others of the Toulmin model to rhetoric except as  they clarify  the 
relationship  betw een Toulmin's v iew s  and rhetorical theory in a direct 
manner. Brockriede and Ehninger's i s  an extension  of Toulmin's 
system  and a llow s  for general warrants such a s  "What is  true of the 
sample is  probably true of the majority of members in th is  c l a s s ,  " and 
"Since in e s se n t ia l  r esp ec ts  State B is  similar to State A. " D e c is io n  by 
D eb ate , op . c i t . ,  135 and 139.
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for induction are fie ld -dependent, no general layout of criteria would
be helpfu l. If so , one must study the standards of the fie ld  in question
in order to evaluate  the resu lts  of induction. For, as  Toulmin put it,
"all the canons for the criticism  and a s se s s m e n t  of arguments, I
conclude, are in practice fie ld -dependent, w hile  a l l  our terms of
a s se ssm e n t  are f ie ld -invariant in their force.
Data, warrant, backing, criteria for the use  of modal qualifiers,
and conditions o f  exception  or rebuttal a ll  are derived from some
particular field with its  own s e t  of inductive procedures, and, it may
w ell be argued, the claim  is  e stab lished  only in the context of the
field from which it w as generated. One may be a b le ,  for example, to
support a claim that plan X should be rejected on economic grounds but
51
that does  not mean that it should be rejected per s e .  One might be
50
U se s  of Argument, o p . c i t . . 38.
51
Although the fie ld  from which the parts of an argument must come 
is  usually  c lear , one may not recognize that a particular claim is  applicable  
only in a fie ld -dependent s e n s e .  For this reason one might profitably amend 
the Toulmin system  to indicate the f ie ld -dependence  of c laim s by inserting  
a parenthetical statement concerning the field of app licability  of the claim  
between the qualifier and the c laim . For exam ple, one might argue: (data) 
Program X would lead to d e fic it  spending; so (warrant) s in ce  d efic it  spending 
is  usually  unwise; presumably ( ^ a n  economic s e n s e ) , program X would be 
un w ise . Such an addition to Toulmin's layout would be co n s is ten t  with his  
d iscu ss io n  of backing for warrants: " . . .  the kind of backing we must 
point to if we are to e s ta b lish  its  authority w ill  change greatly a s  we move 
from one field of argument to another. 'A whale w ill  be ( i . e .  is  c la s s i f ia b le  
as) a mammal'; 'A Bermudan w ill be (in the e y es  of the law) a Briton', 'A 
Saudi Arabian w il l  be (found to be) a Muslim' - -  words in parentheses  
indicate what th ese  d ifferences are."  U ses  of Argument, o p . c i t . . 104.
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able to support a claim from the field of e th ic s  that would outweigh  
the pertinent economic con s id era t ion s .
Toulmin's d is t in ct io n s  betw een  the force and criteria for the 
use  o f modal terms, h is  notions of fie ld -d ep en d en ce  and fie ld -in var ian ce ,  
and his d istin ction  betw een  induction and deduction are important to th ose  
who would invent argum ents. If a warrant and its  backing must come from 
the field of econ om ics, for exam ple, statem ents from authorities in the 
f ie ld s  of religion or education would not appear to be of  much value in 
that argument. Further, if  a s ta t is t ic a l  statement a s se r t s  a degree of  
probability, one should be aware o f the criteria which a llow  one to make 
such statem ents . Each fie ld  has its  own criteria for the u se  of modal 
terms and for what co n st itu te s  a "fact. " The "fact" that there are X 
number of low income fam ilies  in Chicago depends on a definition of the 
term and the use of techniques in accumulating data; the "fact" that light 
travels in straight l in es  is  an accep ted  sc ien t if ic  way of v iew ing ph ysica l  
phenomena; the "fact" that a whale i s  a mammal is  a matter of taxonomical 
c la s s i f ic a t io n .  In evaluating ev id en ce  both of fact and opinion, the 
inventor or critic of arguments is  aided by determining the fie ld  from which  
that ev idence  must com e. Toulmin's system  makes apparent the f ie ld -  
dependent nature of arguments and d irects  one to the co n c lu s io n s  and 
methodology o f  a g iven f ie ld  for the materials from which arguments must 
proceed.
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Ethics and Rhetoric 
Aristotle regarded rhetoric a s  amoral. As a faculty  for discovering  
the ava ilab le  means of persuasion , i t  w ill  be used a like  for good or 
e v i l .  Of the princip les  o f  rhetoric, he sa id , "A man can confer the 
greatest o f  benefits  by a right u se  o f  th ese ,  and in f lic t  the greatest  of
52
injuries by using them wrongly. "
Although rhetoric, a s  method, is  amoral, its  study is  an e th ica lly
justifiab le  on e , however, "because things that are true and things that
are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their o p p o s ite s ,  so  that
if  the d e c is io n s  of judges are not what they ought to b e ,  the defeat
must be due to the speakers th em se lv e s ,  and they must be blamed  
53accordingly ."  Further, s in ce  rhetoric i s  particularly w e l l  adapted to 
popular a u d ien ce s ,  truth and ju st ice  can be made to prevail by the 
presentation of both s id e s  of any question by speakers using  the ava ilab le  
means o f persuasion . For if both s id e s  of a controversy are presented  
with equal rhetorical s k i l l ,  the natural advantage of truth w ill  assure  
victory for the cau se  of  ju s t ic e .  Good men, therefore, should become, 
sk illed  in the u se  of rhetoric so that they may communicate the good to 
popular au d ien ces  and be able  to overcome the arguments o f  th ose  in 
error. D ia le c t ic  a lone w ill  not assu re  victory, but mastery of a l l  the 
a va ilab le  means of persuasion w ill if ,  a s  Aristotle a s su m e s ,  truth
c i t . , 1 3 5 5 b.  ^^Ibid.  . 1355®.
- 1 6 0 -
and ju stice  have an inherent advantage over their o p p o s ite s .
Aristotle d o es  not specify  that the use of any particular rhetorical
d ev ice  is  uneth ica l, He does  not propose any eth ica l standards for
rhetoric. He id en tif ie s  the eth ical problem in rhetoric with the moral
54purpose of the speaker.
Although the attempt to estab lish  some sort of eth ical standard 
for rhetorical practice is  a worthwhile one and many authors have pro­
posed such standards, Toulmin's v iew s are only  very indirectly concerned  
with such efforts . His philosophical observations are, however, directly  
concerned with how one may properly argue about e th ica l v a lu e s .
Ethical Standards and Rhetorical Invention  
One may very w ell  d isagree with Toulmin's theory that the moral 
code of a so c ie ty  is  something of its  own making and s t i l l  agree with him 
on how one may reason about eth ical qu estion s.^ ^  For whether the moral 
standards of a s o c ie ty  are regarded a s  a matter of so c ia l  conven ience ,  
a s  d iv ine ly  ordained, or a s  a c lo se  approximation of some "absolute
54
A recent textbook in the fie ld  of rhetoric which r e lie s  almost  
e x c lu s iv e ly  on the resu lts  of experimental stud ies  in communication takes  
the same position and a s se r ts  that it is  commonly accep ted . "It is  
pertinent to note that most d isc u ss io n s  o f  the e th ic s  of persuasion are 
e s s e n t ia l ly  elaborations of Aristotle 's  v iew  that 'soph istica l d ia le c t ic ,  
or sop h is t ica l speaking, is  made so , not by the faculty , but by the moral 
purpose.'"  Jon E isenson , J. J. Auer, and John Irwin, The Psychology  
of Communication (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963), 296.
55
Supra. Chapter II, 8 0 -8 1 .
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standard" v/hich man must try to apprehend through his  in te l le c t ,  one
may argue about individual and group behavior in accordance with the
moral code of a g iven s o c i e t y . Y e t  a valid criticism  of Toulmin's
position is  that such a moral code i s  d ifficu lt to identify . For, a s
John Rawls argues,
. . . Toulmin speaks of there being moral rules to which appeal  
can be made to ju stify  sp e c if ic  a c t s .  He seem s to think o f th ese  
as a d efin ite ly  known, and publicly ascerta inab le  se t  of rules to 
which e x p lic it  reference is  constantly  being made. But the only  
rules Toulmin mentions are the rule that promises should be kept and 
the rule that one should drive on the left-hand (right-hand) side of  
the r o a d .57
This cr it ic ism , although important, ap p lies  to a ll  attempts to argue 
about moral q u es t io n s .  Toulmin may have le ft  the fa ls e  im pression that 
the moral code o f a community is  e a sy  to identify , but his v iew  of reasoning
about eth ica l questions is  valuable insofar a s  one can identify  commonly
5 8held moral v a lu e s .
56
A c lo s e ly  related v iew  which would apply to the eth ica l standards 
by which a sp e tch  or speaker should be evaluated is  presented by Edward 
Rogge, "Evaluating the Ethics of a Speaker in a Dem ocracy, " Quarterly 
Tournai of S p ee c h . XLV (December, 1959), 4 1 9 -2 5 .
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Review of An Examination of the Place o f  Reason in E th ics , 
Philosophical R eview . LX (October, 1951), 576 .
58
One might a ls o  regard "commonly held moral values"  a s  psycho log ica l  
facts  about the attitudes and opinions of an au d ien ce . If so ,  the following  
a n a ly s is  of e th ica l reasoning would sti l l  be pertinent, but one might ch oose  
to ca ll th ese  arguments "motivational" rather than "eth ical."  The v iew  held  
in this study is  that such attitudes and opinions are a reflection of the moral 
code of a community and that the d istinction  between th ese  and other motives  
is  a useful on e .
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Although Toulmin gave  no exam ples of the u se  o f  h is  model for 
dealing with eth ica l arguments, he often referred to e th ica l warrants 
and indicated that the model could be used for e th ica l  a s  w e l l  a s  other 
kinds of arguments. One may phrase h is  a n a ly s is  o f  the typ es o f  
eth ica l questions in the terminology o f h is  layout o f  argument a s  
fo llows:
1. In "simple moral questions"  one need only  u se  a part of the 
moral code a s  a warrant to reason from data to c la im .
2 . In "conflicts of duty" an accep ted  moral warrant i s  qualified  
to recognize  another moral rule which serv es  a s  a condition  o f  
rebuttal or counter-warrant.
3 .  In qu estion s  of the "justice o f  so c ia l  practices"  the b a s ic  
e th ica l assum ption of "not inflicting  avoidable  suffering" becom es  
the warrant.
Rhetoric i s  ch a racter is t ica lly  concerned with the ch o ic e  o f  a lternative  
cou rses  of ac tion , and, a s  a co n seq u en ce , with the c h o ic e  o f  moral v a lu e s .  
By recognizing the kinds of moral question  involved  and laying i t  out 
according to the Toulmin m odel, one should be aided in preparing and 
evaluating moral arguments.
Warrants, it w ill  be remembered, are f ie ld -d ep en d en t ,  and whatever  
backing must be presented w il l  be both f ie ld -d ep en d en t and a u d ien ce -  
dependent. An argument which would take the form of a "simple moral
5 9
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question" for a sp e c if ic  audience  might be regarded by a crit ic  or another 
audience a s  Involving a "conflict of duty." A "simple moral question"  
for an audience which would a ccep t  the warrant without reservations  
might take the following form:
The law  requires C it iz e n s  should
integration of the ____________________  ^ So, support the integration
public sch o o ls  ' of public sch oo ls
C it iz e n s  have a moral 
r esp o n s ib il ity  to uphold 
the law
A cr it ic ,  on the other hand, might w ish  to recogn ize  a qualification  
to the warrant which would make the argument a "conflict of duty. One 
might lay out such an argument a s  fo llow s:
The law requires C it iz e n s  should
integration of t h e _____________________  v so ,  pres.unably, support the
public sch o o ls  ' ' integration of the
‘ ' p-'blic sch oo ls
C it iz e n s  have a moral U n le ss
resp o n sib il ity  to uphold '
the law  One has a moral duty
to r e s is t  a repugnant 
(or unconstitutional) law
A very important point to recognize  is  that a particular audience
may accep t as a "simple moral question" what another aud ience may regard
60
The crit ica l audience might a lso  refuse to accep t the data, 
rejecting the Supreme Court d ec is io n  a s  "the law , " and, if so ,  reasoned  
argument could not take p lace in Toulmin's view u n le s s  the data v/ere to be 
supported by another argument in which the valid ity of the law w as made 
the claim . In th is ,  and later exam ples , only those a s p e c t s  of the layout 
of argument which illustrate  the matter under d isc u ss io n  will be presented .
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as  a "conflict of duty. " This fact can be further illustrated if one
changes the data and claim  and retains the warrant, qualifier, and
conditions o f  exception  or rebuttal from the previous example a s  follows:
State law  requires C it izen s  should
segregation o f public _____________________v so , presumably, support the
accommodations ' segregation of
' public accom -
Sihce modations
C it iz e n s  have a moral U n le ss
resp on sib il ity  to uphold '
the law One has a moral
duty to r e s is t  a 
repugnant (or 
unconstitutional) law
An advocate may present and an audience may accep t a number of
arguments which take the form of "simple moral q u estion s, " but the critic®^
w ill  find very few moral arguments which cannot or should not b% viewed
a s  involving at l e a s t  a potential "conflict of duty. "
The use  o f  accep ted  moral standards a s  warrants in "simple moral
questions" may lead to a valid  and unqualified claim such as:
Jones deliberate ly  _____________ SOj________________ v Jones should die
murdered Smith ' for the murder
Since
A man who commits murder 
deserves  to die
61
The cr it ic ,  it must be remembered, can be the advocate h im self,  
an opponent, a crit ica l au d ien ce , or anyone who see k s  to te s t  the valid ity  
of c laim s which are stated  or implied.
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In such c a s e s ,  if one w is h e s  to challenge the claim , he must do so by 
rejecting the warrant. For example:
The death penalty The death
for murder c a u ses   ________________ SOj________________ ^  penalty should
n ee d le ss  suffering ' be abolished
Since
One (or a society) should  
not in flict n e e d le ss  suffering
This type of attack on a previously accep ted  part of the moral code
of a community Toulmin refers to as  questions of the "justice of so c ia l
p r a c t ic e s . " This type of argument differs from the "conflict of duty"
argument in that the former would reject a so c ia l  warrant per s e , whereas
the latter admits the valid ity  of the warrant but su g g ests  that another
socia l warrant which co n fl ic ts  v/ith it is  a lso  valid .
In addition to pointing out the three kinds o f moral questions
d isc u sse d  above, Toulmin's work on e th ics  a lso  introduced the useful
notion of "limiting q u estio n s .  " He holds that any particular fie ld  of
inquiry rests  upon certain assum ptions from which log ica l con clu s ion s
can be drawn but which are not subject to lo g ica l support by other argu-
Ô 2rnents from within that fie ld . When such assum ptions are used as  
warrants and are not accep ted  by the aud ience, they may have to be 
maintained a s  claim s :o be supported by data and warrants from other
62
Supra , 8 7 - 8 y ,
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f i e l d s .  For e x a n i p le ,  in the  f o l l o w i n g  argument:,
J o n e s  is  a q u a l i f i e d  ________________So ,  v J o n e s  m u s t  be
Negro a p p l i c a n t  ' a d m it t e d  to
' c o l l e g e
S in c e
A q u a l i f i e d  a p p l i c a n t  m ust  
be  ad m it t ed  to c o l l e g e
On a c c o u n t  o f
The f o l l o w i n g  l e g a l  
p r o v i s i o n s
If the a u d i e n c e  w e r e  to r e j e c t  the  warrant  b e c a u s e  t h e y  f e l t  the  l a w  sh ou ld
not  b e  o b e y e d ,  there c o u l d  be  no further a p p e a l  w i t h in  the f i e l d  o f  l a w .
IF one r e j e c t s  the fundam enta l  l e g a l  a s s u m p t i o n  that  l a w s  m ust  be  o b e y e d ,
r . r g u ' n e n t  c a n  p r o c e e d  o n l y  i f o n e  t r i e s  to v a l i d a t e  t h i s  a s s u m p t i o n  b y
argum ents  from another  f i e l d .  If th i s  were  d o n e  w i th  the  p r e v io u s  e x a m p l e ,
one  might s h i f t  to the f i e l d  o f  e t h i c s  and end v/ ith an  argum en t  w h i c h  m ak e s
c le a r  that  the d.’f t e r e n c e  o f  o p i n i o n  d o e s  not  i n v o l v e  an  i n te r p r e ta t io n  o f  l a w
hut a c o n f l i c t  among e t h i c a l  v a l u e s .  In f a c t ,  the e x a m p l e  o f  " c o n f l i c t  of
duty" c i t e d  earl i er  wo .Id s e r v e  to i l l u s t r a t e  the form that  s u c h  an e t h i c a l
argument wou ld  'ake  if o n e  e n c o u n t e r e d  a "l imit ing  q u e s t io n "  in law:
The l a w  r e q u ire s  a d m i s s i o n  All  q u a l i f i e d
of  al l  q u a l i f i e d  s t u d e n t s  to  _____________   S o ,  p r e s u m a b ly  s t u d e n t s  should
r o l i e g e  ' ' b e  adm it ted  to
S in c e  U n l e s s  c o l l e g e
C ' U z e n s  ha v e  a moral One h a s  a moral
l e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to duty to r e s i s t
onoy  the lav/  r epugnant  (or
U - . c o n s t i tu t io n a l )  l a w s
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Toulmin's v iew s on "simple moral q u est io n s ,  " "conflicts of  
duty, " "the ju st ice  o f  so c ia l  p ra c tices ,  " and "limiting questions" can  
be of value to the rhetorical cr it ic ,  b eca u se  rhetoric i s  character is tica lly  
concerned with rational ch o ice  among a lternatives  o f  b e l ie f  and action .  
C h o ices  w ill  n e c e s s i ta te  reasoning about moral v a lu e s ,  whether one  
is  speaking on an e th ica l  question  or led to recogn ize  the importance 
o f  e th ica l standards a s  one encounters "limiting questions"  in p o l i t ic s ,  
law , or some other f ie ld .
Ethics and E ffec tiven ess  
Rhetoricians, at le a s t  s in ce  the time o f  Plato and A ristotle , have  
been concerned with the d iscovery  o f  the ava ilab le  means of persuasion  
and with the e f fe c t  of persuasion on s o c ie ty .  All have recognized  that 
the techniques o f  rhetoric can be used  for good and i l l  and that persuasion  
can be affected  in a manner contrary to the accep ted  moral code o f  a 
community. Today, a s  the methodology of the empirical s c ie n c e s  is  
being employed by the rhetorician to determine with precision  the 
e ffe c t iv e n e s s  of a l l  kinds o f  lo g ica l and n o n -lo g ica l  a p p ea ls ,  the 
evaluation of rhetorical e f fe c t iv e n e s s  is  becoming a s c ie n c e .  In
63
Experimental s tu d ies  from the f ie ld s  of s o c ia l  psycho logy ,  
advertis ing , "motivational research, " and sp eech  have demonstrated  
s ta t is t ic a l ly  the superiority some speech  techniques have over others.
All qu estion s o f  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  are not a matter o f " sc ien tif ic  fact" and the 
resu lts  of a number of s tud ies  seem contradictory, but research techniques  
are ava ilab le  which make sc ien t if ic  in vestigation  of rhetorical e f fe c t iv e n e s s
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tirne, the r h e to r i c ia n  may no lon ge r  n e e d  to s p e c u l a t e  a b o u t  w h at  kind o f  
a p p e a l s  are  m o s t  e f f e c t i v e  in a s p e e c h ;  he  may know t h i s  for a f a c t .
Take s e v e r a l  h y p o t h e t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n s  w h i c h ,  in f a c t ,  may be  
true.  S u p p o s e  that  a s t a t e m e n t  from a n  u n q u a l i f i e d  but  popular source  
c an  b e  proved to b e  more e f f e c t i v e  than o n e  from a q u a l i f i e d  author i ty .  
S u p p o s e  that  a s p e e c h  b u i l t  upon a s s e r t i o n s  i s  more e f f e c t i v e  than o n e  
w h ic h  i n c l u d e s  a per t in e n t  f a c t u a l  b a s i s  for a rgum en t .  S u p p o s e ,  in 
g e n e r a l ,  that  no a d v a n t a g e ,  in e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  c o u l d  b e  de m on str a ted  
from lear n in g  t e c h n i q u e s  o f  r e s e a r c h  a nd  the l o g i c a l  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  
i d e a s .  If t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  did p r e v a i l ,  the t e a c h e r  o f  rhe tor ic  w ou ld  
probably s t i l l  t e a c h  h i s  s t u d e n t s  to e m p lo y  the b e s t  m eth od s  o f  r e s e a r c h  
a v a i l a b l e  and to u s e  the m o s t  l o g i c a l l y  d e f e n s i b l e  ar gu m en ts  a s  a matter  
not  o f  e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  but  o f  e t h i c s .
F ac tua l  a c c u r a c y ,  h o n e s t y ,  and l o g i c a l  r e a s o n i n g  in p ub l ic  sp e a k in g  
are a part of  the moral  c o d e  o f  our s o c i e t y .  T h e s e  m oral ly  approved  
q u a l i t i e s  o f  publ ic  s p e a k i n g  ha v e  not  b e e n  d e m o n s tr a t e d  e m p ir i c a l ly  to 
he  more e f f e c t i v e  than their  o p p o s i t e s ,  and i t  may b e  that  t h e y  are  not .
Yet ,  a s  a matter o f  e t h i c s ,  many r h e to r i c ia n s  w o u ld  a rgue  that  t h e s e  
q u a l i t i e s  s h o u l d  be  ta u g h t ,  no t  under the g u i s e  of e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  but  a s  
the e t h i c a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  the a d v o c a t e .  The s t u d e n t  o f  rhetor ic
p o s s i b l e  and e v e n t u a l l y  may make p e r s u a s i o n  more o f  a s c i e n c e  than an 
ar t ,  M any  of  the k inds  o f  s t u d i e s  m en t ioned  here are d i s c u s s e d  by  
F i s e n s o n ,  Auer, and I r w in , o p .  c i t . ,  27 1-32  7.
- 1 6 9 -
s h o u ld  be  taught  to d i s c o v e r  a i l  the a v a i l a b l e  m e a n s  of  p e r s u a s i o n  and  
how  to u s e  them i f ,  a s  A r i s to t l e  b e l i e v e d ,  truth and  j u s t i c e  are  to 
preva i l  over  their  o p p o s i t e s ,  but  he s h o u ld  a l s o  b e  taught  to  a t t e n d  
to matters  o f  f a c t  and l o g i c  a s  an  e t h i c a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,
Toulmin i s  no t  c o n c e r n e d  w i th  the e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  r h e to r ic  nor,  
for that  matter,  w i th  rhe tor ic  a t  a l l  a s  he u n d e r s t a n d s  the term. H is  
s y s t e m  i s  c o n c e r n e d  o n l y  w i th  the r a t ion a l  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  argum en ts ;  
but the r a t ion a l  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  a r g u m en ts  i s  a m o s t  important c o n c e r n  
o f  rhe tor ic ,  i f  not  a s  a matter o f  e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  a t  l e a s t  a s  a matter o f  
e t h i c s .
H i s  s y s t e m ,  i f  f o l l o w e d  b y  the  a d v o c a t e , c a n  be  e t h i c a l l y  
a d v a n t a g e o u s  for.
1. Tt h e l p s  id e n t i f y  a f i e l d  o f  inquiry  where  per t inent  data  and  
warrants  m u s t  be  found if  a c la im  i s  to be  s upp orted .
2 .  It h e l p s  the  a d v o c a t e  s e e  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  the  r e s u l t s  
o l  proper i n d u c t io n  and the p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  d e d u c t i v e  a r g u m e n t s .
3.  It e n c o u r a g e s  the r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  the probab i l i ty  b a s i s  of  
argument  and  d i s c o u r a g e s  a t t e m p ts  to f ind c a t e g o r i c a l  and a b s o l u t e  
p r e m i s e s  w h er e  s u c h  may n o t  e x i s t .
C o n c l u s i o n s
The purpose  o f  th is  s tu d y  h a s  b e e n  to s u g g e s t  that  the r e c e n t  
r e - e v a l u a t i o n  o f  the nature and  purpose  o f  p h i l o s o p h y  w h ic h  c u lm in a t e d  
in L in g u i s t i c  or Fun ct iona l  A n a l y s i s  w ou ld  be  important to the r h e to r i c ia n ,  
b e c a u s e  p h i l o s o p h y  and rhetoric, share  a common i n t e r e s t  in l o g i c  and
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e t h i c s .  To a c c o m p l i s h  t h i s  p u r p o s e ,  the  w or k s  o f  a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
o f  t h i s  group,  S tephen  T ou lm in ,  h a v e  b e e n  e x a m i n e d  bo th  to de ter m in e  
the v a l u e  of  h i s  w or k s  to r h e to r i c  and to i n d i c a t e  the  p o s s i b l e  r e l e v a n c e  
o f  L i n g u i s t i c  or F u n c t io n a l  A n a l y s i s  a s  a w h o l e  to r h e t o r i c a l  t h e o r y .
If the  c o n c l u s i o n s  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  are v a l i d ,  T o u lm in ' s  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
w r i t i n g s  are p e r t inent  to  r h e to r i c  and are s u g g e s t i v e  o f  the g e n e r a l  V ' l u e  
o f  F u n ct io n a l  A n a l y s i s  to the  r h e t o r i c i a n .  T ou lm in ' s  v i e w s  h a v e  b e e n  
r e la t e d  to the f i e l d  o f  rhe tor ic  in the  f o l l o w i n g  w a y s ;
1. The nature a n d  purpose  o f  rhetor ic  —  Al though Toulmin d o e s  
not  u n d ers tand  the nature  and purpose  o f  rhe tor ic  in i t s  c l a s s i c a l  s e n s e  
and ig n o r e s  A r i s t o t l e ' s  a n a l y s i s  o f  common ar gu m en t ,  h i s  t rea tm e n t  o f  
both l o g i c  and e t h i c s  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  the t ra d i t io n a l  v i e w .
2 . The s o u r c e s  o f  p e r s u a s i o n  - -  T ou lm in 's  i s  a u s e f u l  w a y  o f  
regard ing  the l o g o s  e m p l o y e d  by  a s p e a k e r  and the  B rockr ied e  and  
Ehninger e x t e n s i o n  o f  T o u lm in ' s  s y s t e m  p r o v i d e s  a m ethod b y  m e a n s  o f  
v.’h ich  the c r i t i c  may c l a s s i f y  and c r i t i c i z e  a l l  k in d s  o f  a r t i s t i c  p r o o f s .
3 .  Indu ct ion  and d e d u c t i o n  - -  Toulmin i d e n t i f i e s  d e d u c t io n  wi th  
w a r r a n t - u s i n g  a r g u m en ts  and in d u c t io n  w i t h  w a r r a n t - e s t a b l i s h i n g  
a t g u m e n t s  (not a l l  v / a r r a n t - e s t a b l i s h i n g  a r g u m e n t s ,  h o w e v e r ,  are i n d u c t i v e . )  
H is  m odel  o f  the l a y o u t  o f  argum ent  w a s  d e s i g n e d  for w a r r a n t - u s i n g  
(d e d u c t iv e )  a rgum en ts  a n d ,  a s  s u c h ,  i s  a more u s e f u l  w a y  o f  c r i t i c i z i n g  
e n t h y m e m e s  than by  e m p lo y i n g  the c o n v e n t i o n a l  s y l l o g i s t i c  c r i t e r i a .
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He o f fe r s  no s y s t e m  for a n a l y s i s  o f  r h e to r i c a l  in d u c t io n  b u t . h i s  treatment  
o f  the f i e l d - d e p e n d e n t  nature o f  argument  f o c u s e s  a t t e n t io n  on the  c r i t i c a l  
s ta n d a r d s  o f  part icular  f i e l d s  for proper i n d u c t iv e  t e c h n i q u e s .  A l s o ,  b y  
the u s e  o f  the Brockr ied e  and  Ehninger e x t e n s i o n  o f  h i s  s y s t e m ,  many  
k in d s  o f  i n d u c t iv e  ar gu m en ts  c a n  b e  l a id  o u t  for a n a l y s i s  after the  pattern  
o f  Toulmin m o d e l .
4 .  E t h ic s  and  rhetor ic  - -  Rhetor ic  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  c o n c e r n e d  
w ith  the r a t i o n a l  c h o i c e  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  o f  t h o u g h t  and a c t i o n ,  and  s uch  
c h o i c e s  o f t e n  i n v o l v e  e t h i c a l  d e c i s i o n s .  T o u lm in ' s  m od e l  and h i s  
a n a l y s i s  o f  the p l a c e  o f  r e a s o n  in e t h i c s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  h i s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
o f  the  three k i n d s  o f  e t h i c a l  q u e s t i o n s  and h i s  n o t io n  o f  " l im it ing  q u e s t i o n s ,  " 
c a n  be  o f  v a l u e  to the  r h e to r i c ia n  a s  he  c l a r i f i e s  the nature o f  s u c h  e t h i c a l  
d e c i s i o n s .  H is  t rea tm ent  o f  l o g i c  and  e t h i c s  c a n n o t  b e  sh o w n  to l e a d  to 
more e f f e c t i v e  p e r s u a s i o n  than other  s im i lar  w a y s  o f  v i e w i n g  both  f i e l d s ,  
nor do t h e y  i n d i c a t e  that  a n y  part icu lar r h e t o r i c a l  d e v i c e s  are u n e t h i c a l .
If,  h o w e v e r ,  o n e  b e l i e v e s  that  f a c t u a l  a c c u r a c y  and v a l id  r e a s o n i n g  are  
an e t h i c a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  the a d v o c a t e ,  he  may c o n c l u d e  that  Tou lm in 's  
co n t r ib u t io n s  are important  a s  a matter o f  e t h i c s ,  i f not  a s  a matter o f  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s .
The branch o f  p h i l o s o p h y  repres - . .Led  b y  S te p h e n  Toulmin s e e m s  
e s p e c i a l l y  w e l l  a d a p t e d  to r h e to r i c .  It s  e m p h a s i s  on common l a n g u a g e  and  
common r e a s o n i n g  and i t s  c o n c e r n  wi th  e t h i c a l  pr ob le m s  r e la te  i t  c l o s e l y  
to the major c o n c e r n s  o f  rhe tor ic  and w o u ld  s e e m  to Jus t i fy  further r h e to r i c a l  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
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